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Chapter 1
Introduction
Ray Jureidini and Said Fares Hassan
A principle concern of the authors in this collection of papers is how Islamic 
ethical and legal traditions can contribute to current global debates on the di-
lemmas of migration and displacement. Can the Muslim tradition provide an 
alternative international moral and legal paradigm where others have proven 
inadequate? Abou El Fadl, in this volume, argues that the Muslim tradition is 
replete with “powerful virtuous ethical impulses that could make substantive 
contributions to the field of forced migrants and displacement.” The ethics of 
muʾākhā (brotherhood), ḍiyāfa (hospitality), ijāra (providing protection and 
support), amān (providing safety), jiwār (neighborliness), sutra (protection, 
esp. in case of marriage), kafala (to guarantee someone) among others, may 
provide common ethical grounds with other religious traditions, moral phi-
losophies and social customs that can go beyond the technical applications 
and procedural standards of international law. The argument that these moral 
principles or “ethical potentialities and trajectories” are only entitled to fellow 
Muslims and not applicable to non-Muslims, contradicts the general historical 
trajectories and normative understanding in Islam. These ethics, according to 
the authors of this volume, are inclusive and not context-specific. They present 
“a normative imperative for Muslims that would apply whenever there is an 
obligation to escape oppression or injustice,” and represent “purposeful con-
struction of social and political virtues” (Abou El Fadl, Chapter One). 
Unfortunately, post-colonial Muslim scholars have been more occupied 
with the apologetic discourse of either reinterpreting classical concepts (such 
as the division of the world into dār al-Islām and dār al-ḥarb) to relate to the 
political conceptualization of contemporary nation states, or proving an es-
sential compatibility and reconcilability between Islamic theology and inter-
national law. The better task is to turn the moral imperatives inherited from 
the Islamic tradition into significant theological and ethical engagements with 
modern discourses on human rights and dignity.
This volume provides scholarly attempts to achieve this task by reviewing 
questions of migration, residence, naturalisation and citizenship from multi-
sided perspectives, thus more broadly defining the Islamic tradition to cover 
not only theology but to also encompass ethics, customs and social norms, as 
well as modern political, humanitarian and rights discourses.
© Ray Jureidini and Said Fares Hassan, 2020 | doi:10.1163/9789004417342_002
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC-BY-NC 4.0 License.
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1 Movement/Migration 
The movement of people—individuals, families, tribes and entire communi-
ties—has shaped and transformed the history of humankind. Groups of peo-
ple have migrated for many reasons: economic, religious, political, as well as 
for education and cultural exchange. Masses have also migrated to escape con-
flict, persecution, natural disaster and harsh living conditions. The scholarly 
field of migration studies has been developing for over a century, primarily in 
the English speaking West in both colonial and post-colonial contexts, but pri-
marily within established social science disciplines such as Sociology, Anthro-
pology, Politics and Demography, but also in Labour Economics, Industrial 
Relations and International Relations. Migration studies also include forced 
migration and refugee studies with a proliferation of university departments 
and research centers in the last few decades teaching and researching migra-
tion issues—but rarely, perhaps never, from an Islamic ethical and juridical 
perspective.
This is a curious phenomenon since a large proportion of global migration 
and refugee movements are related to Muslim-majority states—as origin, tran-
sit and destination countries (Castles et al. 2014). For example, as of 2015, the 
majority (65%) of the 21.3 million refugees worldwide were Muslim (including 
5.2 million Palestinian refugees). Almost 40 per cent of the 65.3 million classi-
fied as forcibly displaced (that includes internally displaced persons), were 
hosted in the Middle East and North Africa. Excluding Palestinians, around 54 
per cent of registered refugees were from 3 Muslim countries—Syria (4.9 mill), 
Afghanistan (2.7 mill) and Somalia (1.1 mill) (UNHCR 2015). As of June 2016, 
most Syrian refugees were being hosted by the neighbouring countries of Tur-
key (2.8 million), Lebanon (1.02 million), Jordan (655,000), and Iraq (230,000). 
Around 900,000 Syrians filed asylum claims in Europe, while resettlement 
countries have taken relatively few—USA (18,000), Canada (40,000), Australia 
(12,000) (Migration Policy Centre, 2016). The GCC states (excluding Oman) 
have admitted around 620,000 Syrians since 2011, although there are claims of 
having taken more. The GCC countries do not, however, classify them as “refu-
gees,” partly because they are not signatories to the 1951 UN Refugee Conven-
tion (see De Bel Air 2015; Jureidini and Reda 2017).
In the same way that it has shaped many communities across the globe, 
migration also shaped the history of Islam from its very beginnings. Indeed, 
the question of the legality of Muslims residing in a non-Muslim state was the 
first of the “juridical” problems facing Muslim minorities. 
Hijra in the Islamic tradition has been seen as the starting point of Muslim 
civilization and set the foundations for an Islamic society. It was one of the 
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defining elements that revolutionized the conception of unity among the na-
scent Islamic community, not only among the Meccan supporters of Prophet 
Muhammad, later known as “the migrants” (al-muhājirūn), but also between 
them and the hosting community in Medina, later known as “the helpers” 
( al-anṣār). Unity meant solidarity between the muhajirun and the anṣār. Thus, 
Islamic teachings associated with hijra have contributed to the ethical princi-
ples relating to the treatment of foreign or migrant communities. It is seen as 
“a source of ethical norms and social behaviour” associated with brotherhood, 
economic cooperation, protection and social integration. 
In modern Arabic hijra also means “migration” in a general sense. In Islamic 
jurisprudence it has a specific meaning, namely, the duty to migrate from a sur-
rounding of unbelief towards a society where Islamic rules are prevalent, fol-
lowing the example of the Prophet and his Companions, who migrated from 
infidel, polytheistic Mecca towards Yathrib which, with the support of the 
anṣār, was to become the City of the Prophet, the basis of the historical body 
politic of Islam. So we see hijra, before anything else, being discussed by reli-
gious scholars as a religious principle to be performed as a duty under certain 
conditions. Throughout Islamic legal history, a doctrine of hijra was estab-
lished, not only questioning the movement of people but also investigating the 
movement of converts, traders, and preachers.
More recently, Muslim political groups have referred to hijra in other ways. 
To give just a few examples: (1) in opposition to colonial rule; (2) those leaving 
Russia and the Balkan states in the 1800s; (3) Indian Muslims moving from 
British-controlled India to Afghanistan in the 1920s; (4) Muslims emigrating 
from India to the newly created state of Pakistan. These follow a pattern in that 
they all discuss whether Muslims were obliged to leave areas ruled by “infidels” 
(Muslims in medieval Christian Spain, colonialized areas, Russia and the Bal-
kans, India towards Afghanistan or India towards Pakistan, etc.) and if so, un-
der what conditions. These discussions were very closely related to issues of 
jihad. 
In addition, post-World War II Muslim migration to Europe was of great 
historical importance, as it formed the basis of a fundamental change of con-
cepts in Islamic normative thought. It developed what became known as a 
reverse hijra, that is, an unprecedented number of Muslims emigrating vol-
untarily from Muslim lands to non-Muslim countries. After the Second World 
War, with the introduction of the United Nations and the formation of Muslim 
minority communities in Western Europe, Muslim political, legal and religious 
scholars reached a new interpretation of the peaceful relations between the 
Muslim and non-Muslim world, rejecting the traditional dichotomy of dār al-
Islām (abode or land of Islam) and dār al-Kufr (abode or land of disbelief) 
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as anachronistic. This paved the way for an Islamic acceptance for residence, 
naturalisation and citizenship of Muslims in non-Muslim nation states under 
certain conditions (such as freedom of religion). 
This acceptance became the basis for a new branch of Islamic Law that was 
developed in the 1990s and 2000s, namely fiqh al-aqalliyyāt. In less than two 
decades, fiqh al-aqalliyyāt shifted the legal discourse from fiqh al-hijra to fiqh 
al-muwāṭana, the Islamic law of citizenship. However, this does not mean that 
citizenship, nationality and integration of more than 15 million Muslims in the 
European Union was accepted by Muslim scholars overall. There are still cer-
tain countries, circles and traditions where this is rejected and where Europe 
continues to be seen as part of dār al-Kufr. The process of re-interpretation of 
Islamic thought concerning this vital political issue has not yet been complet-
ed. These circles normally allowed Muslim residence in other parts of the 
world for specific, temporary reasons, but not for the purpose of settling (Ra-
madan 1999; Aldeeb Abu-Sahlieh 1996). 
2 Settlement/Citizenship 
Normative ethico-legal discussions include rights in contemporary Islamic 
ethical thought, including, but not exclusive to, fatwas on migration and refu-
gees. This requires critical, analytical and comparative analyses of the norma-
tive ethical frameworks in both Muslim countries and the West. Early 
discussions of citizenship and naturalisation largely began in the late Ottoman 
period around issues of conversion to Islam as a precondition for citizenship. 
A stream of fatwas and debates followed on naturalisation and nationality dur-
ing the colonial era (especially in North Africa).
Islamic discourse around migration and settlement, along with idealiza-
tions of a generalized Islamic community has, however, been historically “bur-
dened” by the jurisprudence around the dichotomy of dār al‐Islām and dār 
al‐ḥarb. This has prevented the development of a deeper understanding of 
contemporary citizenship within nation states that did not exist during early 
Islamic history and the foundational texts of the Qurʾan and Hadith. From the 
late Ottoman period, the nation-state has been seen, by those who define the 
ummah as the body politic of all Muslims, as oppositional to or contradicting 
the conceptualization of a universal Muslim community. Thus, many contem-
porary questions can be raised as to the application of normative Muslim prin-
ciples to current practices—such as non-Muslim rights in Islamic states or the 
naturalisation of Muslims in non-Muslim states. 
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In the Gulf States, citizenship rights are based on Jus sanguinis, or the right 
of blood; that is, citizenship is granted to offspring if one or both parents are 
citizens. However, gender issues arise where personal status laws do not give 
the right for women to confer citizenship to their children or husbands. This is 
distinguished from the right of citizenship for a person born in a particular 
country (Jus soli, right of soil). 
The above issues are addressed by the various chapters in this book that 
makes for a multidimensional and multidisciplinary set of conceptualizations 
and empirical research.
3 Background to the Book 
The chapters in this book were first presented over three days at an internal 
seminar, 28–30 January 2018. The seminar was entitled “Migration and Islamic 
Ethics: Issues of Residence, Naturalisation and Citizenship” and was held at 
the Center for Islamic Legislation and Ethics (CILE) in the College of Islamic 
Studies at Hamad Bin Khalifa University, Doha, Qatar.
We sought scholarly papers that would explore multi-dimensional ap-
proaches to Islamic ethics as applied to various forms of inward and outward 
migration, in both contemporary contexts and historically, whether forced or 
voluntary, and how issues of citizenship, integration and assimilation are/were 
viewed from an Islamic perspective.
Studies on migration usually takes two directions. One direction is to focus 
on a geographical region (e.g. Eastern Europe, the Middle East, etc.), analyzing 
migration patterns, causes and effects that such migration may have on the 
(re)structure of territories and demographies, and socio-economic and politi-
cal organization of the region. A second direction is to go thematic with a spe-
cific methodological approach, adopting social science theories or relying 
generally on a humanitarian orientation, or method. Both directions yield 
qualitative and quantitative results on their own. However, bringing both di-
rections together in one volume and even going beyond them may reveal other 
ways of thinking about the phenomenon of migration in a Muslim world. If 
these other ways of thinking are taken into consideration, we will be better 
informed of the phenomenon, not only in terms of who, why and what hap-
pened, and not only in terms of numbers, locations, time and space, but also 
we can have a perspective on the moral, ethical, emotional and religious fac-
tors at play. For example, studying a phenomenon like the impact of the prac-
tice of kafala (chapter 6) on migration movement from this perspective reveals 
that it is not only about economic control of the labour migrants or about 
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humanitarian exploitation, but also ethical (e.g. Islamic contractual moral as-
sumptions like that of sound intention) and religious factors (e.g. fatwa issu-
ance) can have an impact on the application of the practice and real life 
situations.
As editors, we could have asked our contributors to confine their chapters to 
certain themes or to adopt certain methodological frameworks, but we did not 
opt to do this. We did not want to provide a regular-analytical text that could 
have been produced elsewhere. Our objective is to show the over-complexity 
of the subject matter, and that it cannot be studied only by counting numbers, 
or providing statistics, or drafting laws, but as every subject dealing with hu-
mans, a comprehensive multi-layer perspective and interdisciplinary approach 
are needed. Such an approach may result in better understanding of the sub-
ject under investigation, provide informative analysis, and lead to better work-
able solutions.
We understand that this approach may result in a volume that seems to lack 
a unified thinking paradigm, but a closer look will not only reveal the intercon-
nectedness of the chapters but also opens new venues of thinking about the 
subject among researchers in the field. One anonymous reviewer of the manu-
script’s original draft noted that the book chapters “collectively, are original to 
the extent that the new conditions of rapid and uncontrolled migration origi-
nating in Muslim countries allowed the contributors to see old events in a new 
light and state a case that a new condition has developed that requires an Is-
lamic ethics of migration, aside from a global one.” 
4 Chapters in the Book
The chapters are loosely divided into three themes; the first, addressing theori-
zations and conceptualizations using contemporary examples, mainly in the 
treatment of asylum-seekers, refugees and other forcibly displaced; the sec-
ond, containing empirical analyses of contemporary case studies; and third, 
historical accounts of Muslim migratory experiences.
After this introductory chapter, the book begins with the chapter by Khaled 
Abou El Fadl, distinguished professor of Law at the University of California Los 
Angeles School of Law. We could not have wanted more for an opening chapter 
to this book than Professor Abou El Fadl’s powerful and eloquent overview of 
Islamic ethics, human rights and migration. He uses the idea of “Islamic moral 
impulses” as a means for addressing migration and forced displacement issues. 
These moral impulses are comprised of concepts of counter-istiḍʿāf, counter-
ing oppression and powerlessness (between Muslims themselves and with 
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“the other”) through mobility and accessibility; as well as the ethics of muʾākhā 
(brotherhood), ḍiyāfa (hospitality), and ijāra (asylum). The chapter touches on 
almost all of the issues focused upon in the subsequent chapters, without hav-
ing been privy to their content—from classic Islamic scholars of the text to 
contemporary critiques of the sorry state of affairs in global migration and 
refugee movements, particularly in relation to Muslim migrants and refugees 
and the responses or lack of responses from the more powerful and affluent 
states. In a most encouraging passage for further pursuit, Abou El Fadl states: 
The values of brotherhood and hospitality provide fascinating normative 
precedents that could have been developed by contemporary Muslims 
into a significant inspirational ideation or an aspirational moral direc-
tion. Hospitality and brotherhood, added to migration as a normative 
response to a state of powerlessness; all of that, plus the ethic of mobility 
as an essential component of human dignity, is a promising ethical bag-
gage that could be seen as trajectories that could be employed in the pur-
poseful construction of social and political virtues.
In the third chapter, Abbas Barzegar looks at the Muslim practice and dis-
course of humanitarianism in relation to refugees. He refers to a “theologically 
informed universal humanitarianism” that he identifies as a “living fiqh,” in-
voked by Muslim communities that transcends or overcomes “religious sec-
tarianism, ethno-nationalism and political ideology” that burden contemporary 
migration crises. Along with the living fiqh is Muslim custom (ʿUrf ) in relation 
to humanitarian principles and aid. The author provides illuminating exam-
ples from his study of Syrian refugees in Turkey in a reflective ethnography of 
both Turkish and Syrian aid workers, or humanitarian activists. 
He asserts that living ʿurf practices go beyond the limitations of textual jus-
tification set forth by experts and academics. In these social spaces of interac-
tion and encounter among people, practical theology brings in new precepts 
that may be further explored for potential ethical developments. These pro-
vide much needed concrete examples of cooperative ethics and practical solu-
tions to pressing problems faced by the victims of forced displacement and the 
resultant impact on questions concerning the place of Islam and Muslims in 
the contemporary world.
In chapter four, Tahir Zaman looks closely at Muslim brotherhood and hos-
pitality by drawing upon his ethnographies of the lived realities of refugees 
(Palestinian, Syrian, Sudanese, and Iraqi) in countries of asylum, particularly 
Turkey and Syria (before 2011). He takes the traditional notion of jiwār, or 
neighbourliness, in an understanding of the care and protection of others that 
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transcends the nation state in the sense of independence from state gover-
nance over asylum-seekers and with the idea of “self-settlement.” In the neigh-
bourhood, “the open-ended possibility of everyday mundane social interactions 
that take place in parochial spaces generates an ethos that invites the stranger.” 
The Turkish state, it is argued, expresses good intentions but this political in-
tention remains ambiguous and ambivalent in actual everyday life.
Zaman provides an example of how a tradition maintains its ongoing rele-
vancy to the present world through negotiation, adaptation and accommoda-
tion. This discursive power allows successive generations to find meanings for 
themselves. The ethical jiwār principle creates a space of acceptability, acces-
sibility, and conviviality, not only to the neighbor next-door, but also generally 
to the fellow-refugee in need. This example stresses again the internal mecha-
nism of the Islamic tradition to recall its ethical and moral properties and re-
late them to living practices of people that push against individualization, 
self-interest and state-interest principles dominating political and philosophi-
cal discourses. 
In chapter five, Dina Taha provides a sometimes heart-rending account of 
Syrian refugee widows with children in Egypt who seek and are sought by 
Egyptian men to marry under the principle of Sutra, or “protection marriage.” 
Using three case studies, the author far from presents the women as hapless 
victims, but provides them with agency by identifying quite different experi-
ences, motivations and actions that take place. Invoking the idea of a Muslim 
“jurisprudential culture,” the analysis of the three case studies is viewed from 
both feminist and post-colonial perspectives. The examples also provide evi-
dence of how moral virtues can be manipulated and exploited for personal 
gain.
Chapter six, by Ray Jureidini and Said F. Hassan, takes a more innovative 
evaluation of the infamous kafala system of migrant labour management in 
the Gulf States. They canvas the traditional historical applications of kafala as 
an Islamic trusteeship mechanism whereby a person acts as a guarantor (kafīl), 
taking responsibility for someone else (makfūl)—whether a stranger, an or-
phan, a debtor or someone who must attend court or a business meeting. From 
the mid-twentieth century, this system was applied to the management and 
control of the increasingly large foreign workforce required to develop these 
countries following the sudden riches that flowed from oil and gas production. 
The chapter concludes that the human rights and Islamic ethics violations that 
have received much critical publicity over the past decade has not been so 
much a function of the kafala per se, but the lack of compliance to the tradi-
tional principles. A key example is given regarding the fundamental principle 
that a kafīl (guarantor) should not receive any remuneration or profit in that 
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role and that this principle has been sustained as evidenced by fatwas, laws 
and prosecutions.
In chapter seven, Sari Hanafi conducts a content analysis of 74 recent aca-
demic articles in Arabic, English and French dealing with the question of mi-
gration and religion in the context of Muslim immigrant communities. 
Intriguingly, he starts his investigation by positing the controversial questions 
on the nature of knowledge production of social studies: is it universalistic (i.e. 
hard core science) or normative (i.e. having morals and conscience)? Where 
does the social scientist stand? He argues for a dual approach where social 
scientists, at least in migration studies, combine a Weberian ethic of convic-
tion (defined as liberal, multiculturalist with a neo-enlightenment framework) 
and an ethic of responsibility. Hanafi aims in this chapter, as well as in his oth-
er publications, to establish collaboration between social science and religious 
ethics where each can be informed by the other. Social scientists combine eth-
ics of conviction and ethics of responsibility, while Islamic ethicists would pro-
vide what would be a constant and primordial in Islam that should be taken 
into account in this normative moment. These different ethics will enter into 
tension that should be resolved through dialog, mutual learning and beyond a 
mere legalism or rationalism.
With this conviction, Hanafi examined his collection of articles to prove 
that a great deal of researchers in social science who deal with migration issues 
constitute an epistemic community that negotiates both ethics of conviction 
and responsibility while not necessarily being in conflict with Islamic ethics. 
By that he means they do not reject revelation, nor do they make mention of it. 
This resulted in a paradigmatic shift in the policies of migration: from a para-
digm that forces migrants into assimilation/integration into another country 
to a paradigm that acknowledges the migrants’ lived experiences, their diver-
sity, and the role of religion in their day-to-day lives.
Chapter eight, by Radhika Kanchana, switches focus from legal and social 
responses to the questions of migration to Muslim state policies of naturalisa-
tion. The objective here is to investigate contemporary Muslim states’ practice 
(18 states) in terms of how “open” is the gate of citizenship to the outsider, 
considering the impact of Islamic doctrine, existing international norms and 
contemporary practice. Studying these practices reveals that there is a general 
similarity in naturalisation provisions toward resident foreigners. Most Muslim 
states are inclined to the Jus sanguinis practice, but they do not take a uniform 
path. This, however, indicates political considerations in the discrimination or 
strategy, rather than a rigid formula inspired from religion. 
Focusing more on the Arab-Gulf nations’ citizenship policies, Kanchana 
notes the discrepancy between the legal text on the conditions of granting 
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naturalisation and the application in practice. She argues that the policies in-
volve ambiguous provisions, a matter that gives authorities the space to apply 
them in an instrumental way. To what extent the legal text is Islamic and to 
what extent the application is ethical are questions that are raised in this de-
bate and still require more in depth investigation. 
Chapter nine, by Rebecca Ruth Gould, touches upon one of the basic fea-
tures of living traditions in Islam—the internal ability to de-and-re-construct 
meanings and concepts to accommodate with various historical, political and 
social settings. We see in this chapter an example of “how certain concepts 
now regarded as foundational to Islam were revived in modernity after having 
undergone centuries of relative marginalization.” Gould takes us on a journey 
through space and time, demonstrating how the event of the hijra of the 
Prophet Muḥammad in 623–3 AD had turned from an historical moment into 
a religious doctrine that changed people’s world view and the perception of 
their role in their communities and in the larger society of the umma. 
Gould examines the hijra narrative in the context of the people of the Cau-
cuses, explaining how it shaped the local histories and formed the diasporic 
identities of Caucasian Muslims forced out of their homes in the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries. Hijra served as 
a reminder that “salvation lay in going forth for heroic ventures,” and as a 
response to persecution, hijra increasingly became a discourse on the 
condition of being Muslim in a non-Muslim world, and a commentary on 
the extent to which the Islamic community (umma) could be spatially 
imagined and materially mapped.
The intriguing phenomenon in this context is that “hijra doctrine” is not estab-
lished only through the legal theological narrative but it became part of the 
literary and cultural history in the Caucasus. The hijra literature is found in 
novels, poetry, autobiography and other literary forms—in official languages 
and in the vernacular. In the last part of the chapter, Gould turns to a couple of 
historical novels from the twentieth century to provide readers with another 
perspective on how the hijra story is being acted out repeatedly.
In chapter ten, Mettursun Beydulla informs us about a different hijra experi-
ence—the Chinese Xinjiang Uyghur Muslim hijra to Turkey and the United 
States. Based on field work and more than 200 interviews conducted between 
2013 and 2017 with diasporan Uyghurs in Istanbul, Ankara, and Kayseri in Tur-
key as well as Washington, New York and Boston in the US, Beydulla demon-
strates modes, causes and effects of this forced migration experience. It is a 
comprehensive treatment focusing upon theological, legal, social and political 
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dimensions not only of the immigrants themselves, but also of both the home-
land and host countries.
A particularly salient point in the author’s analysis is that the Uyghur refu-
gees’ relationships with Turkey and the US can be analyzed within a context of 
Turkish and US multiculturalism. This implies on the one hand as democracy 
and tolerance and, on the other hand, exclusion, inferiorization and “other-
ness.” Regardless of their formal status, Uyghurs in the US, and to some degree 
in Turkey, are considered as “other” and are thereby subject to unfair treat-
ment, being ignored, ridiculed or treated differently. They are not viewed or 
treated as equals socially or culturally, hence, there is a gap between formal 
and “substantive” citizenship. As for the relationship of the Uyghur migrant 
community with their origins, the author’s fieldwork showed that they have 
maintained intense social and emotional bonds to their homeland in Xinjiang.
Chapter eleven, by Abdul Jaleel P.K.M., concludes the volume by reminding 
us that scholars in the field of migration, especially those studying Muslim mi-
gration experiences, should go beyond simple generalizations and taken-for-
granted assumptions such as the argument that the process of “naturalisation” 
of immigrant Muslims in modern nation states should be understood from 
within the Islamic legal parameters drawn by Muslim scholars in the heart-
lands of Islam. Conversely, the peripheral context, as in the case of Arab im-
migrants to the Indian Ocean, can provide a better understanding of the 
process of naturalisation in non-Muslim lands. In other words, the author ar-
gues that the legal-ethical demarcations of habitats by classical Muslim schol-
ars into dār al-Islām and dār al-ḥarb were mostly de-contextualized general 
assertions that did not correspond to the real experiences of naturalisation 
that Islam and Muslims have experienced in these countries.
To prove his case, Abdul Jaleel P.K.M. provides a comparative review of his-
torical and legal critical texts (Ibn Ḥajar’s al-Fatāwā al-Kubra, al-Maʿbarī’s 
Tuḥfat al-Mujāhidīn, al-Makhdūm al-Ṣaghīr’s Fatḥ al-Mubīn) from both 
spheres, the heartland (Mecca and Cairo) and the periphery (Malabar). Such a 
comparative analysis raises the important question of what to focus upon 
while studying Islam and Muslims as an historical phenomenon. Should it be 
textual traditions or human practices, the integration of both as part of a dis-
cursive tradition, or as a hermeneutical engagement with the Pre-Text, Text 
and Con-text?
The answer to this question reveals itself in different places in this collec-
tion. To explore Islamic Ethics in the context of migration, one needs to engage 
not only the legal texts or the moral principles, but also the philosophical as-
sumptions, the historical experience and the social setting. It is a multi-layer 
process that should engage all these elements together to produce a better un-
derstanding of migration.
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The uniqueness of this book is threefold. First, the authors combine theo-
retical, legal and philosophical perspectives to the sociological and anthro-
pological approaches that provide grounded, real-life observational analyses 
to the empirical sites of their subject matter. Second, common to most contri-
butions is the tension between Western thinking paradigms about immigra-
tion and the Muslim tradition. There was reference to the plight of Muslims 
trying to manage with Western thinking paradigms of post-colonialism and 
their need to look inside to their own tradition that provides healthier alter-
natives to the problems of migration and displacement. In all chapters, the 
analyses draw upon the rich scholarship of Islamic ethics that provide a di-
mension to migration studies that has not been addressed previously. Third, 
the selection of papers provides a broad geographical coverage with case stud-
ies from many corners of the Muslim world, and addressing many specific ac-
tors—men, women, religious leaders, political authorities, non-governmental 
organizations, social and humanitarian activists.
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Chapter 2
Islamic Ethics, Human Rights and Migration
Khaled Abou El Fadl
I will begin by addressing the issue of migration first from a Muslim perspec-
tive. I will then comment about the international law that governs issues of 
migration, and then come back to what might be termed, “Islamic moral im-
pulses”—what in my view is a tradition that could be developed, but which so 
far, has not. 
1 Normative Impulses 
Perhaps a good starting point would be the Qurʾanic verse in Surat al-Isrāʾ (The 
Night’s Journey) stating that “God dignified human beings and has facilitated 
to them mobility on earth and the seas, and bestowed bounties upon them and 
distinguished human beings over much of God’s other creations (or crea-
tures).” (Q. 17:70). I have always been struck by the discourse of this verse: the 
idea that mobility and travel—i.e. the ability to traverse earth and sea, and 
mobility and access in the form of travel—is perhaps a constituent element in 
human dignity; and in fact, that the denial of mobility detracts from our dig-
nity as human beings. Mobility implies freedom, and in this context, the 
Qurʾanic discourse can be understood to refer to the freedom to enjoy what 
God has created and made available to human beings. If human beings are 
denied the freedom of mobility, does this diminish human dignity? Note that 
it is not necessarily the actual movement that is necessary for human dignity 
but the freedom to do so. What is deprecating to dignity is the inability or more 
precisely, the denial of freedom of movement.
Added to the Qurʾanic narrative found in Surat al-Isrāʾ is the discourse of 
 Surat al-Nisāʾ (The Women), one that easily lends itself to the issue of migra-
tion. In Surat al-Nisāʾ, the Qurʾan addresses those for whom the angels come to 
arrest their souls and are found in a state of inequity. Then, we have this intrigu-
ing inquiry from the Heavens asking what had prevented them from migrat-
ing? The Qurʾan rhetorically asks those who are in a state of inequity—literally, 
“ẓālimī anfusihim,” which means “those who are unjust towards themselves”—
“Wasn’t God’s earth vast and expansive enough for you to migrate?” (Q. 4:97). 
Critically, according to the Qurʾanic discourse, these individuals exist in a state 
of inequity, and their excuse for living in a state of injustice is that they are 
oppressed. The reason that these individuals live in a state of oppression is 
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that they are powerless. This condition of powerlessness is what Qurʾanic com-
mentators refer to as a state of “istiḍʿāf ”—a state of oppressive injustice due to 
disempowerment. But per the Qurʾanic discourse, the way to address this state 
of oppressive injustice and powerlessness is through migration. 
Reading the Qurʾanic verses in  Surat al-Isrāʾ together with Surat al-Nisāʾ, 
there is a rather fascinating conjunction and a point of normative meeting 
between the idea of an earth that has been bestowed and granted to human 
beings in general, and the notion that mobility and travel is an essential or 
constituent element of human dignity. Oppression is a state in which one is 
powerless to enjoy the bounties (niʿam) of God’s creation. A human being is 
entitled to dignity as a right bestowed by God upon creation, but this dignity 
is not simply theoretical or abstract; it has a concrete and material essence, or 
one can say, it is quintessentially deontological in meaning. The dignity of hu-
man beings is intimately interconnected with the opportunity to enjoy God’s 
bounties and the freedom of movement and mobility. Accepting or acquiesc-
ing in oppression is iniquitous; it is as if passive acceptance of oppression leads 
one to be unjust towards oneself. Existing in such a state of injustice is mor-
ally unacceptable, and importantly, freedom of movement is necessary for the 
right to dignity and perhaps for a virtuous existence. Of course, the Qurʾanic 
narrative goes on to state that men, women, and children who are truly weak 
and oppressed, and therefore, without any real means for escaping persecu-
tion are deserving of God’s pardon because they are not blameworthy (Q. 4:98). 
Before proceeding further, we should note that when it comes to the verses 
about migration in Surat al-Nisāʾ, a number of Qurʾanic commentators con-
cluded that this revelation was intended to address a particular set of histori-
cal events. Some Muslims who had converted at the time of the Prophet in 
Mecca had failed to join the Prophet and his followers in migrating to Medina. 
As a result, some of these converts to Islam ended up fighting on the side of 
the Meccan idolaters against fellow Muslims in the Battle of Badr. The revela-
tion in Surat al-Nisāʾ was intended to blame those who placed themselves in 
the deplorable situation of having to fight on the side of idolaters against fel-
low Muslims by failing to migrate. If the Qurʾanic discourse on migration is 
wedded to this specific historical circumstance, or in other words, if we read 
these verses as addressing those who converted to Islam but failed to join the 
Prophet in Medina and as a result, ended up joining the Battle of Badr on the 
wrong side; then these verses are substantially emptied of their normative 
content because they were intended to address an historical contingency that 
has already come to pass. But as a number of Qurʾanic commentators have 
noted, even if the occasion for revelation was a specific historical event, by the 
terms of its own phrasing, the Qurʾanic discourse on migration remains nor-
matively pertinent. The Qurʾanic narrative on migration is stated broadly and 
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generally, and therefore, seems to be in a form that is non-contextual and to 
create a normative imperative for Muslims that would apply whenever there is 
an obligation to escape oppression or injustice (al-Rāzī 1990, 10–13; Quṭb 2007, 
744–6).
We should note here that the issue of hijra or migration as a normative obli-
gation in Islamic theology and law is complex and layered. Many jurists insist-
ed that there is a permanent and lasting obligation upon every Muslim to 
migrate from the abode of unbelievers (dār al-kufr) to the abode of Islam (dār 
al-Islām). Accordingly, any sojourn to the abode of unbelievers must be tempo-
rary and wedded to a specific purpose. However, some reports attributed to the 
Prophet assert that the obligation to migrate was abrogated upon the defeat of 
Mecca and its entry into the Islamic fold (lā hijrata baʿda al-fatḥ) (al-Hanbali 
1996, 114). In other words, according to this genre of hadith, migration was a 
temporary obligation that expired upon the defeat of the Meccans at the time 
of the Prophet. This counter tradition to the claimed obligation to migrate 
from the abode of unbelievers to the abode of Islam continued to be dynamic 
and viable, as many Muslims who lived in non-Muslim territories continued to 
seek legitimacy for their status. In other words, while some Muslim jurists in-
sisted that Muslims should permanently reside only in the abode of Islam, 
other jurists negated this obligation contending that the duty to migrate ex-
pired shortly before the death of the Prophet. Nevertheless, apart from the po-
larizing debate about residing in the abode of Islam, the issue of wājib al-hijra 
or the duty to migrate as a response to injustice, persecution, and oppression 
remained a tantalizing normative challenge throughout Islamic history. Many 
Muslim jurists argued that migration remains a normative duty until the end 
of time, but the obligation is to migrate and reside wherever Muslims may 
practice their faith freely or what they called “iẓhār al-dīn.” Others argued that 
the duty is to migrate from the land of inequity (dār al-fisq) to wherever justice 
reigns (dār al-ʿadl). Especially in mystical Sufi orientations, the duty to migrate 
was interpreted in entirely spiritual and internal terms: hijra. In these spiritual 
theologies, hijra becomes an obligation to journey from and abandon the low-
er base and material self to the higher divine and supernal self. Hijra is not a 
physical residential status but a dynamic and perpetual process of spiritual 
elevation (Hassan 2013; Abou El Fadl 1994). 
In addition to the normative idea of migration as a response to disempower-
ment and oppression, there are at least two other moral impulses within the 
Islamic tradition that are important to note in any discussion on Islamic ethics 
and migration. The two possible ethical norms in the Islamic tradition are 
wājib al-ḍiyāfa, the norm arising from the duty of hospitality, and muʾākhā 
(brotherhood), which is an ethical example set when the Prophet built an ef-
fective social brotherhood between migrants of Mecca and the natives of 
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Medina. I will comment on ḍiyāfa and muʾākhā momentarily, but it is worth 
noting at this point that the Islamic tradition is replete with normative ethical 
possibilities or what one may describe as ethical potentialities and trajectories. 
The values of brotherhood and hospitality provide fascinating normative prec-
edents that could have been developed by contemporary Muslims into a sig-
nificant inspirational ideation or an aspirational moral direction. Hospitality 
and brotherhood, added to migration as a normative response to a state of 
powerlessness; all of that, plus the ethic of mobility as an essential component 
of human dignity, is a promising ethical baggage that could be seen as trajecto-
ries that could be employed in the purposeful construction of social and po-
litical virtues. I see the moral baggage inherited from the Islamic tradition as 
containing ethical impulses of virtue that could have been marshalled by con-
temporary Muslims into significant theological and ethical engagements with 
the modern discourses on human rights and dignity. 
In my view, the Islamic tradition is replete with ethical potentialities that 
are embedded in complicated and layered historical narratives. These layered 
historical narratives do not contain a single or a unitary normative trajectory. 
Indeed, the historical narratives contain numerous normative trajectories that 
are often conflicting and that exist in tension with one another. Having said 
this, however, it is undeniable that in the midst of this tension, one finds 
soundly embedded ethical impulses or virtues, such as hospitality and brother-
hood, that are as if an untapped potentiality. These ethical impulses have a 
moral trajectory or a possible normative power, but only if reclaimed and re-
constructed into coherent epistemic interventions and practices in the mod-
ern world (Abou El Fadl 2014, iiii-iv). Relying on their own native moral and 
ethical resources, Muslims could have anchored themselves on virtues such as 
brotherhood and hospitality in making serious interventions in the contempo-
rary discourses on migration and human rights (Hollenbach 2016; Wilson & 
Mavelli 2016).
The reality, however, is that far from developing these normative impulses 
in their own tradition, Muslims in the contemporary, post-colonial age became 
rather obsessed with the apologetics of proving the essential compatibility be-
tween Islamic theology and law, and international law, but not going much 
beyond that. One often gets the impression that in Islamic normative discus-
sions it as if the reconciliation between the Islamic tradition and the perceived 
demands of international law is a sufficient moral response to the challenges 
that confront the international community. There are numerous contempo-
rary Muslim studies that seek to prove that Islamic norms are reconcilable 
with international legal standards. However, for the most part, in response to 
the growing problems of forced migration and displaced populations, contem-
porary Muslims have not leveraged their own ethical tradition in attempting 
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to critique the limitations and exceeding the expectations of international law. 
Put bluntly, when it comes to forced migration and displacement, anchoring 
themselves on the moral thrust of their tradition, Muslims could have exceed-
ed existing international law standards. 
2 The Inadequacy of International Law 
When dealing with forced migration and the displacement of human beings, 
international law continues to be largely inadequate. So, to argue the point 
that Islamic ethics or norms are simply consistent with international law is not 
much of a moral achievement. We know that the Refugee Convention and its 
accompanying protocol sets the standard for the non-refoulement of forced 
migrants, but we also know that its coverage is very limited. Article 33 in par-
ticular, which is the operative Article in much of the jurisprudence on mi-
grants, provides the following:
No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any 
manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or free-
dom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion.
The fact is that the Refugee Convention only addresses displaced individuals 
who have crossed an international border. The Refugee Convention does not 
cover internal displacement, i.e. people who have been displaced but have not 
crossed an international border. Moreover, the Refugee Convention simply ob-
ligates Contracting Parties not “to refoul,” or turn back to the frontiers of terri-
tories, those individuals who are threatened on account of race, religion, 
nationality, social group or political opinion. The protected categories of race, 
religion, nationality, social group, or political opinion are legalistic and techni-
cal. For the most part, Contracting Parties to the Refugee Convention are not 
obligated to provide anything beyond the duty of non-refoulement. If the rea-
son that someone is threatened falls out of the protected categories of race, 
religion, nationality, social group or political opinion, then states may, in fact, 
refoul or send back individuals to areas where their life and safety can be at 
risk. One should add that under The Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment, there is an absolute prohibition 
against the refoulement of individuals who are at risk of suffering torture or 
any of the other enumerated harms. However, the protections afforded by the 
Torture Convention are narrow, and, in my opinion, are rather insufficient 
(McArthur & Buchinger 2008). 
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The obligations of Article 33 of the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Sta-
tus of Refugees (Refugee Convention) are severely constrained by the acknowl-
edgement that States can refoul those individuals who threaten a country’s 
national security or its perceived political stability. Thus, in international law, 
while we often talk about the ideals of voluntary repatriation, local integration, 
or safe resettlement to a stable country, the durable solutions continue to elude 
us. Ever since World War II, we have been talking about durable solutions for 
displaced refugees, whether it be groups of refugees such as Palestinians; Iraqis 
in Iran; Afghanis in Iran and Pakistan; Syrians in Turkey; Tibetans in Nepal; 
Filipinos in Malaysia; Angolans in Zambia; Sri Lankans in India; Mauritanians 
in Senegal; or Rohingyas in Thailand, India, Malaysia or Bangladesh. Solutions 
continue to elude us because the international jurisprudence that governs 
displaced individuals—while speaking of the ideals of voluntary repatriation, 
local integration or safe resettlement—does not have the power to obligate 
nations to, in fact, provide durable solutions. 
What has been occurring is that for some 60 years, the world has taxed the 
already overtaxed Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
to provide ad hoc solutions to displaced populations around the world, often 
condemning people to life in camps with tents or makeshift communities, 
while countries continue insisting on the framework of national sovereignty as 
the overarching paradigm in dealing with and reacting to the crisis of displaced 
human beings around the world. One of the critical components missing in 
International Law is that there is no proportional obligation upon States that 
create the displacement of migrants, such as the United States or Russia, to 
take a proportional number of migrants for resettlement. In other words, a 
country like the United States can create an enormous amount of displace-
ment in Iraq or Afghanistan, but wash its hands when it comes time to reset-
tling refugees, simply throwing the obligation upon other countries such as 
Turkey, Pakistan, Kenya, Jordan, Lebanon, Chad, or according to the latest sta-
tistics, Germany. There are numerous problems with the International legal 
framework that continues to create a perpetual state of crisis in the world 
when it comes to dealing with forced migration, whether for political or eco-
nomic reasons, and other displaced individuals. The problems of forced migra-
tion overlap with the exploitation of cheap labour and the trafficking in human 
beings in complicated and deeply troubling ways. We know that the 1951 Con-
vention and 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees came into being 
post-World War II addressing largely European concerns in the Cold War era. 
The Refugee Convention protected specific categories of people that are able 
to be physically present in the territory or port of entry of the host country 
and that are then able to make an application for non-refoulement. But there 
is no international standard obligating countries that cause widespread dis-
placement because of political, military, or economic policies pursued by such 
 19Islamic Ethics, Human Rights and Migration
countries to take responsibility for the population of forced migrants. As it 
stands, the US, through the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, has created a seri-
ous refugee crisis. Russia has exasperated the refugee crisis in Syria through its 
persistent bombardment of populated areas. Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E. have 
created a refugee crisis in Yemen that is truly horrific, and Israel continues to 
act with absolute impunity towards the Palestinian refugee crisis. In all of these 
situations, while there are humanitarian and human rights standards that do 
apply, and that do condemn offending countries for their acts of aggression, 
the international law response to forced migration and displacement remains 
weak at best (Martin & Weerasinghe 2014; Cubie 2017). Ideally, if a country, 
through its military policies or otherwise, causes forced migrations and dis-
placements, then such a country at a minimum should be held financially ac-
countable for compensating the displaced populations, and should be 
responsible for providing a safe haven and the safe resettlement of the popula-
tions it displaced. Otherwise, powerful countries and governments through ag-
gressive military, political, or economic policies will continue to exacerbate 
the ongoing refugee crisis in the world. Some states and governments are more 
responsible than others for creating the current refugee crisis and it is ethically 
defensible to expect that these states and governments bear the greater bur-
den of solving this crisis (Duarte et al., 2017).
3 Islamic Ethics and Migration 
Returning to the issue of Islamic ethics and migration, I think it is fair to say 
that the Muslim contribution in this ongoing state of crisis has been largely 
muted and ineffective. In fact, there has been a drift away from the Islamic 
tradition, which could have enriched international discourses by tapping into 
the theology of muʾākhā (brotherhood), or ḍiyāfa (hospitality), or hijra (migra-
tion) as a response to istiḍʿāf (oppression). Indeed, beyond these under-devel-
oped normative impulses, there is a well-embedded moral concept of refuge 
and protected status in the Islamic tradition (Zamān 2017, 19–43; Shoukri 2010; 
Arnaout 1987). The Qurʾanic text states: “And if any of the unbelievers seek 
asylum with you (istajāraka), grant it to him (fa-ʾajirhu) until he hears the Word 
of God, then escort him to a place where he is secure for they are people with-
out knowledge.” (Q. 9:6). Classical Muslim jurists developed extensive discus-
sions on the rights of the musta⁠ʾman (person enjoying a protected status) and 
the status of amān (pledge of security or safe conduct) (Bashir 2018, 236–9). 
Whether asylum can be elevated to the status of an entitlement or right as op-
posed to a solemn and perhaps sacred privilege is anchored in the ethical tra-
dition of ijāra as opposed to the jurisprudence of amān. The muʾjar or the 
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recipient of ijāra was a person who enjoyed a protected status by virtue of a 
social status as opposed to political or business interest. Although the practice 
of ijāra in the Islamic tradition calls for more extensive historical investiga-
tions, the ethical impulse is poignantly represented in a number of traditions 
from the time of the Prophet. Umm Hanī bint Abī Ṭālib, the Prophet’s cousin, 
made a grant of ijāra to unbelievers who were visiting Medina. As the narrative 
goes, she had a rather public and heated dispute with ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib, her 
brother, about the validity of this grant of protection. The dispute was taken to 
the Prophet who ruled in favor of Umm Hanī, making what would become a 
famous statement providing that the grant of ijāra by a single Muslim is bind-
ing upon all Muslims. In perhaps an even more famous incident, the Prophet’s 
daughter Zaynab stood up in the mosque in Medina after the morning prayers, 
and announced that she had given an ijāra to her ex-husband, the idolater Abū 
al-ʿĀṣ ibn al-Rabīʿ, who apparently was present in her house at the time. The 
Prophet stood up and announced that this is the first that he has heard that Ibn 
al-Rabīʿ was in Zaynab’s home, and that Zaynab had granted him protection. 
However, the Prophet announced that as Zaynab had granted Ibn al-Rabīʿ this 
status, her ijāra must be respected. Reportedly, on this occasion, the Prophet 
made a proclamation that has for long engaged and stimulated the ethical 
thinking of Muslims. Reportedly, the Prophet said words to the effect that the 
commitments of one Muslim is binding upon all (dhimmatu al-mus limīn 
wāḥida), and that a grant of protection by the weakest in society is binding 
upon even the strongest (Al-Jawzī 1992, 257; Al-Ṭabari 1387, 348; Guillaume 
1955, 317). 
The above mentioned traditions on ijāra are often cited in classical juristic 
discussions on amān or the granting of safe conduct. In fact, relying on the 
Zaynab and Ibn al-Rabī precedent, Ḥanafī jurists and some others held that a 
guarantee of safe conduct can be granted by any member of society and it is 
valid and effective against all (Al-Dawoody 2011, 133). However, one suspects 
that the tradition of ijāra connoted a moral virtue of hospitality and kindness 
towards strangers or aliens that is broader in its ethical import than amān. The 
Qurʾanic verse quoted above advising Muslims to grant unbelievers safe con-
duct so that they may hear the word of God (Q. 9:6) was interpreted by Muslim 
jurists as the legal basis at the heart of the jurisprudence of amān. However, 
this verse uses a derivative of the word j.w.r. which means to protect, aid, or 
honor. In the Muslim tradition, the word jiwār has a diverse set of meanings 
that contain far reaching moral implications (Ibn Manẓūr 1997, 414–5). 
A mujāwir was a client who adhered to the service of a sanctuary, and such 
clients enjoyed a sacrosanct status (Bashir 2018, 50; Al-Ghunaimi 1968, 11–13). 
Servants of shrines or Sufi lodges were known as mujāwirs (mujāwir sg./
mujāwirun pl.) and at least until modernity this class of individuals enjoyed a 
protected status. Moreover, the rights of neighbors, or neighborly rights and 
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privileges, is known as ḥaqq al-jiwār or ḥaqq al-jār, which continues to be an 
important normative category at least in non-urban or less urbanized Muslim 
cultures.
The ethical impulses that one finds permeating the Islamic tradition if 
transformed into inspirational ideological concepts, or even beyond this, if ar-
ticulated into systematic legal conventions and treaties between Muslim na-
tions, could have coalesced to become an influential institution in modern 
international practice. The concept of freedom of movement as a necessary 
element for upholding human dignity; the right to escape oppression through 
migration; this coupled with the traditions of hospitality and brotherhood 
(which is analogous to the French concept of fraternity); in addition to neigh-
borly rights and the sanctity of visitors create a powerful normative universe 
that could become the basis of inspired activism and practice. To the extent 
that ideals can inspire and influence human activity, one can rightfully expect 
that Muslims tap into their own rich normative tradition to improve upon the 
universal standards that humanity sets for itself. Unless one believes in strict 
historical materialism and does not credit ideas with the ability to at least in 
part direct and shape human activity, I think we are justified in asking whether 
contemporary Muslims have been able to co-opt, adapt and negotiate their 
own moral traditions in helping to shape the humanitarian standards that ex-
ist in the world today. I think it is fair to say that the entire genre of “human 
rights thinking,” or “thinking about virtue ethics” is premised on an aspiration-
al modality. All thinking about human rights standards as well as the discipline 
of virtue ethics seeks to change conduct through persuasion and influence. If 
one abandons the task of hoping to persuade and influence the way people 
conduct themselves, then there would be no point to scholarly narratives be-
yond the strictly descriptive and non-evaluative. However, because I do believe 
that ideals do matter, in much the same way that ethics and legal standards 
matter, I do not believe that it is overly naïve to hope that Muslims would be 
able to tap into the power of the ethical trajectories embedded in their own 
tradition to achieve a greater measure of justice for the human community.
Before commenting on Muslim countries in the modern context, I should 
briefly address the issue of dār al-Islām versus dār al-kufr or dār al-ḥarb (abode 
of Islam as opposed to the abode of infidels or the abode of war). Even before 
the rise of ISIS and its so-called Caliphate state, some modern commentators 
have continued to argue that the major obstacle to Muslims embracing an in-
clusivist participatory paradigm towards the world community is their persis-
tent influence of the polarity of the abode of Islam, which exists in opposition 
to the abode of infidels or the abode of war (Lewis 2006). According to this 
point of view, it is the continued impact of this dichotomous and exclusivist 
perspective upon Muslim thinking that has obstructed the ability of Muslims to 
make normative commitments to democracy, human rights and humanitarian 
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standards. Although this is a larger issue that cannot be adequately addressed 
in this context (Abou El Fadl 2014, 203–270), I will say that I do not believe 
that the historical legacy of dār al-Islām or abode of Islam versus any other 
abode as a significant obstacle to the development of a moral response to the 
issue of displacement in the modern age. For the most part, I do not see it as a 
significant obstacle because I think that dār al-Islām is an ambiguous category, 
endlessly discursive in nature, and endlessly negotiable. In my reading of the 
tradition, much of what is written on dār al-Islām in the classical period cor-
relates to or parallels the medieval discourses on Christendom, or in the case 
of Judaism, the discourses on Jews and Gentiles (MacCulloch 2014; Hall 1997). 
There were historically embedded ideological and political categories that 
helped pre-modern subjects negotiate the realities of their existence. However, 
those who study the history of the Crusades and the complex and non-dog-
matic Muslim response to the Crusades, and those who study the rise and fall 
of Muslim dynasties and the rise of the Ottoman Empire ought to be struck by 
the historically discursive and persistently negotiable nature of a designation 
such as dār al-Islām. The least one can say is that it was no less negotiable and 
no less resistant to broad generalizations than the history of the idea of Chris-
tendom or the categories of Jew and Gentile. Moreover, one should note that 
Muslims have found it sociologically easy to migrate from Muslim countries to 
non-Muslim countries if that meant attaining a greater degree of dignity and 
a greater degree of justice. In the modern age, while Saudi muftis continued to 
issue responsa, prohibiting Muslims from migrating or residing in the abode of 
infidels, and by infidels they mean the West, such fatwas do not seem to have 
made much of an impact in stemming the flow of Muslim migrants to Western 
countries. The alleged or presumed continued impact of the abode of Islam 
upon the Muslim mind is nothing but a projected myth—dār al-Islām has be-
come a nuanced, highly problematized category in the Muslim mind and has 
been so for centuries. It is disingenuous to suggest that dār al-Islām has sur-
vived as a coherent category not only through the vestiges of medieval history, 
but also colonialism, World War I and II, the Arab Revolt, the breakup of the 
Ottoman Empire, the rise of nation-states, and even dramatic and traumatic 
modern events such as the Iraq/Iran war and many others.
Overcoming the hold of a stereotypical dichotomous division of the world 
over the Muslim imagination is not the challenge that Muslims must overcome 
in the modern world. The real challenge is for Muslims to re-interrogate and 
rediscover their own rich tradition and adapt it to meeting the moral chal-
lenges of the age. For instance, the very idea of dār al-Islām coupled with the 
Qurʾanic narrative describing Muslims as but a single nation or umma (Q 21: 92; 
Q 23: 52) could have inspired Muslims to overcome, or at least mitigate the 
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worst pitfalls of nationalism, ethnocentrism, and racism. Muslims could have 
co-opted and leveraged the moral impulse behind dār al-Islām into an ethic of 
civility, fraternity, and decency towards one another. Indeed, the utter failure 
of projects such as the Muslim World League in mitigating the draconian 
harshness of national territorial borders or in alleviating the suffering of dis-
placed people—especially displaced Muslim populations in other Muslim 
countries, is living proof of the ineffectiveness of a concept such as dār al-
Islām upon the modern Muslim imagination. I do not say this because I wish to 
deconstruct the concept of dār al-Islām as perhaps intimately interconnected 
to the notion of a single umma or indeed to a Muslim fraternity or muʾākhā. 
Rather, I say this because it does take a certain amount of incredulous mytho-
logical thinking to continue ignoring the socio-historical realities, and insist 
that Muslims do in fact adhere to conceptual categories found in medieval 
texts written for a different time and place.
Unfortunately since the colonial era, Muslim countries have first emulat-
ed Western countries in adopting vulgar forms of stark nationalism in which 
they drew strict territorial boundaries vis-a-vis one another. But then Muslim 
countries lagged behind Western countries that have reached a point of what 
some have called a “post-nationalist paradigm.” In other words, the West has 
successfully managed to reach a post-nationalist reality in which they diluted 
the national borders between various Western countries. It is true that this 
post-nationalist reality is racially and ethnically contingent—the rise of the 
ideology of a unified Europe was accompanied by the rise of the racist thesis of 
the clash of civilizations and the triumphalist, albeit racist, thesis of the “Euro-
pean miracle” and the West against the rest (Schmidt 2004; Pagden 2009; Jones 
2003). But the reality is that one can be an American citizen and travel all over 
Europe without a visa, and one can also be a British citizen and travel all over 
Europe without a visa. Moreover, it has become as if an article of faith that an 
act of aggression against a single Western country is an attack against the rest. 
It is not an exaggeration to say that in the contemporary world, despite the dif-
ferences in languages, cultures, economic systems, and religious beliefs, there 
is a basic and fundamental moral unity of purpose and fate among White Euro-
peans. Trying to make sense of this post-nationalist unity of fate and purpose, 
some have even resorted to describing it in terms of the largely incoherent 
category of the “Judeo-Christian tradition,” as a distinctive sociologically and 
anthropologically shared reality (Cohen 1971; Topolsky & Nathan 2017). The 
irony is that while orientalist scholars continued to refer to the Muslim world 
as a single unit and to attribute to this unit a tribal-like mentality of allegiance 
and affiliation, it is really the White Western world that developed a common 
sense of solidarity and cultural affinity. Whether one accepts that the Western 
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sense of solidarity is in reality racially based or not, many believe that the West 
has formed a common sense of purpose over shared normative values such as 
democracy, liberty, freedom of speech and the like. 
Muslims meanwhile have deconstructed the concept of umma, and decon-
structed the concept of brotherhood (ukhuwwa), and largely ignored their tra-
dition of ḍiyāfa or hospitality in rather ironic and paradoxical ways, to become 
more zealously defensive of the paradigm of nationalism and nationalist bor-
ders, even amongst Muslim countries themselves in ways that have made them 
lag morally behind Western countries. We should recall in this context the ka-
fala system in Gulf countries that continues to be directly responsible for very 
widespread abuses against labour (Human Rights Watch 2009). Far from being 
consistent with the ethics of ḍiyāfa, muʾākhā, or ijāra, the kafala system has 
institutionalized structural abuses against migrants and displaced people. 
Some countries such as Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E. have become habitual of-
fenders in the unconscionable practices of human trafficking and modern-day 
slavery (Mahdavi 2009). Moreover, in oil-rich Gulf countries, the kafala system 
has become inextricably interwoven with a racist outlook in which the West-
ern White man occupies the upper height of the racial hierarchy. In oil-rich 
Gulf countries there is a strict racially stratified cultural outlook in which the 
White European and American male occupies a distinct place of superiority 
and privilege. It is as if many Muslim countries imported and internalized the 
racial outlooks of their former White colonizers in ways that have effectively 
hampered their ability to rehabilitate and develop their own natively-based 
ethical contributions towards migrant workers and displaced human beings.
If one wants to understand the hold of territorial nationalism over the Mus-
lim imagination, one needs to go no further than evaluating the status of the 
Hijaz since it came under Saudi control in the early 20th Century. The Hijaz, 
the place of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, is a cultural and moral heri-
tage for all Muslims of every school, sect, and creed. Yet instead of having some 
semi-independent sacred status such as the Papal states or a status of shared 
Muslim governance, the Hijaz is treated strictly from within a territorial na-
tionalist paradigm. It is considered part of the nationalist territory of the sov-
ereign state of Saudi Arabia, and it would be absolute sacrilege for any Muslim 
country to demand a role in the shared governance of the holy sites (Abou El 
Fadl 2014). My point is that the status of the Hijaz is emblematic of the fact that 
it is not the native ideals of dār al-Islām or the single umma that holds sway 
over the modern Muslim imagination but the imported principles of vulgar 
territorial nationalism. Some of the nationalist practices of Muslim countries 
have been nothing short of shocking to the conscience. For instance, the way 
Egypt has dealt with the displacement of Bedouins in Sinai or the Palestinians 
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of Gaza, or the way that the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia have dealt 
with displacement in Yemen is a course of a pattern of practice that is not just 
offensive to modern concepts of humanitarian law and human rights, but even 
to the most basic principles of the Islamic tradition. The conduct of the Egyp-
tian, Emirati, and Saudi governments towards displaced and destitute Palestin-
ians and Yemenis respectively evidences not just a gross disregard of human 
rights and humanitarian standards but also the flouting of Islamic ethical pre-
cepts with rather disquieting impunity. 
4 Conclusion 
We should not end on a despondent note. The aspiration is that Muslims would 
investigate their own moral tradition to help construct humanitarian para-
digms that elevate international moral trajectories rather than simply acqui-
escing and rubber-stamping vague doctrines produced by nation-states in 
search of their own national interests. The Muslim tradition is replete with 
powerful virtuous ethical impulses that could make substantive contributions 
to the field of forced migrants and displacement. Among these ethical impuls-
es are critical concepts of counter-istiḍʿāf—countering oppression and power-
lessness through mobility and accessibility, first and foremost between 
Muslims themselves; and then second, between Muslims and “the other”; as 
well as the ethics of muʾākhā (brotherhood), ḍiyāfa (hospitality), and ijāra 
(asylum). These are ethical concepts that could easily find common ground 
with other religious and faith-based traditions, in a way that challenges and 
elevates, rather than simply apologetically rubber-stamping modern interna-
tional law. It is perhaps not too audacious to hope that Muslims take their own 
ethical tradition seriously enough by deploying it in the service of alleviating 
and removing human suffering, especially when it comes to what the Qurʾan 
poignantly describes as al-ghārimīn wa fī sabīli Allah wa ibn al-sabīl (those who 
are burdened with debt and the wayfarers in need) (Q. 9:60).
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Chapter 3




Global refugee and migration flows stemming from recent economic, social, 
and political conflicts in the greater MENA region have become a pressing 
global priority for governments, NGOs, and civil society networks alike. Practi-
tioners in these sectors are faced with competing pressures ranging from the 
delivery of urgent humanitarian relief and providing sustainable development 
solutions to counter increasingly erratic Islamophobic practices by European 
and American governments and media outlets. Over the course of the last 
three years, I have conducted ethnographic and policy research aimed at bet-
ter understanding the ways faith-based humanitarian organizations operate, 
specifically Muslim ones, in this complex multi-sector landscape. I have ex-
plored both their logistical capacity to tackle these problems as well as the 
ethical and moral discourses that undergird their operational culture. In this 
paper, I analyze the ethical practices that emerge organically in these spaces to 
better understand the emergence of a distinct discourse. Provisionally, I refer 
to this discourse as a type of “non-secular universal humanism,” that seem-
ingly binds an otherwise incompatible set of actors together in a quest to over-
come the truly impossible challenge of providing humanitarian care to forcibly 
displaced migrants across the MENA region and the Mediterranean corridor to 
Europe. 
In doing so, I argue that this emerging discursive tradition, and the practices 
it enables, provides Muslim ethicists with a rich repository of existing 
customs (ʿUrf ) from which they can derive normative solutions and ethical 
positions that can address the range of complex issues engendered by the 
forced migration crisis. These challenges include increased sectarian division, 
rights to national citizenship, and presumed conflicts between humanitarian 
law and Islamic law. Thus, this paper proceeds in two broad sections. First, 
following Talal Asad’s logic of understanding the living practice of Islam as 
a “discursive tradition” (Asad 1996), I analyze the ways in which secular, 
nationalist, and religious discourses converge in the practices of Muslim 
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humanitarian organizations dealing with the challenge of forced migration. 
For this analysis, I draw upon fieldwork in Turkey among organizations such 
as Deniz Feneri (Lighthouse) and IHH (Humanitarian Relief Foundation) 
as well as upon institutional literature from Islamic Relief Worldwide that 
addresses migration and conflict. In doing so, I demonstrate the pervasiveness 
of non-secular humanistic discourse in the Muslim humanitarian sector as an 
emerging customary practice in global Muslim civil society. Then, in the second 
section I discuss how a normative Islamic ethics of universal humanism can be 
derived from this discursive tradition and its attendant practices by developing 
an integrated approach to modern methods of humanistic inquiry and Islamic 
ethical development. In the former, I draw upon the work of Tariq Ramadan, 
and in the latter, I posit the use of ʿUrf. When taken together, this synthesis 
creates the concept of a “living fiqh,” a term I employ to refer to the day-to-day 
Islamic discursive and material practices that underwrite the pervasive ethic 
of non-secular humanism found in the Muslim humanitarian sector.
The key feature of this approach prioritizes an empirically grounded 
understanding of the operative, embedded discourses, concepts, and categories 
that enable actors “on the ground” from secular, Christian, and Islamic back-
grounds to work together in the quest to serve the needy, over and above the 
often abstract theological and textual justifications set forth by academics, 
public intellectuals, and traditional clergy (ʿulama⁠ʾ). I argue that in these 
spaces and sites of social interaction, encounter, and cooperation, interesting 
examples of practical theology can be mapped and further explored for their 
potential ethical development.
The outcome of this analysis supports the positions of critical thinkers such 
as Talal Asad who argue for a nuanced understanding of the forces of secular 
logic in the post-modern period as well as moral philosophers such as Tariq 
Ramadan who demand that the only viable theological and ethical framework 
for Muslims and their secular counterparts around the world must be ground-
ed in real-world contexts. If mapped, debated and engaged with responsibly, 
the discourses that emerge in the spaces of “living fiqh” that I have outlined 
above promise to provide much needed concrete examples of cooperative eth-
ics and practical solutions to pressing problems faced by the victims of forced 
displacement and the resultant impact on questions concerning the place of 
Islam and Muslims in the contemporary world. 
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2 Turkish, Syrian, Muslim, Human
The non-descript border town of Kilis, located in southern Turkey sits just forty 
miles north of the war-ravaged metropolis of Aleppo. An otherwise forgotten 
stop on an ancient trading route, Kilis found itself at the center of sectarianism, 
imperialism, and geopolitical rivalry. Between 2012 and 2016, the city of 90,000 
swelled to just over a quarter of a million as countless displaced Syrians fled 
their homes to find shelter, medical treatment, and sustainable life anywhere 
they could. Kilis, with its streams of humans in transit, miles of aid convoys, 
and overpopulated tent cities provides a useful, if callous, space to witness the 
emergence of non-secular humanism. 
After spending an afternoon with Mahmood, a local philanthropist in his 
late fifties who upon first glance one would assume is a day labourer, I asked 
him about what kind of Islamic literature he read when he was younger. Mah-
mood’s story was an illuminating one. I was attempting to get a sense of the 
intellectual motivations that drove this successful and wealthy businessman to 
dedicate the majority of his time and energy tending to the care of some 106 
women and children whom he had housed in various locations in the city. He 
told me, counting off the names on his fingers, “Ḥassan al-Bannā, Sayyid Quṭb, 
Ayatollah Khomeini, Ali Shariati, Mawdūdī, Muhammad Iqbal… they all had it 
right, they said the same thing, and we got it wrong. But, Mawlana [Rumi] had 
it a 1000 years before them: Insān, Insān!” Insān, or simply mankind, was a re-
frain that I heard continuously among aid and development workers in the 
Turkish-Syrian context, but to hear it in this formula has made me think more 
carefully about what my interlocutors meant when they talked about human-
ity, or humans. In one sentence, Mahmood had managed to combine a vast 
and complex range of contemporary Islamic political thought and conclude 
that the aim of these projects was an essentially humanistic one. But the 
human here was clearly not the human of western liberal secularism, nor could 
I say that it was the human of some rarified Islamic theological vision. The 
humanitarian imperative for Mahmood was as self-evident as it was universal. 
For Mahmood, the rights of his guests (misafirim)—the term used for dis-
placed Syrians in Turkey both legally and colloquially—were not grounded in 
a formal legal institution or charter, such as the international human rights 
regime. Rather, the rights and entitlement of those he cared for were simply 
ontological, yet simultaneously divinely ordained.
Mahmood’s use of the term guest has larger implications, however. Turkey’s 
President Erdogan, for example, during a Ramadan dinner in the summer of 
2015 repeated a motif he had long expressed to justify his policy on hosting 
Syrian refugees:
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I pray this may be the last Ramadan you observe away from home. You are 
Muhājirūn for us. We, as Anṣār, try to take care of our Muhājir brothers 
with the love, enthusiasm, excitement of Medina. In our culture, a guest 
means prosperity, honour and joy. You have brought prosperity to us. You 
have honoured us with your presence. (“President Erdogan Shares” 2015)
Many Turkish Muslim activists and some of their Syrian counterparts imagine 
their relationship as a parallel to the Prophet Muhammad’s flight (hijra) from 
persecution in Mecca to refuge and solace in Medina. The story is a foundational 
element in Islam’s grand narrative. The themes of the Muhājirūn and Anṣār 
pervaded virtually every conversation I had with faith based Turkish aid 
agencies.
Mahmood and I had this conversation in the courtyard of an old residential 
building that now doubled as a makeshift charity headquarters. This is where 
Mahmood hired a cook to prepare daily meals for his guests, received dona-
tions and supplies, as well as hosted volunteers and guests such as us. The 
doorway boasted a large banner belonging to Humanitarian Relief Foundation 
(IHH), the leading Muslim aid agency in Turkey, familiar to most of the world 
for its role in the Gaza Freedom Flotilla in 2010. Although Mahmood worked in 
tandem with IHH, his efforts to help those in need in his hometown were of his 
own volition and that of his close network of colleagues and friends. IHH, how-
ever, with its central offices in Istanbul was, like most aid agencies, keen on 
demonstrating its presence as far and wide as possible. So, when it found an 
implementing partner in the person of Mahmood, it was quick to offer basic 
food provisions in exchange for a formal partnership.
At IHH headquarters in Kilis I was met by volunteers who, with good cause, 
were deeply suspicious of my presence. I asked for an interview and the group 
reluctantly accepted after my Turkish hosts insisted on my trustworthiness. 
I was given a twenty-two-year-old volunteer who participated in daily deliveries 
to the Aleppo countryside. He had himself only recently arrived in Kilis from a 
small town north of Istanbul. I asked how he and his fellow aid workers man-
aged to conduct their work inside Syria. My question, in fact, had been a pure-
ly logistical one. He responded however with something far more existential. 
He told me, “IHH has a paid staff of 500 and volunteer force of 5000 that works 
harder than the staff. Every day we wake up and have 70,000 orphans to feed.” 
He continued and reminded me of the Qurʾanic imperative to care for orphans, 
doing so with a tone of voice and body language suggesting that he lamented 
why something so obvious must even be explained. Like Mahmood, the young 
IHH volunteer understood his work as a natural outgrowth of a self-evident 
Islamic humanitarian ethic.
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The rhetoric of the volunteers and workers in Kilis differed drastically with 
that of Huseyin Oruc, the deputy director of IHH. When I inquired about the 
role of Muslim NGOs in the conflict he quickly corrected me and insisted that 
I refer to his organization as a strictly humanitarian one engaged in main-
stream aid and development work. He considered the classification of IHH as 
a faith-based group a deliberate attempt to undermine their work; that is, he 
interpreted such a description as relegating IHH to a second-tier organization. 
He did make it clear, however, that what distinguishes IHH from others is their 
expressly political posture. In addition to advocating for taking the unique po-
sition of being both an aid agency and a human rights advocacy organization, 
he described IHH’s position on international humanitarian law as particularly 
strident. He argued that IHH considered human rights, especially those of the 
basic entitlements of food, shelter, and safety as absolutely inviolable. IHH 
takes the position then that no politics or economics can or should stand in the 
way of the delivery of these basic services. This is the logic, he explains, that 
allows IHH activists and volunteers to weather the danger of war zones such as 
Syria to deliver aid, or to challenge the military blockade of Gaza, or to help 
broker local cease-fires in conflict zones around the world.
Yet, in the offices of IHH in Istanbul, one is hard pressed to find any refer-
ence to Islamic culture or thought. Rather, the décor resembles something one 
would expect from any mainstream international aid agency: large maps of the 
world, pictures of women and children in need, images of their services, and so 
forth. Is it the case the IHH deliberately conceals its Islamic orientation for the 
purposes of strategic maneuvering in the Turkish and international political 
space? It is, of course, no secret that IHH is connected to global Islamist net-
works and its rank and file is deeply connected to the Islamist governing party, 
the AKP. So why wouldn’t the group simply announce its Islamist leanings 
overtly? I am inclined to suggest that the answer to such a question lies some-
where in the observation that humanitarianism and the notion of humanity 
itself has become such a vacuous rhetorical currency in global politics that a 
group like IHH can appropriate it and give it any meaning it deems worth-
while. In this way, the Islamist vision of humanity that we see articulated casu-
ally among aid workers seamlessly weaves into global secular discourses of 
humanitarianism yet retains its vernacular and colloquial religious character 
in local vernacular. contexts.
Other large aid agencies such as Deniz Feneri and Mahmood Hudayi Vakfi, 
also based in Istanbul with operations around Turkey, share IHH’s sense of hu-
manitarian urgency but are much more open at higher levels of the organiza-
tions to express their overtly Islamic orientations. These groups’ visions for 
humanitarian aid is also much more grounded in a sense of Turkish identity. 
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Members from both of these groups told me on separate occasions, for exam-
ple, that when doing their work they often recall the words of the medieval 
Turkish Sufi poet and saint, Yunus Emre (d. 1320): “We love all created beings, 
for the sake of the ultimate creator.” Likewise, the directing manager of Deniz 
Feneri was eager to express to our group of visitors over lunch that charity and 
stewardship were integral parts of Turkish Islamic identity. He also recounted 
a story of an Ottoman sultan—which one and when it doesn’t matter of 
course—who spread bread crumbs and grain on the snowy hilltops of the east-
ern Anatolian mountains in the dead of winter so that it could be said that 
even the birds were cared for under his dominion. The story is a reinvention of 
an early Islamic tale where the Umayyad Caliph ʿUmar ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz is said 
to have done the exact same thing. Today there is even a charitable organiza-
tion that actually feeds birds in winter in the Kurdish regions of eastern Turkey. 
The repetition and reinvention of this tradition, and others, speaks volumes to 
the imagined community that contemporary aid workers inhabit.
The narrative motifs of Islamic charity, civilization, and history surfaced in 
all of my conversations with aid workers and volunteers. It was clear that these 
were sincere discursive commitments on the part of the practitioners—that 
this was the world they created and occupied. It allowed them to be fully 
Turkish, Muslim, and human simultaneously. I argue that this discursive 
matrix enables a culture of non-secular humanism that underwrites a range of 
huma nitarian and civic practices that challenge conventional paradigms of 
national identity as well as those of reified theological or sectarian identity. 
Muslim ethicists can draw upon and expand these discourses to augment a 
powerful resource for an emerging and transnational Islamic ethics of civic 
and humanitarian engagement.
3 Islamic Relief Worldwide and Non-Secular Humanism
Islamic Relief Worldwide (IR) is the leading independent Muslim humanitarian 
NGO headquartered in North American and Europe. Established in 1984 by Dr. 
Hany Al-Banna it now boasts a global reach, operating in dozens of countries 
around the world with an annual operating budget reaching nearly half a 
billion dollars. Although Islamic Relief and its various branches have been 
accused of having connections to organizations such as the Muslim Brother-
hood or other Islamic revivalist and politically oriented organizations, it has 
consistently gained the trust of the conventional aid and development sector. 
Islamic Relief representatives are often the sole voice representing the Muslim 
humanitarian sector in leading think tanks, international organizations, and 
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policy forums such as the German-led Partnership for Religion and Develop-
ment, The Overseas Development Institute, and the UN Inter-Agency Task 
Force on Religion and Development. Given their wide reach and credibility 
across multiple sectors, Islamic Relief aid teams are often found on the front 
lines of the world’s most pressing humanitarian crises. I argue that Islamic 
Relief can operate in these fragile and otherwise polarized contexts largely due 
to its religious-ideological orientation, which is deeply rooted in a vision of 
Islamic values and ethics but also seamlessly intertwines with a global ethic of 
universal human rights and citizenship recognized by the international com-
munity.
Here, I briefly review the way in which this espousal of a non-secular 
humanism is expressed in Islamic terms through two Islamic Relief publications 
that bear directly on the question of regional instability, migration and conflict 
in the MENA region. The first text is a small pamphlet entitled, “The Rights of 
Forced Migrants in Islam” which outlines the way in which the organization 
approaches the subject of forced migration from an Islamic humanitarian per-
spective (Kidwai 2014). The second, “Working in Conflict: A Faith Based Toolkit 
for Islamic Relief” is a conflict transformation manual taught at various levels 
of the organization’s operational and administrative teams (Salek 2015). IR’s 
development of this manual is in line with the increasing tendency among hu-
manitarian actors, including faith-based organizations such as World Vision 
and Mercy Corps, to take a more active role in the transforming conflict sce-
narios that precipitate many of the crises they are asked to manage. What we 
find in both texts is an expression of IR’s worldview that simultaneously af-
firms its commitment to universal, liberal, and ultimately secular conceptions 
of human rights as well as a faithfulness to Islamic concepts of community and 
human fraternity. 
IR’s brief pamphlet on forced migration attempts to “nurture the theological 
discourse on the issue of forced migration protection in Islam” in light of the 
fact that Muslim countries play a key role in hosting displaced peoples (Kidwai 
2014, 3). From the outset of the text we find that the subject of forced migration 
is positioned as both a particular problem in the contemporary moment and 
universal feature of human history. The pamphlet begins:
Forced migration has been a core element of the human experience 
throughout history. The Islamic tradition is rich with stories of forced 
migration and teaching on the importance of providing protection from 
those seeking refuge. (Kidwai 2014, 4)
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The text proceeds to discuss migration in the context of pre-Islamic 
prophetic history, reminding readers that figures such as Ibrāhīm (Abraham), 
Mūsā (Moses) and of course Muḥammad were all forced migrants. 
The pamphlet proceeds to equate concepts such as asylum with the idea of 
“security” (amān) whereby the author states that it is universally agreed upon 
that Muslims are obligated to provide refuge to those in need, whether “Muslim 
or non-Muslim, and is not dependent on political, civil, social cultural religious 
or economic characteristics of the fleeing person (Kidwai 2014, 11). Foundational 
principles of the international humanitarian regime such as the right to non-
discrimination and the right to freedom of religion are also discussed through 
recourse to Qurʾan, Tafsīr, and Ḥadīth traditions. Through these discursive 
practices, Islamic Relief participates in and contributes to the emergence of 
the culture of non-secular humanism visible in other contexts of faith-based 
humanitarianism. 
The IR conflict toolkit provides a useful explanation of its continuing effort 
to balance Islamic ethics and values that are typically applied to the Muslim 
community in particular with a wider sense of how these ideas merge with a 
secular, humanistic framework. IR is explicit about its approach:
It is important to emphasize that we do not intend to work only with 
Muslims, or to engage in daʿwah (proselytising for the Islamic faith) 
through our work. These tools are equally valid for use with non-Muslim 
communities and we actively encourage readers to redesign these 
appropriately. We do not advocate for a particular school of thought or 
make judgements about sectarian differences. Our goal is to better 
understand the Islamic values that motivate us to alleviate suffering, and 
how these values unite us across our cultural and theological differences. 
This toolkit aims to refer to sources across the spectrum of Islamic 
thought, to inspire readers to develop understanding of the connections 
across the Muslim world about how we are encouraged to transform 
conflict towards peace. (Salek 2015, 1.7)
Throughout this text, IR begins with the particularities of Islamic principles 
and slowly merges them with universal concepts. For example, the following 
description of Tawḥīd [tawhid], or the Islamic concept of monotheism, is 
seamlessly blended with the idea of the unity of humanity:
Tawhid (unity and oneness) lies at the heart of the Islamic tradition and 
refers to the state of unity, oneness and uniqueness of God (Allah). 
Tawhid further encompasses the integration and connected nature of a 
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diverse humanity as emerging from one Divine source of creation. (Salek 
2015, 1.14)
The authors draw upon the well-known Qurʾanic verse, “People, we created 
you all from a single man and a woman, and made you into races and tribes so 
that you should recognize one another (49:13)” to justify this appeal to the 
sanctity of human diversity as a feature of Islamic faith and practice.
The theme of universal human sanctity is also expressed through an 
elaboration on the concept of Fiṭra [Fitrah]:
Fitrah (sacredness and dignity of human life) recognizes the fundamental 
goodness of all people at birth: “We create man in the finest state (Q 95:4; 
see also 2:30–34, 17:70).” Because of fitrah all human life is sacred and its 
dignity (karama) is to be preserved: “…We decreed to the Children of 
Israel that if anyone kills a person—unless in retribution for murder or 
spreading corruption in the land—it is as if he kills all mankind, while if 
any saves a life it is as if he saves the lives of all mankind Q 5:32.” (Salek 
2015, 1.16)
The blending of the theological concepts of Tawḥīd and Fiṭra with humanistic, 
secular sensibilities is indicative of an emergent, but stable tradition and 
custom of what I propose to refer to as the “living fiqh” of the Muslim humani-
tarian sector. Indeed, the theological concepts found in the discourses of 
Muslim humanitarian organizations is not merely rhetorical; in concrete 
situations of humanitarian relief, organizations such as IR provide aid in 
a neutral, unbiased way, without recourse or pretense to proselytization, 
sectarian bias, or ideological association. 
The emergence of a non-secular humanistic discourse in the tradition of 
Islamic Relief ’s humanitarian work is perhaps most poignantly illustrated in 
its sublimation of the Maqāsid al-Shariʿa (aims and objectives of the Shariʿa) 
into the concept of human dignity. As we have seen above, IR has steadily 
found symmetry between foundational Islamic principles such as Fiṭra and 
Tawḥīd and those of human rights and dignity that are pervasive in the conven-
tional aid community. Figure 3.1, taken from the Islamic Relief “Toolkit,” how-
ever, provides a powerful image of how this discursive operation unfolds in 
context. Taken from the section on policy, the five traditional categories of the 
Maqāṣid (faith, life, intellect, posterity, wealth) are presented here in a floral, 
circular pattern reminiscent of Islamic geometrical motifs and couched within 
a discursive framework of “human development” and “human dignity.” The 
image is accompanied by a set of columns with bullet points, which outline 
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various dimensions of each of the Maqāṣid. These characteristics include 
language and parlance traditionally found in the aid and development sector 
but adapted here under the rubric of Islamic ethics and values. For example, 
“humanitarianism” is categorized under “life,” while “environment” is found 
under “posterity.” This integration of Islamic humanistic values and those 
traditionally associated with a secular, human rights framework is among the 
chief characteristics of the emergent non-secular humanistic discourse found 
throughout the Muslim aid and development sector. As I argue in more depth 
in the next section, these discourses provide a stable ground through which a 
new tradition of normative ethics and law may be realized by Muslim ethicists 
and legal practitioners. 
4 Context (Wāqiʿ): Tariq Ramadan’s Call for a Socially Derived 
Normative Ethics
My argument that an emergent non-secular universal humanist, but simul-
taneously Islamic, ethic occupies a distinct space in the political and moral 
imagination of Muslims in the current political moment is confirmed by ob-
servers of political Islamic formations elsewhere. Indeed, as Halim Rane ar-
gues, the “maqāṣid-contextual approach” of Islamic oriented parties both in 
and out of the Arab world have enjoyed more electoral success than their pre-
decessors, precisely because they have focused less on an utopian ideology that 
stresses “shariʿa” and more on universal human values and practical programs 
of social reform (Halim Rane 2012–13). These examples include the election 
of the Nahda Party in Tunisia, the overwhelming success of the AKP in Tur-
key and the Prosperous Justice Party in Indonesia. Such an observation seems 
to corroborate my ethnographic claims that the living traditions of Islamic 
Figure 3.1  
Five crucial dimensions of human development
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humanitarian practices undergird a new space of Muslim civic en gage ment 
whereby an ethics of global citizenship are cultivated inextricably with a sense 
of global Islamic revival. Islamic ethical and legal thinkers would benefit by 
engaging these existing practices as sources of practical ethics and law.
In advocating to derive a living fiqh from pre-existing spaces of Muslim civic 
engagement, here specifically those found in the Muslim humanitarian sector, 
I call for a coherent integration of social sciences and Islamic normative ethics. 
As we have demonstrated thus far, Talal Asad’s methodological and theoretical 
concept of understanding Islam as a “discursive tradition” has enabled us to 
analyze social and cultural contexts through an anthropological framework. In 
doing so, we have identified examples of a living fiqh whereby Muslims engage 
humanitarian work with universally informed moral and ethical principles 
that are coterminous with their interpretations of Islamic theology and law. 
In our current case, I posit that Muslim humanitarian practices can inform 
emerging Islamic legal and ethical approaches to civic engagement, democrat-
ic culture and global citizenship by virtue of the fact that existing custom (ʿUrf) 
of Muslims in these spaces has now come to prioritize humanistic principles 
that transcend national, ethnic, sectarian, and ideological affiliations. At the 
same time, these practices are thoroughly fused with the larger aims and ob-
jectives (maqāṣid) of Islam and Shariʿa and thereby have become part of the 
customary understanding of Islamic truth by millions of Muslims around the 
world. These practices, which are informed by subtle interpretations of Islamic 
ethics, provide the “data” or living texts that can help ethicists and legal think-
ers better determine norms and guidelines to develop timeless Islamic solu-
tions to contemporary and particular problems. 
To further make the case that the social scientific observation of Muslim 
practices should be used as a source of Islamic normative thinking, I now turn 
to Dr. Tariq Ramadan’s notion of context or wāqiʿ to serve as the hermeneutical 
bridge needed to integrate the largely disconnected realms of uṣūl al-fiqh and 
modern social sciences. Here, I draw upon Ramadan’s call to not only integrate, 
but to center wāqiʿ or context based knowledge as a primary source in deter-
mining contemporary Islamic ethical practices. I do so to then (re)introduce 
the principle of ʿUrf as a source of Islamic law that grounds the notion of living 
fiqh within a broader tradition of both contemporary and historical Islamic 
hermeneutics. 
Ramadan begins his discussion about wāqiʿ with a reminder that among the 
many divine mandates of the Qurʾan is the continual invitation to ponder and 
analyze the existing universe as an unfolding revelation of God’s truth in and 
of itself. He argues that this element “affects all the areas of human knowledge 
about the created Universe: a Universe that is both a gift and a “sign” fraught 
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with meaning and its Creator, as we have seen, keeps inviting “those who are 
endowed with insight” to observe, study, and analyze it in all its dimensions 
(Ramadan 2008, 104). From this vantage point, Ramadan encourages the ethi-
cist to move beyond the conventional modern tradition of using scientific rea-
son to “prove” the truth of revelation and rather engage in a deep understanding 
of the human culture, tradition and art as an equally valid source of augmenting 
Islamic ethical and legal norms. By elevating the truth found in the social 
sciences to that of the natural or empirical sciences, he enables thinkers to 
contextualize the interpretation of Islam in the contemporary moment as part 
of a continuation of tradition, rather than a break from it. 
To accomplish this, however, Ramadan must differentiate between the two 
broad types of interpretive conclusions used in Islamic legal judgements: qaṭʿī 
(certain, definitive) and ẓannī (speculative). He argues that one realm of the 
social sciences attempts to identify the underlying universal principles and 
laws that undergird human behavior historically:
The constants in the various legislative models, relations to power, domi-
nation structures, the relationship to politics, the historical behaviors of 
the rich and the poor, and symbolic expressions, match logical patterns 
and causality principles that may be verified even though those are not 
exact and scientifically definitive. The laws underlying the diversity of 
phenomena remain operative and universal and in this respect they are 
similar to the qaṭʿī category as to their qualification. One cannot, in the 
social sciences, deny or overlook the presence of constants explaining 
human behavior patterns. (Ramadan 2008, 107)
Ramadan is less concerned, however, with this area of the social sciences 
because despite significant levels of debate, in his opinion the quest for gener-
alizable principles in the social sciences is similar to that in the natural 
sciences. What is more challenging is understanding society, social norms, and 
human behavior in particular and concrete historical moments that are fluid, 
subject to change, and politically contested.
The challenge of deriving principles for Islamic ethics that are contextually 
grounded is due to the highly speculative (ẓannī) nature of these interpretative 
conclusions. Acknowledging the inconclusive nature of contextual readings of 
cultural norms and social change, Ramadan argues that human reason and 
“constant ijtihād” defined as an “autonomous critical approach” can serve as 
guides to support navigating this complex interpretative space. Precisely 
because they are speculative and require the rigorous reflection of human 
reason, they demand particular attention. I quote Ramadan at length:
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The Book of the Universe and the social sciences that unfold there open 
the doors of the zannī that requires human reason to perform a constant 
ijtihād (autonomous critical approach) to identify enduring or/and 
changing causality principles, the various relationships to cultures and/
or customs, symbolical and/or imaginary projections, and the like. A vast 
field thus opens for the exercise of human rationality, and it is by no 
means less important because it contains less certain knowledge than 
the exact or experimental sciences: on the contrary, it is because of the 
need to be in direct contact with the lived reality and with human 
behavior (in its diversity in worldly time) that specific attention must be 
paid to the social sciences as a whole. What they teach us about 
humankind, about indeterminate elements in groups and in human 
behavior, in value systems and in cultures—although this is zannī (open 
to interpretation) or rather all the more so because it is zannī—is essential 
to any intellectual exercise striving to remain faithful to the ethical 
meaning of the revealed Book. It is indeed in this field of the zannī that 
jurists elaborated the main part of their reflections: at the heart of 
diversity, of the nonorganic, the seemingly unorganized, they tried—by 
deduction as well as by inference—to suggest ways of respecting 
faithfulness to the global, and invariably positive, message of scriptural 
sources. The social sciences, the many specializations in the observation 
and understanding of reality, play the same part and it would be 
unthinkable—and quite illogical and absurd—to cut oneself off from 
those fields of knowledge because they offer nothing “certain” or because 
behaviors, or even “moral categories,” appear there as indeterminate or 
contradictory. (Ramadan 2008, 107–8)
Ramadan’s insistence that context-specific zanni interpretations of human 
behavior and culture provide a basis for ethical and legal determination may 
seem broad and inconclusive to some critics who then argue that no concrete 
solution to pressing social problems is made by such an intervention. Such a 
criticism is, in part, correct but ultimately misguided. 
It is the case that the call to rely upon ijtihād or human reason is open ended 
and categorically inconclusive. However, Ramadan’s call to rely upon these 
tools aims precisely to urge that Muslim ethicists—to phrase it in my own 
words—embrace and determine the course of their own tradition, to develop 
it, to curate it. In advocating an open-ended, zannī approach to using the social 
sciences as a source of law, Ramadan is encouraging contemporary scholars to 
follow in the footsteps of Islamic civilization’s great thinkers, rather than sim-
ply mimic them. He concludes: “the first Companions, as well as early scholars, 
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confident, as we said, in the Revelation’s global message and intimately familiar 
with their natural environment, never refrained from including the latter in 
their legal elaborations” (Ramadan 2008, 108). Ramadan’s call therefore is one 
of actionable intelligence—a call to intervene in and reform the ethical stag-
nation that plagues many quarters of the Muslim intellectual milieu. In order 
to address the overwhelming ethical, social, and political challenges posed by 
the forced migration crisis, it is imperative that Muslim thinkers in the 
contemporary moment develop conceptual frameworks that are both 
theologically and practically viable. In the remainder of this essay, I argue that 
ʿUrf (customary practice) is a conceptual tool that can satisfy the multiple 
demands faced by Muslim ethicists today.
5 The ʿUrf of the Non-Secular Humanism
I close this essay with a (re)introduction of the concept of custom (ʿUrf) as a 
means through which contemporary Muslim ethicists may consider 
concretizing the existing practices of non-secular Islamic humanism found in 
the Muslim aid and development sector into a normative Islamic ethical 
tradition. I also argue that ʿUrf provides an intellectual basis to allow for the 
project of deriving norms from the lived context (wāqiʿ). Taken together, I posit 
that the complex challenges of sectarianism, ethno-nationalist citizenship, 
and political ideology can be mitigated by developing the emerging custom 
(ʿUrf) of non-secular Islamic humanism found in the Muslim humanitarian 
sector into a viable normative Islamic ethical tradition. 
As part of a multi-generational effort of reformist theology, Muslims have 
developed contemporary interpretations of fiqh, akklāq, and Shariʿa that are 
intended to better enable Muslims ways to navigate the complex social space 
of religious and political identity in the era of the modern nation state. As part 
of this conversation, it has long been argued that classic Islamic ethnical for-
mulations of political community remain at odds with modern concepts of 
citizenship and equality. Critics and reformists alike point to structures such as 
the jizyā system of non-Muslim taxation or concepts such as al-walāʾ wa-al-
barāʾ, which encourage communal solidarity and repudiation of non-Muslims 
as examples of the incompatibility of Islamic political ethics and modern 
norms of universal humanism. While most of this discussion takes place in the 
abstract and theoretical, I use the practice of Muslim humanitarianism as a 
site to explore how contemporary practices of Muslim communal solidarity 
intersect with the international norms of neutrality and impartiality. I argue 
that, contrary to the alleged tension between Muslim identity and modern 
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universal humanism, the practice of Islamic humanitarianism is embedded in 
and embodies a rich discourse of non-liberal, universal humanism grounded 
in a deep discursive and performative tradition of Islamic ethics. I argue that 
this non-secular humanism constitutes a source of ʿUrf, or custom, that can be 
considered a site through which contemporary Muslim practices can serve as 
a basis for sustained ethical cultivation.
As noted by a range of scholars such as Hashim Kamali, Anver Emon, Gideon 
Libson, and Ayman Shabana among others, while it is well known that although 
custom is not formally recognized as a source of law, Muslim jurists and 
theorists have consistently incorporated it into their determination of law and 
ethics (Emon 2006; Kamali 2005; Shabana 2010; Libson 1997). In the modern 
period, ʿUrf has played a central role in the revival and reformation of Islamic 
ethics in a range of contexts. As Ayman Shabana, whose research provides a 
useful overview of the subject’s treatment in classical and modern scholarship 
notes:
ʿUrf, as well as similar legal principles such as maslaḥah, was an important 
legal tool that Muslim reformers invoked in their efforts to work out a 
comprehensive methodology to bridge the gap between the past and the 
present on the one hand and legal theory and practice on the other. (Shabana 
2010, 41)
Indeed, the writers of the late Ottoman Mejelle and leading modern Muslim 
intellectuals such as Rashīd Riḍā and Muḥammad Amīn Ibn ʿĀbidín (d. AH 
1252–1836 CE) looked to ʿUrf as one of the main mechanisms through which 
the practice of ijtihād could be used to address a range of emerging social prob-
lems and questions. The prolific scholar, Mohammad Hashim Kamali, likewise 
has given special attention to the depth and nuance of ʿUrf as a source of Is-
lamic jurisprudence. He points to the broad utility, even democratic nature of 
ʿUrf in that it: 1) requires broad but not uniform consent; 2) depends on popu-
lar affirmation, not just a decision by the mujtahids; 3) is changeable in light of 
differing times and circumstances; and 4) depends on gradual acceptance over 
time (Kamali 2003, 375–76). The two different types of ʿUrf: approved (ṣaḥīḥ) 
and disavowed (fāsid) also provide a mechanism through which cultural prac-
tices are identified as compatible with emerging norms and positive principles 
or should be discarded as unacceptable (Kamali 2003, 376).
The precedent of taking custom seriously throughout Islamic civilization 
and history is indicative of a strong tradition of independent thinking and 
practice among jurists and ethicists that seemingly strengthens over time. 
Here I draw upon the work of the scholars mentioned above to outline some of 
the textual sources and genealogies of custom as an authoritative tradition in 
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order to augment the authority of Ramadan’s call to ground contemporary 
judgements in living context (wāqiʿ).
The strongest explicit support for custom as a source of law seems to have 
come from the pen of Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-Sarakhsī (d. 490/1097) who 
mentioned custom as a source of law when discussing the conditions of a 
jurist’s capacity for independent reasoning: “if a mujtahid is familiar with the 
Qurʾan … and with the Sunna, and if he is an expert in qiyās and knowledgeable 
with regard to the custom” (Lisbon 1997, 138). In this instance al-Sarakhsī seems 
to suggest that custom is on par with the foundational sources of Islamic law. 
That al-Sarakhsī mentions custom instead of ijmāʿ as might be expected is 
representative of a larger and deeper tradition among jurists to equate the two. 
In most cases, custom was sublimated into other sources of law and 
hermeneutic tools. For example, Mālikīs would assume the custom of Madina 
as a standard part of the Sunna and Ḥanafīs would often use the principle of 
preference (istiḥsān) to incorporate local custom into law and ethics. 
By the post-classical period, custom seems to have become a very normative 
feature of the Islamic legal landscape. Ibn Nujaym (d. 970/1563), for example, 
notes: 
Know that the consideration of custom and usage reappears frequently 
in law in many cases, so much so that they [viz., the jurists] have 
transformed it into a legal source, and they said in the uṣūl literature, in 
the chapter on the abandonment of literal meaning: the literal meaning 
is abandoned on the basis of an indicator found in inferential methods of 
inquiry and in custom. (Lisbon 1997, 141)
As Gideon Libson notes, this trend to close the gap between practice and 
theory on the role of custom continued into the late Ottoman period, where it 
was codified in the Mejelle as a source as authoritative as revelation itself: 
Article 45 reads “Whatever is dictated by custom is as if dictated by Scripture” 
(Lisbon 1997, 154). Although few would accept this logic or find a viable route 
to apply it, the fact remains that custom is one of the richest sources of Islamic 
ethical and legal thinking available to contemporary jurists and ethicists.
In closing, however, I would like to highlight another feature of utilizing 
custom as a source of law that I find important for the contemporary 
conversation on legal reform: the demand of autonomous and independent 
juristic discernment. Most sources of law are textual. Aside from the Qurʾan 
and Sunna, even the precedents found in qiyās, ijmāʿ, and the qawāʿid are 
deeply rooted in a textual tradition that often positions the jurist or ethicist in 
a secondary or tertiary role in arriving at a conclusion. While this is not actually 
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the case in practice given that scholars always apply their own thinking to a 
problem, textual fidelity often obfuscates and hides the amount of independent 
thinking taking place in the way a scholar approaches a problem. Reliance on 
custom, however, demands that jurists engage in an autonomous act of 
discernment. Custom demands a sound, but ultimately subjective, analysis of 
a fluid and dynamic social context, echoing Ramadan’s discussion above about 
the incorporation of the social sciences and humanities in contemporary 
Islamic thinking.
In the past, this process seems to have been less controversial than it may be 
today. A concise statement that sums up how simple, yet powerful, ʿ Urf actually 
is has been attributed to Imām al-Ghazālī: “Custom is that which is established 
in a man’s mind by virtue of logic and the sound mind accepts it (Libson 1997, 
141).” It is interesting to note that the criterion for “logic” and “sound mind” here 
are not elaborated upon or discussed in detail. In fact, much of the legal 
literature on custom assumes it to be self-evident which essentially empowers 
and entrusts the jurist to come to their own conclusion on the subjects. This 
conclusion, however, was determined by the wider sense of what the 
community considered acceptable, appropriate, and viable. The pervasive 
legal maxim (qawāʿid fiqhiya), “al-ʿāda muḥakkama” (custom is binding), 
which underwrote a range of legal discussions, was often justified in the saying 
of Ibn Masʿūd, which was also cited as a Prophetic ḥadīth: “That which the 
Muslims see as good is considered good by God.” Here, again, we see a position 
for Muslims to understand custom as self-evident, binding, and legally sound.
6 Conclusion
The “living fiqh” of Muslim humanitarianism that is non-secular and also non-
sectarian should be understood as a rich repository of practical custom (ʿUrf) 
through which Muslim ethicists can develop concrete normative positions, 
which can help bridge the presumed gulf between secular humanism and the 
classical Islamic tradition. That is, rather than creating a theological justification 
from classical sources to justify or persuade practitioners of the potential for an 
integrated Islamic and secular ethics, the normative traditions emerging in the 
Muslim humanitarian sector offer a repository of discursive resources that are 
already operative in social life and thoroughly entangled in both Islamic and 
secular traditions. The ethicist’s position becomes then, not one to convince or 
argue for a potential normative stance, but merely to augment it. In a sense it 
is to provide a “reverse reification” of existing practices in order to ensure that 
they are not treated as merely anecdotal or happenstance, but rather supported 
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by legitimate hermeneutical traditions. For such a reverse reification to take 
place and remain viable, Muslim ethicists need to draw upon intellectual 
practices grounded in classical Islamic traditions as they formulate their 
positions. Here, I have suggested that they draw upon practice of ʿUrf to do so.
The contemporary challenges of the forced migration crisis for Muslim 
ethicists and scholars are staggering. The MENA region and its immediate en-
virons are plagued by internecine and sectarian feuds in fragile political con-
texts where foundational problems of citizenship, identity, and citizen rights 
continue to evade resolution. In the midst of this turbulence, the transnational 
Muslim aid and development sector, through its continued engagement with 
universally recognized principles of humanitarian engagement, has devel-
oped a living tradition of customary practice that prioritizes the unconditional 
rights of beneficiaries over and above considerations of nationality, religion, or 
sect. As we have seen, the discursive environment that enables these practices 
is firmly grounded in Islamic discourses, texts, and traditions, leaving no ques-
tion as to their compatibility with the historic tradition of a multitude of Islam-
ic civilizations and cultures. It has been my argument that Muslim ethicists, 
jurists, and intellectuals will recognize that the belaboured discussions and 
questions surrounding the relationship between the Shariʿa and issues such as 
citizenship and human rights can be rejuvenated in this dynamic and largely 
understudied social space. Such an agenda of intellectual practice promises to 
not only answer theoretical questions of law and ethics entertained by Mus-
lims in the modern period for generations, but also provide ethical and moral 
guidance to help arrive at a shared vision for resolving a humanitarian crisis 
that promises to remain with the global community for generations to come.
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Traditions as on-going “arguments extended through time” (MacIntyre 1988) 
allow us to move beyond the meta-narrative of the nation-state and find much 
needed space to begin thinking differently. The understanding that these argu-
ments are on-going means they remain unresolved and open—the future is 
not the past repeated. We now live in a world wherein mobility stratifies and is 
a material mark of difference between people. For displaced people standing 
at the threshold of a sedentarist world created by the nation-state, religious 
traditions provide a powerful vernacular and idiom that allows them “to create 
a past” for themselves which will legitimate them in a way where just being 
themselves in the present will not allow them to do (Shils 1971: 133). 
For Talal Asad (1986, 14), readings of what constitutes Islamic tradition and 
practice must be understood on its own terms. It cannot be disentangled or 
disembodied from the living practices of historically and socially located com-
munities and their institutions—it is a discursive tradition wherein “each suc-
cessive generation [of Muslims] confronts its particular problems via an 
engagement with a set of on-going arguments” (Haj 2009, 6). In conversation 
with David Scott, Asad tells us:
A tradition is in part concerned with the way limits are constructed in 
response to problems encountered and conceptualized. There’s always 
a tension between this construction of limits and the forces that push 
the tradition onto new terrain, where parts or all of the tradition ceas-
es to make sense and so needs a new beginning. And looked at another 
way: with each new beginning, there is the possibility of a new (or “re-
vived”) tradition. A new story about the past and future, new virtues to 
be developed, new projects to be addressed. (Asad cited in Scott 2006, 
289–90)
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Thinking of ways in which traditions are susceptible to re-calibration and 
re-assemblage rather than simply a continuity of well-rehearsed beliefs and 
practices holds open the distinct possibility of traditions to transform and 
move in new directions. A brief survey of refugee populations across the world 
today reveals that mass displacement crises are perhaps this generation’s im-
mediate “particular problem.” More than half (53%) of the 14.4 million refu-
gees registered with the UNHCR came from three countries: Syria, Afghanistan 
and Somalia (UNHCR 2014, 9). This number excludes the 5.1 million Palestin-
ians who are displaced and receive assistance from UNRWA. Similarly, Muslim-
majority countries account for four of the top five countries that are hosting 
refugees (ibid.).1
The response to this movement of displaced people has been characterised 
by ambivalence, ambiguity, and even paradox on the part of majority Muslim 
states. It is in this encounter between settled resident populations and the ar-
rival of the newly displaced who are often co-religionists, that a “sedentarist 
metaphysics” (Malkki 1992, 31) positing the nation-state as the moral container 
for people, culture, and politics is called into question. Here, the dissonance of 
contemporary Islamist approaches to the Muslim other is laid bare for all to 
see. In what follows, I draw on the Turkish state response to on-going Syrian 
displacement and the Syrian state’s response to the earlier displacement of 
Iraqis (2005–11) to illustrate how the sedentarist logic of the nation-state im-
pedes practices of conviviality that emerge from the lived realities of encoun-
ter between those already resident and those who newly arrive.
2 Dissonance—between Hospitality and Exclusion
In the case of the Turkish response to the Syrian displacement crisis, the AKP 
cleaves to the exclusionary logic of the nation-state. On the one hand, Islamic 
rhetoric is mobilised to express solidarity with the displaced. In May 2013, 
following a car-bombing in the Hatay province bordering Syria, Prime Minister 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan openly mobilised religious symbolism in reference to 
displaced Syrians: “My siblings in Reyhanlı should serve as anṣār to the 
muhājirūn who fled from the brutality of al-Assad. They should fulfil the same 
duty, they should also open their homes exactly like it happened at the time [of 
the Prophet]” (Hurriyet Daily News, May 24, 2013). On the other hand, displaced 
1 The numbers should be taken as a conservative estimate as they do not include refugees who 
have spontaneously self-settled in urban locations and have not availed themselves of the 
protection and assistance available under the aegis of the UNHCR.
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Syrians are readily configured as an available pool of exploitable labour. Access 
to the labour market in Turkey reveals the contradictory positions taken by the 
Turkish state towards Syrian refugees in its clumsy attempts to reconcile an 
ethical position (its religious narrative of hospitality) with a political position 
(state interests). Such dissonance has led some commentators to characterise 
the AKP as following policies of urban neoliberalism with Islamic traits 
(Karaman 2013). Two years after the bombing in Hatay, the Minister of Work 
and Social Security, Faruk Çelik, was taking a less generous stance in relation to 
Syrians right to work, stating: “It would be unfair to take away their [local Turk-
ish] jobs and give them to refugees” (Reuters, 07 August 2015). By January 2016, 
there was another volte-face as the AKP government announced it would be 
opening up access to the labour market for Syrian refugees following an agree-
ment with the European Union wherein Turkey agreed to stem the movement 
of migrants out of Turkey in exchange for $3.3 billion and favourable European 
entry visa requirements for Turkish citizens (Reuters, 11 January 2016).
The unprecedented numbers of Syrian, Iraqi and Afghan asylum-seekers 
transiting through Turkey and across the Aegean since the summer of 2015 in-
dicates that the Turkish state has hitherto been reticent in responding to the 
protection needs of self-settled urban refugees. This has been partially ad-
dressed through Article 91 of the 2014 Foreigners and International Protection 
Law that makes specific reference to the idea of temporary protection recog-
nizing the collective character of displacement crises. Invoking temporary pro-
tection measures to deal with the mass influx of refugees into Turkey has 
meant theoretically, for Syrians at least, more straightforward access to sec-
ondary rights pertaining to education, healthcare, and the labour market.
The temporal nature of such protection should be considered in light of the 
fact that where refugees are directly administered by the Turkish state they are 
in camps located close to the Syrian border—emphasising that the primary 
concern for the Turkish authorities is on managing displaced people rather 
than protecting them. Temporary protection provides a bulwark against full lo-
cal integration of the displaced and encourages repatriation to Syria. Following 
outbreaks of anti-Syrian sentiment and violence in cities with a large Syrian 
population in August 2014, the Turkish state predictably reverted to doing 
what states faced with a large foreign displaced populations often do—en-
campment. The response also draws attention to the conflicting narrative of a 
universal hospitality anchored in the ethics of religious responsibility and the 
imposition of conditionalities on hospitality by the Turkish state, which privi-
leges first and foremost a territorialized understanding of rights sanctioned by 
the nation-state. The Mayor of Gaziantep from the AKP, Fatma Şahin, declared:
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People took refuge in our city to protect their lives and their families after 
the civil war in Syria. It wasn’t their choice but an existential necessity. 
They took refuge with their neighbours they saw as a safe port. Being 
neighbours is a sacred relationship according to our beliefs. We are making 
massive efforts to enable them to live on their own land in peace. We want 
our Syrian brethren to have a place where they can live in Syria. [Emphasis 
added] (Kutahyali 2014).
Such statements underscore the degree to which religious ideas are subordi-
nate to the “national order of things” (Malkki 1995) whereby the practicable 
solution to a mass-displacement crisis is the common-sense approach of hav-
ing the refugees return home where they supposedly belong. The ambiguities 
and contradictions of temporary protection expose the arbitrary character of 
the decision-making process on the part of local authorities as they struggle 
with the tension between conditional and unconditional hospitality. The em-
phasis on neighbourliness as being a “sacred relationship” should not go unre-
marked upon. As we have seen, the AKPs treatment of neighbourliness is 
characterised by ambiguity and ambivalence. It is mobilised at both local and 
national scales—the Syrian refugee as a physical neighbour and Syria as a 
neighbouring country. In what follows, I will outline an Islamic discourse of 
neighbourliness and its practice. Jiwār, interpreted not only as a right and obli-
gation to protect the stranger, but also as a social pattern of cohabitation, 
equips people with tools to negotiate and manage conflict in their own inter-
ests unencumbered by the spatial ordering and management projects of the 
state. It allows for the self to be constituted through relationships and opens 
up space for a nurturing and care of relationships between residents and new 
arrivals alike. The argument here is that proximity through everyday interac-
tion renders the racial, ethnic, and linguistic particularities that construct the 
citizen, as “unremarkable” (Gilroy 2004, 40). 
3 Islamic Readings of Neighbourliness
In the Islamic imaginary the loss of social and material capabilities through 
being made an exile is a fate worse than penury—it speaks of a poverty of 
relationships (Rosenthal 1997) or what has been described in refugee studies as 
“social disarticulation” (Cernea 1996). This we find encapsulated in Arabic loan 
words that have found their way into proximate languages. For instance, the 
word for a person living in poverty in Urdu is the same as that for the stranger 
in Arabic—gharīb. Similarly, a popular proverb in Damascus warns of the fate 
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that lies in store for one forced to leave his home: yallī byitlaʿ min dāru ʾall 
miqdāruh—the one who leaves his home, lessens his value.
Nonetheless, the stranger cuts an ambivalent figure in Islamic tradition; 
standing in for a wide array of characters from students, traders, ascetic der-
vishes, pilgrims and forced migrants. While exile for the stranger may be ac-
companied by poverty, the response towards the stranger from those who are 
“in place” is often welcoming. Ahlan wa-sahlan—an oft-heard expression in 
the Arabic speaking world is more than simply a welcoming phrase. As al-
Ghazālī (Sherif 1975, 83) observes it is the sound of awkwardness and barriers 
being removed: a welcome that finds “room in the heart and in the place.” Lit-
erally, it is an invitation for someone to be at ease as if they were at home with 
their family. The word sahl, it should be noted, is also in reference to fertile 
plains to be contrasted with the inhospitable terrain of the desert dominating 
the landscape of the Arabian Peninsula. Good treatment of strangers was thus 
a highly regarded custom of pre-Islamic Arabian culture such that those who 
demonstrated kindness and generosity to strangers were lauded with the title 
of ma⁠ʾwā al-gharīb—refuge of the stranger (Rosenthal 1997, 68). This favour-
able disposition towards the stranger was further institutionalized by Qurʾanic 
and Prophetic injunctions, which encouraged generosity and good conduct 
toward strangers.
In particular, the bolstering of the pre-Islamic tribal practice of jiwār—the 
granting of protection and assistance to the one seeking refuge, illustrates the 
central importance of hospitality toward the stranger. While jiwār was largely 
granted for a limited period it was not uncommon for the one granting, the 
mujīr, to extend the scope of protection and assistance such that the one 
claiming protection, the mustajīr, would be integrated fully into the fold of the 
clan of the mujīr (Shoukri 2011, 5)—drawing attention to the fluid understand-
ings of both belonging and kinship. The mujīr, both before and after the advent 
of Islam, could grant protection and assistance to the mustajīr, and the clan to 
which the mujīr belonged was obligated to respect this decision without hin-
drance. The granting of jiwār carried much resonance in the Arab world in 
which Islam emerged. In providing jiwār, the guarantor and the clan he be-
longed to accumulated symbolic capital which raised the prestige and honour 
of the clan (ibid., 4–7). However, alliances between clans also pre-empted the 
possibility of jiwār. This understanding of jiwār as protection can be contrasted 
with a more contemporary reading of protection wherein the nation-state 
alone has monopolised the right to grant asylum.
An examination of the biography of the Prophet Muhammad reveals that 
jiwār was fundamental in securing the prophetic mission before the hijra—the 
collective migration of the nascent Muslim community from Makkah to 
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Madina. The granting of jiwār to the Prophet by al-Muṭʿim ibn ʿAdiy and its 
recognition as legitimate by the Quraysh following the Prophet’s return from 
al-Ṭāʾif is an indication of the importance that Arab society attached to the 
custom of jiwār. The political gravity of the context in which al-Muṭʿim granted 
protection and assistance to the Prophet cannot be understated given that the 
Prophet’s overtures to the notables of al-Ṭāʾif was deemed tantamount to 
 sedition by the Quraysh leadership (ibid., 25–26).
It is following the hijra we begin to see a codified Islamic position on the 
concept of jiwār to develop beyond that of protection and assistance but also 
as a code of conduct governing social patterns of cohabitation. The signifi-
cance of the Prophet’s hijra lay not only in the act itself as a spiritual journey of 
self-renewal and religious re-birth but perhaps just as important was its mate-
rial and social implications—the response it engendered. Securing sustainable 
livelihoods for displaced people was equally a concern at the time of the 
Prophet as it is today. The muhājirūn (The name given to the forced migrants 
from Makkah) who had sought refuge in Madina found themselves at an eco-
nomic and social disadvantage, having been forced to abandon much of their 
wealth in Makkah. Previously they had been accustomed to earning their live-
lihood through commerce. In Madina, they had to re-adjust to the demands 
and mainstays of the local economy—craft and agriculture. Many had left 
their friends and families behind in Makkah and felt alienated in their new 
surroundings. How did this community of believers respond to the challenges 
of hosting a displaced population? The response of the anṣār (Literally, the 
supporters: this is the name given to the people of Madina who pledged alle-
giance to the Prophet Muhammad and gave refuge to the exiled Muslims from 
Makkah) has been celebrated in the Qurʾan and held forth as an example for 
future generations (Qurʾan, 59:9). Despite the apparent generosity of the anṣār, 
it was deemed necessary to legislate for a system guaranteeing the muhājirūn a 
means to earn a living and make a contribution to society. In contemporary 
parlance, a durable solution facilitating local integration was founded. Within 
the first year of the hijra, the Prophet established a contract of brotherhood: 
the muʾākhā , between 45 men of the muhājirūn and an equal number from the 
anṣār promoting mutual support between the pairings in matters of material 
assistance, care, advice, and even extending to inheritance rights (though this 
latter provision was later to be abrogated).
Here, hospitality is not immutable but transformational. To use Derrida’s 
(2000) felicitous phrase, the mastery of the house is ceded in order to trans-
form both host and guest into something different—into neighbours or kin. 
The concept of jiwār should thus be correctly recognised as a right of neigh-
bourliness—one recognised as both a “moral and legal right” (ʿAbd al-Rahim 
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2008, 19) underpinned by the Qurʾan and the example of the Prophet. Gener-
ally speaking, a neighbour was considered to be anyone (Muslim or otherwise) 
residing within a radius of forty houses in any direction. Indeed, the Prophet 
explained that one’s neighbour has rights whether they are Muslim or not. He 
said:
The rights of a neighbour are that, if he falls sick you visit him, if he dies 
you follow his funeral procession, if he asks you for a loan you lend to 
him, if he is in need you assist him, if good befalls him you congratulate 
him, if misfortune befalls him you console him, that you not build your 
house up above his, blocking out the breeze, and that you not afflict him 
with the aroma of your cooking pot without offering him some.2
In his discussion on the duties owed to the neighbour recorded in The Revival 
of the Religious Sciences, al-Ghazālī recalls the oft-cited tradition in which the 
Prophet emphasized the rights of the neighbour to the extent that his 
companions were left with the distinct impression that the Prophet may 
commend the neighbour to be included as a rightful heir to an inheritance (al-
Ghazālī 2005, 675). 
What value then does an Islamic reading of neighbourliness hold for us in 
contemporary times? How are such rights of neighbourliness for the newly ar-
rived to be balanced against the rights of more long-standing neighbours? To-
day, there is little doubt that the production of locality and relational ties 
therein are so heavily shaped by the collective efforts of the apparatus of the 
nation-state whose citizenry is pitted against a referent migrant other. How-
ever, this simple binary occludes how the nation-state operates concomitantly 
with the interests of capital. Those who possess adequate levels and composi-
tions of capital are arguably looked favourably upon by agents of the nation-
state. In the context of Western Europe, for instance, anti-immigration raids or 
border profiling practices are rarely carried out on white middle class males 
who may have overstayed beyond the terms stipulated on their visa. Yet, locali-
ties with longstanding histories of migration from Africa and Asia, whose resi-
dents include citizens and non-citizens alike, are the target of state policies 
that seek to produce a “hostile environment” for migrants and the communi-
ties they reside in (Jones et al., 2017). 
2 Although the authenticity of this hadith is contested by some scholars, it is important to 
acknowledge that understanding of the rights and obligations that underpin neighbourly 
relations are broadly recognised as part of a discursive tradition (al-Zabīdī 1994, 6: 
308–309).
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Thus, we can see that beyond neighbours being recognised as citizens by the 
nation-state there are also those who occupy a range of differentiated legal 
statuses contingent on their migration histories: there are those who enjoy a 
right to residence granted through having educational or labour mobility; 
some who may have been granted a temporary protection status; and yet 
others who enjoy no recognised status—effectively illegalized. Such statuses 
do not necessarily correlate with duration of stay but may nonetheless shape 
the production of neighbourly relations. Illegalized migrants, for instance, may 
find it difficult to access and navigate certain spaces of the city wherein they 
are made visible to agents of the nation-state. Yet, the presence of people with 
differentiated legal statuses living cheek by jowl to produce localities and 
alternative socialities offers an opportunity to move beyond sedentarist 
assumptions underpinning the distribution and allocation of resources 
through the nation-state. This emphasis on propinquity and presence as the 
seat from where rights are located opens possibilities for the stranger to 
become familiar. This allows us to understand the practice of jiwār not only in 
terms of protection, as discussed above, but also more broadly in terms of 
conviviality.
4 Practices of Conviviality (and Its Impediment)
It is instructive to think about neighbourhoods as both centrifugal and cen-
tripetal flows rather than territorially bounded. In her seminal sketch of her 
local high street in Kilburn, Doreen Massey (1991, 28) observes that “what gives 
a place its specificity is not some long internalised history, but the fact that it 
is constructed out of a particular constellation of social relations, meeting and 
weaving at a particular locus.” This quality of “throwntogetherness” (Massey 
2005) is at the heart of what characterises a neighbourhood. The bodies carry-
ing social relations themselves are arriving from other places at different times 
on journeys that may not yet be complete. The neighbourhoods in which they 
arrive can thus be thought of as “the contemporaneous existence of a plural-
ity of trajectories; a simultaneity of stories-so-far” (ibid.: 12). Here, the open-
ended possibility of everyday mundane social interactions that take place in 
parochial spaces generates an ethos that invites the stranger. Empathy towards 
the other emerges as a by-product of this “situated multiplicity” mediated by 
the coming together of bodies, matter, and technology (Amin 2008: 19). 
This explicit acknowledgement and accommodation of difference lies at 
the heart of conviviality as an integral aspect of civic formation in public 
space—however fleeting and momentary (Amin 2008). Conviviality—let us 
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be clear—requires work and maintenance. This work, however, cannot be de-
rived from unequal hierarchical relationships. It is work that demands every-
day practices of support, reciprocity, and narratives of friendship. Conviviality 
is not to be located in a premeditated collaboration that seeks to endorse a 
cosmopolitanism from above (think of state instigated policies of multicultu-
ralism), but rather it is about being affected by the condition of the world to 
create a “cartography of togetherness” (Rolnik cited in Nowicka & Vertovec 
2014, 347). The openness of possible encounter borne out of this “thrown-
togetherness” and the ethical response it engenders cultivates a culture of 
neighbourliness. This ethical impulse is at one and at the same time a learned 
and an instinctive response to a given situation. In paying attention to one’s 
relationships, virtues are disciplined and care of the self is practised (Zigon 
2014, 21). That is not to say this relational ethic is always positive—as we all 
know tension and conflict between neighbours is commonplace. The point 
being emphasised here is there is an explicit acknowledgement of the other; 
an encounter negotiated between the one who is present and the one who 
arrives. This encounter does not happen outside of the sedentarist logic 
championed by the nation-state. In fact, this encounter witnesses the collision 
of two very different geographical imaginaries—producing ambivalence or 
even dissonance.
Through a broadly consistent refusal to grant refugees the right to work, gov-
ernments ensure that the responsibility to provide welfare for refugees falls 
squarely on the shoulders of international organizations. Refugees come to re-
gard local integration as a dim prospect; buttressing the logic of the host state, 
which opposes integration in favour of creating a more vulnerable refugee 
population that is able to induce greater financial resources from the interna-
tional community to share the cost of hosting refugees. It also marks the refu-
gees as recipients of aid that the local population is not entitled to. Entitlements 
bestowed through the auspices of the state were a point of contention between 
marginalized communities on the peripheries of Baghdad. The bureaucratic 
labelling of Palestinians as “guests” by the state was adopted in public dis-
course in Iraq. A popular Arabic proverb has it that the stranger should be well-
mannered—Ya gharīb kun adīb! Likewise, Palestinians in Iraq were expected 
to know their place and show gratitude for the hospitality shown to them rath-
er than challenge the stratification that placed them below the status of citi-
zen. Fatima, a 40-year-old housewife from Mosul, told me:
Whenever there would be a problem between us and our neighbours or 
someone, they’d remind us we are Palestinians living in Iraq. They’d say 
things like Inta nazīl wa dabchu ʿala saṭḥ [you’re a guest and you dance on 
56 Zaman
my roof]. It’s an old Iraqi proverb that means you think you’re better than 
us; that you don’t even have respect for your hosts.
Top-down interventions to manage populations by the state in this way do 
little to nurture practices of neighbourliness. Negotiating the encounter with 
difference is done so from a distance produced by the nation-state that 
exacerbates feelings of suspicion and mistrust. Shared histories and collective 
memories of earlier migrations remain, however. In the camps of Southern 
Damascus kinship ties already existed not only with Palestinian Iraqis that had 
fled Iraq in the earlier phase of the crisis but with relatives that had settled in 
Damascus following the nakba of 1948. Here is Fatima again. This time relating 
her experience of being a refugee in Syria:
Dealings with Palestinian Syrians are good. They’ve supported us and 
I don’t feel like a foreigner around them. This is a Muslim Arab country, so 
I don’t have the sense of ghurba [exile and alienation]. It’s only that my 
wider family is far from me that I feel like that I’m away from home. There 
are so many similarities here and with our lives in Iraq; food, language 
[...] yes, there are some differences but it’s not great. I feel like that we’re 
all Palestinians together here.
Fatima immediately associates the largely positive interactions she has with 
Palestinian Syrians with not feeling foreign. Linking the two is the fact that she 
is in a Muslim Arab country and as such has an understanding of how social 
relations are structured and mediated. However, one cannot ignore that she 
refers exclusively to Palestinian Syrians rather than Syrian society at large. As 
with Syrian refugees in Athens, access to the city was limited. Palestinian 
Syrians in Damascus were largely concentrated in Mukhayyim al-Yarmūk.
For others forcibly displaced from Iraq, the sense of ghurba was more 
tangible. This is particularly the case for men who are expected to be bread-
winners in their households. The liminal space that refugees occupy; the 
ambivalent position of the state toward Iraqi refugees generally, designating 
them as guests and the issuing of fixed term residency status of 2–3 months, 
adds to this sense of ghurba. This feeling of alienation may not initially stem 
from relations with the host population but rather the bureaucracy of state 
and surrogate state (Slaughter & Crisp 2008) that marks them as other, which 
in turn creates a distinction for the host population. Here Abū Yasīn recognizes 
the effect this has on refugee and host community relations, narrating fears of 
an uncertain future:
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It affects [you] even at the level of the people, and not the State. People 
get to know that this house is not a Syrian or Palestinian Syrian house. So, 
social interaction isn’t entirely harmonious. Some people like Iraqis; 
I mean I get on well with my neighbours. But, how do they deal with you? 
You’re not an ibn al-balad [… ] Up ’til now, I consider myself a guest, a 
visitor here temporarily and then leaving. I don’t have any expectation of 
permanent residence.3
The use of the expression ibn al-balad is telling. Literally meaning “son of the 
land,” the term belongs to a category of terms used to highlight autochthony 
and difference between those who belong and those who fall outside the 
community. The term ibn al-balad fell into popular usage around the nineteenth 
century at a time in which local populations were coming to terms with the 
challenges of first having Turco-Circassian and then European colonialists 
occupying the same social and geographical space (El-Messiri 1978). In 
contemporary usage the term refers to someone who is legitimately entitled to 
the resources and welfare of the state and denotes belonging. Rights and 
citizenship are the bedrock on which the edifice of integration rests. For Abū 
Yasīn, it is the nation-state that produces the anxiety, creating a sense of 
alienation. There is also ambivalence in the language that the state employs 
with respect to Iraqi refugees. At one and the same time, they are shaqīq (full 
brothers) and ḍuyūf (guests), which points to a more temporal stay. Oscillating 
between the two categories refugees and host communities struggle to balance 
unconditional hospitality—as a shaqīq the refugee is transformed into ibn al-
balad. Yet, the interventions of the Syrian state and humanitarian agencies 
transform the refugee into a guest constrained by the limits of hospitality. By 
affirming only negative rights and deflecting the burden of welfare responsibility 
onto international humanitarian organizations, the Syrian government in 
tandem with the UNHCR and UNRWA established a parallel system of welfare 
protection that in fact marks refugees as others. This is contrary to the UN-
HCR’s own guidelines on refugee protection in urban areas, which aims to “re-
inforce existing fully authorized delivery systems, whether they are public, 
private or community based” (UNHCR 2009a).
3 Author’s interview. Damascus, 18 November 2010.
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5 Mapping Togetherness
The right of neighbourliness, which at various times the Prophet granted or 
was granted, emphasises relational understandings of rights. They are less 
rights residing in individuals, but rather rights possessed by the Other who 
seeks recognition (Soroush 2000, 62). Al-Ghazālī notes that there are four kinds 
of neighbour; each with a corresponding set of rights. The non-Muslim neigh-
bour who has the claim of neighbourliness rights over you; the Muslim neigh-
bour who has the additional claim of Islamic brotherhood; the non-Muslim 
relative, who is also a neighbour, has both the right of neighbourliness and the 
rights due from kinship. Finally, the Muslim neighbour who is also kin enjoys 
all three claims of rights (Sherif 1975, 100). Everyday encounters are littered 
with reference to real or imagined kin relationships. Fictive kin relationships 
continue to be a prominent feature of propriety in the Arab and wider Muslim 
world. Suad Joseph (1996, 200) observes that through the idiom of fictive rela-
tionships expectations of a set of moral or ethical practices is re-called in deal-
ings with the stranger to produce a “learned grammar of sociability” (Buonfino 
and Mulgan 2009, 16). This we find in everyday colloquialisms that are liberally 
sprinkled in languages spoken by Muslims—kolay gelsin! yiʿṭīk alʿāfiyih! khasté 
nabāshī! for whenever we find someone having done a kindness or worked on 
our behalf.
The cartography of togetherness delineated by the nation-state recognises 
only those already resident as citizens or those whom the nation-state has ad-
mitted onto its territory. The production of spatialities that this cartography 
seeks to map cannot simply be reduced to those already resident. We must 
recognise that for those the nation state seeks to make invisible, for whom a 
clear legal relation to the nation state has not been established, an alternative 
sociality is constantly being cultivated—a mobile commons that privileges 
socio-cultural relations rather than a legal relation. It is in this world that vari-
ous categories of people on the move exist. In spite of their uncertain legal 
statuses, people on the move inhabit and construct along with resident others 
a “world of knowledge, of information, of tricks for survival, of mutual care, of 
social relations, of services exchange, of solidarity and [a] sociability that can 
be shared” (Hardt & Negri 2011, 190). In the following sections, we will consider 
how “cartographies of togetherness” are imagined, inscribed, and interpreted 
through an Islamic ethic of neighbourliness. Here I draw on observations from 
a number of research sites: Calais, Athens, Damascus, and Urfa.
The so-called “Jungle” in Calais meets the criteria for what Isin and Rygiel 
(2007) describe as “abject space.” Despite refugee life being “rendered invisible 
and inaudible” by the state, spaces like the “Jungle” become sites for politics 
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rather than spaces of abjection. This subtle difference they argue suspends the 
logic of the nation-state and in so doing makes acts of resistance possible 
(ibid., 184–5). A practical ethic has produced what Africa, a long term-resident 
calls “a wonderful place” where he not only has neighbours but has “made six 
thousand persons [sic] my brothers.” (Afrika et al. 2017). This, he says makes 
him “a rich man” adding “and because of that I sleep in safety” (ibid.). This 
practical ethic is founded in reciprocal relations where “respect with a little 
smile […] can solve everything here in the Jungle—everything. Because they 
[refugees] are looking for respect” (ibid.). The main avenue of the Calais “Jun-
gle” was lined with Afghan and Eritrean restaurants. The proprietors of the res-
taurants, themselves refugees and migrants, did not simply organise the space 
of their establishments for the purpose of dining. They recognised the needs of 
their fellow travellers and permitted residents of the camp to stay at the restau-
rant, socialise with other residents, share information about possible routes 
out of Calais, and charge their mobile phones. Warmth, conversation, and cups 
of tea were at close hand for the residents of the camp biding their time in 
these eateries. Here, we find a contemporary muʾākhā among residents, con-
trasted with life outside of the “Jungle” in the cities of France where inter action 
is often hostile—particularly with police.
To overcome the diminution of social and material capabilities, human 
activity is re-interpreted through a solidaristic narrative of religion. Being a 
refugee is de-stigmatized and moves beyond the totalizing discourse of 
humanitarian and refugee law; mapping an alternative cognitive space in 
which she is located (Bauman 1993, 148). Thus, while social space may be 
constructed through a knowledge of propinquity, the learned grammar of 
sociability or a cultural capital embodied as an Islamic habitus permits refugees 
to read exile in Muslim majority countries as familiar and as home. ʿĀrif, an 
Iraqi refugee I met in Damascus in 2010, told me:
For Iraqis to leave Iraq it was hard. No one wanted to leave Iraq; they 
needed a safe place to go. I found my belief in Islam makes it easier for me 
to think about being a refugee. It’s a hard thing to do, to leave your home, 
but I know that my Prophet did the same, and he was a refugee. If we 
think about it, in Islam we see that borders are not important. There are 
no nationalities. The differences are with language. All the land belongs 
to God and you can find a place to live and work wherever you go.
An Islamic narrative allows refugees to re-imagine their migration. As ʿĀrif re-
minds us: “all the land belongs to God,” i.e. territorial sovereignty belongs to 
God rather than the state. Everyone has the right to move freely without 
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hindrance—borders have no place under this schema. The Islamic narrative 
demands that the stranger is entitled to “find a place to live and work wherever 
[she goes].’
Here we must also acknowledge that urban contexts are increasingly central 
to the spontaneous self-settlement of refugees as they seek out secure places to 
live and work (Pantuliano et al. 2012). Exploring hospitality extended to forced 
migrants in the case of Greece, Katerina Rozakou (2012) contrasts the outsider 
perspective of the state, INGOs, and international agencies administering to 
the needs of asylum-seekers with that of a more culturally grounded approach 
located in relations of solidarity between activists and migrants in the city. On 
the streets of Athens, Rozakou (ibid., 574) observes, forced migrants are “attrib-
uted the power and agency that they typically lack in other aid contexts […re-
versing] established hierarchies between the citizen and the noncitizen, the 
indigenous and the stranger.” However, hierarchical relations linger which 
privilege “profoundly cultural” understandings of what it means to be host and 
guest (ibid.). This then is the contradictory tension ever present in host-guest 
relations. As Derrida (2000, 14) reminds us: “Hospitality can only take place be-
yond hospitality, only by deciding to make it come from beyond, by surmount-
ing hospitality which paralyzes itself on the threshold where it is” (emphasis 
added).
The so-called “European refugee crisis” which saw over a million people 
journey across the Eastern Mediterranean into Europe from 2015 onwards has 
helped produce new socialities that attempt to move beyond hospitality and 
towards neighborliness. In the city of Athens, migrants, refugees and some lo-
cal residents worked together to create and maintain autonomous housing col-
lectives or squats to welcome those who had been made immobile by the 
European Union. In the absence of support from the formal humanitarian ar-
chitecture and the state, refugee residents of squats drew on collective and 
personal memories of both the village and the hāra—the urban neighbourhood 
street wherein understandings of conviviality, mutual aid, and neighbourliness 
are integral to longstanding socio-cultural traditions. This vernacular of 
solidarity resonated and was made intelligible to local Greek activists who 
themselves had extrapolated practices of mutual aid found in the village in 
response to the crisis of austerity imposed by the Greek state and the European 
Union—underscoring a “recontextualisation of village-hood” to locate hori-
zons of solidarity in the city (Rakopoulos 2016, 143). 
This remains a partial horizon. Accommodation for self-settled refugees is 
limited to very few neighbourhoods from 59 municipalities of the city. While 
these neighbourhoods are conveniently located in the city centre and border 
onto other neighbourhoods densely populated by migrants, it would be a 
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stretch to suggest that the recently arrived refugees are connected to the city. 
One resident of the Acharnon School squat told me, “the squat is great, we live 
like a real community here. My family is here. My friends are here. It’s like a 
small village.” When I asked whether there was much interaction with the 
neighbours he replied, “there’s nothing to do, we don’t really know anyone out 
there. We spend most of our time smoking argileh in here.”
A shared sociability is clearly circumscribed here. The degree to which 
encounter and interaction is possible for the residents of the squats is thus 
heavily contingent on the networks of volunteers and activists choosing to 
visit and contribute their time and resources at the squats. This can be 
attributed in part to a lack of connectivity with the economic life of the 
neighbourhoods where the squats are located. While the squats were arguably 
conceived as an iteration of the mobile commons, their relational sense of 
place remains hemmed in rather than being centrifugal and allocentric. 
Opportunities for residents to reach out to other neighbours are limited and 
constrained to the physical space of the squat where activists and volunteers 
arrive to help meet the evident and urgent needs of residents.
Notions of karam or hospitality and generosity remain integral to Arab and 
wider Islamic culture (Chatty 2014). In everyday relations forced migrants in 
the urban context of the Middle East are able to maintain dignity or karāma as 
they negotiate their experience of exile—hospitality accounts for little if there 
is no dignity.4 While the prestige of the host is enhanced through acts of 
generosity (Chatty 2014, 36; Shoukri 2011, 10), the refugee is able to retain a 
dignity through everyday neighbourly interactions, which is often made 
inaccessible through a securitized humanitarian gaze. A religious narrative on 
conviviality takes us beyond hospitality by transforming the guest into a 
neighbour. 
Refugee-led community development responses are integral to opening up 
spaces for everyday neighbourly interactions. These home-like spaces empha-
sise relational aspects of home (Taylor 2015) where protection and security is 
found within ties of fictive and actual kinship rather than with international 
NGOs and agencies. They are not only spaces in which material resources are 
accessed but familiar welcoming places wherein refugees are recognised as be-
ing more than just a case number—they are friends or part of a larger family. 
They are quotidian everyday spaces, rather than spaces that are explicitly 
labelled as religious, in which the potential to facilitate and maintain 
4 A commonly cited tradition of the Prophet states that among those who will not be exonerated 
on the Day of Judgement is he who reminds recipients of his charity to them. See also the 
Noble Qurʾan 2:264. 
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relationships with both guest and host communities is nurtured. They are con-
vivial “spaces where recognition as well as contestation and conflict can take 
place” (Dikeç 2002, 244). Iraqi, Palestinian, and Syrian refugees I have worked 
alongside over the past six years have all established self-help initiatives rhi-
zomatically connected to transnational networks of self-reliance. (Examples 
include Beit ISP and al-Rābita al-Falastiny fī al-ʿIrāq in Damascus [Zaman 
2016], and ad-Dar in Istanbul: <http://www.addarcenter.org/>) From the 
security of these home-like spaces opportunities emerge for the refugee to be 
both host and neighbour. A Syrian participant in the city of Urfa in Turkey 
echoed exilic experiences of Iraqi and Palestinian refugees I had met in 
Damascus; signalling the salience of neighbourly visits as a barometer of 
meaningful relationships: 
I like it when they (Turks) treat us equally and not as “poor” refugees. 
When they visit and invite us to their homes—I feel normal and equal to 
them. I’m not made to feel like a refugee. It’s great when people call on 
you like this. Visiting people’s homes like this means we have proper 
relations.
6 Conclusion: the Right to Neighbourhood
The recovery and foregrounding of the concept and practice of jiwār invites us 
to reconsider the distribution of rights and entitlements. It calls for an 
interrogation of where the ummah is located and challenges us to think beyond 
the constraints of methodological nationalism. The discursive move towards 
relations of neighbourliness complicates binaries of citizen and non-citizen. 
The concomitant shift away from notions of deserving and undeserving brings 
less audible voices into the discussion. It asks us to reconsider rights and 
obligations in light of those who are present. 
Echoing the growing literature in critical urban geography on the “right to 
the city” (Lefebvre 1967, Purcell 2003, Harvey 2003, Marcuse 2010), the right to 
neighbourhood puts forward the case of enfranchising inhabitants of cities 
rather than simply national citizens, a right of neighbourliness serves to pro-
tect the wellbeing, dignity and integrity of all those resident (temporarily or 
otherwise) in a neighbourhood, including those who arrive as strangers. It pro-
tects the neighbourhood against the caprice of a neoliberal nation-state that 
serves to defend the interests of those close to its centre. The right to neigh-
bourhood upholds not only social, cultural and political rights but economic 
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rights also. Lefebvre (1967, 158) provocatively labelled the right to the city “a cry 
and a demand” and it has been a clarion call for the left since. Peter Marcuse 
writes “the demand is of those who are excluded, the cry is of those who are 
alienated; the demand is for the material necessities of life, the aspiration is for 
a broader right to what is necessary beyond the material to lead a satisfying 
life” (Marcuse 2009,190). At a time where there is an increased enclosure of 
public space in the city, there is heightened anxiety around the growing trend 
for those who are excluded, alienated, and dispossessed to be corralled into 
“abject spaces [...] where their existence is rendered invisible and inaudible” 
(Isin and Rygiel 2007, 184).
The politics of propinquity (Amin 2004, 38) I am advocating here is far from 
parochial. It does not serve to exclude those on the margins. Rather, social dis-
tance between self and Other are compressed and boundaries are recognised 
as spaces to cross rather than bound. It understands an individual, a neigh-
bourhood, or a city to be part of a greater whole. Relationships are configured 
radially. It is useful here to think of a concentric circle spiralling outwards, or of 
a matryoshka doll—the spaces in between are not void but thick with mean-
ingful relationships producing “multiple geographies of affiliation, linkage and 
flow” (ibid.). 
The cultural geographer, Thomas Tweed (2006, 97) asserts that those who 
ascribe to a religious worldview are guided by “autocentric” and “allocentric” 
reference frames. The former can be equated with a concern for the care of the 
self, whereas the latter refers to concern with that which is external to oneself. 
These reference frames enable those who ascribe to religious beliefs and prac-
tices to orient themselves temporally and spatially by placing their bodies 
within homes, homelands, and the cosmos. For those cultivating a virtue ethic 
modelled on the Prophet Muhammad, geographies of affiliation flow outwards 
beyond any circumscribed boundaries of the nation-state. In encountering the 
stranger as a neighbour, virtues as learned, habituated dispositions take on 
transcendent meanings that brings the believer closer to the love of God, as the 
Muslim ethicists would have it. Thus, simultaneously providing both an auto-
centric and allocentric reference frame.
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Chapter 5
“Seeking a Widow with Orphaned Children’: 
Understanding Sutra Marriage Amongst Syrian 
Refugee Women in Egypt
Dina Taha
1 Introduction
Egypt currently hosts more than 200 thousand refugees registered by the UN-
HCR all living in urban communities. More than half, around 120 thousand are 
from Syria1 (ECHO Factsheet: Egypt, 2018) arriving after 2011. Fleeing one of the 
worst humanitarian crises since World War II, Syrians arrive to an economi-
cally troubled country and a politically polarizing atmosphere, where they face 
a lack of opportunities and a high cost of living. Some Syrian women in Egypt 
have drawn the attention of media, religious leaders, and advocacy groups by 
marrying Egyptian men soon after arriving (Hassan 2015; Geha 2013). Social 
media campaigns such as Laajiat Lasabaya (Lājiʾāt la Sabāyā)2 or “Refugees, 
not spoils of war” (also rendered on their Facebook page as: Refugees…Not 
Spoils) were ignited as a reaction to this practice in Egypt, as well as Lebanon, 
Jordan and other Arab countries where such marriages have been facilitated, 
encouraged and organized through different channels such as marriage bro-
kers, social media and religious organizations (Barkan 2012). 
This paper is part of a broader study that I conducted for my fieldwork in 
Egypt during the summer of 2017 where I interviewed thirty-three Syrian refu-
gee women who escaped the conflict in Syria and married Egyptian men post 
2011 once they settled in Egypt. It highlights a recurring notion that I came 
across during many of the interviews—Zawāj al-Sutra (Protection or Shelter 
Marriage). In such cases, the man is motivated to marry a widow, especially 
that of another man who died because of war, with the intention of providing 
her and her children with livelihood and emotional support. Such a practice 
1 The rest are mostly from east Africa or Iraq (ECHO Factsheet: Egypt, 2018). These figures don’t 
include Palestinian refugees (see for instance: Palestine refugees: locations and numbers, 
IRIN, 2010).
2 More information about the campaign available at: <https://www.facebook.com/Lajiaat.
Lasabayaa>.
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was arguably recurrent throughout Islamic history where many have suggested 
it was encouraged in the Islamic tradition.
Muslim scholars’ increased interest in the ways Shariʿa cultivates ethics and 
virtue beyond the legally binding provisions in the modern era is arguably nov-
el, compared to pre-modern scholars (Katz 2015, 26). Some factors can be 
traced back to the impact of modernity and its repercussions on the emer-
gence of a modern (human) subject, as well as the formation of the nation-
state and codified law, particularly personal status law, in many Muslim 
majority countries on the relationship between Islamic jurisprudence and Is-
lamic ethics (ibid., 25). This interest in incorporating ethical questioning due 
to modern dictates, as argued by Tariq Ramadan, [should] change the founda-
tion and nature of Islamic legal reasoning, requiring a more holistic approach 
and an understanding of the theory of knowledge “that generates meaning and 
the ethical questions generated by social, scientific, and intellectual develop-
ment” (Ramadan 2017, 15). Thus, formulating legal rulings to govern forced mi-
gration, a phenomenon that emerged at the end of the second world war and 
the prevalence of the nation-state as the dominant form of political gover-
nance, requires sufficient mastery over the field of knowledge that religious 
rulings are based upon, including an understanding of the higher ethical ob-
jectives of Shariʿa (Maqāṣid). 
I approach the phenomenon of Sutra marriage from an anti-colonial theo-
retical framework which seeks to analyze and use local cultures as a tool to 
resist “the everyday devaluation, denial and negation of the creativity, agency, 
resourcefulness and knowledge systems” of non-Western cultures (Dei 2012). 
Among the pioneers of Postcolonial Feminism, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak 
and Chandra Talpade Mohanty in particular have (re)developed the theories 
of Frantz Fanon and Edward Said towards the creation of Postcolonial/Anti-
orientalist critical approaches of knowledge production to challenge Western 
hegemonic ways of knowing. Mohanty asserts that portrayals of Third World 
women as victims contribute to further marginalizing those women (Mohanty 
1984). Anti-colonial frameworks, however, do not attempt to deny the exis-
tence of victimhood and victimizing dynamics in the Global South; rather, 
they seek to challenge essentialized understandings of binaries such as victims 
or agents. 
My objective from offering an anti-colonial reading of this case study 
is twofold: first, by shedding more light on the complexity of the woman 
refugeeness through addressing women’s multidimensional and complex 
forms of oppression and autonomy in the Global South, I aim to offer Islamic 
scholars and jurists a critical language that responds to the often-orientalised 
feminist and human rights advocates’ characterizations of gendered relations 
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in non-Western contexts. Second, an anti-colonial feminist perspective show-
cases the need for having a “gendered” approach to Islamic fatwas. A gen-
dered approach can be traced whether in offering a “meaningful and healing” 
solution to refugee women, and Muslim women in general, or in revisiting and 
assessing the complex power dynamics that defines conjugal relationships of 
the kind being addressed here.
Moreover, in response to the changing nature of global mobility and in 
commitment to the anti-colonial principle that seeks to destabilize Eurocentric 
hegemonic ways of knowing, the article also seeks to pose questions that push 
the debates surrounding the ethics of migration today. Particularly, Can Sutra 
marriage be considered an ethical and moral response to the gendered forced 
migration? Can it be regulated to echo calls for gender equality and gender 
empowerment? Who sets the rules about principles and notions of interna-
tional humanitarianism? How can we include cultural diversity, including gen-
der, ethnicity, and sexual orientation in ethics of migration? And whose voices 
should be included in these discussions? 
Hence, this is not an ethical, legal, or jurisprudential paper per se, but offers 
important sociological insights to jurists in issuing fatwas that are better in-
formed about contemporary realities, gender discourses and forced migrants’ 
experiences. Sociology “as the study of the individual, society and the relation-
ship between structures and group processes” (Castles 2002) should assist ju-
rists, particularly with regard to understanding human mobility, in grasping 
the societal dynamics of forced migration. A particular contribution relevant 
to this study is introducing issues around identity (re)formation and the effect 
forced migration might have on traditional gender roles in the modern (and 
post-modern) world order as well as critiquing notions such as victimhood and 
exploitation from both gender and forced migration perspectives. 
I start by positioning this practice in Islamic jurisprudence and the role 
played by the jurisprudential culture in defining Sutra marriage and its param-
eters. I then critically engage with a sample of contemporary fatwas in order to 
trace the jurisprudential perception to Sutra as grounds for marriage and Sutra 
marriage as a tool for shelter and aid to Muslim (women) refugees. Next, I re-
late the stories of three women to unfold the different trajectories and the 
mixed experiences that Sutra marriage has taken with different Syrian refugee 
women in Egypt. I seek to address these marriages from the women’s perspec-
tive in a way that goes beyond assessing them morally, but to expose the gaps 
between the fatwa’s opinion, vision and advice and the application, especially 
given the vulnerable status of many forced migrants. Finally, and using an anti-
colonial lens, I conclude with a discussion of (a) how the narratives discussed 
pose theoretical and conceptual challenges to some central feminist concepts 
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such agency and gender roles, and (b) some avenues through which sociologi-
cal research can offer Islamic jurisprudence a deeper understanding of the ex-
periences, and consequently the needs of some marginalized groups such as 
refugee women in Muslim societies. 
2 Sutra Marriage in the Islamic Jurisprudential Texts and Cultures
The term “Zawāj al-Sutra” has been used by both media and advocacy groups 
to mean different things, including marrying rape victims (Barkan 2012; Natour 
2016). In the fatwas below, three meanings of Sutra marriage emerge. First, 
Sutra in the general sense means providing ʿIffa or chastity and modesty. In 
that sense, marriage is considered as a means for the gratification of sexual 
needs and procreation (Mir-Hossein 2003). Second, Sutra can be perceived as 
a means for providing relief for rape victims (or women who committed 
adultery and then repented). Third, Sutra can be used in the sense of providing 
shelter, livelihood support and protection for widows and divorced women.3 
The last meaning is the primary concern of this paper.
Keeping the above in mind, I turn to examining four fatwas that I was able 
to authenticate from the Fatwa Center website. The Fatwa Center is a scientific 
Islamic portal affiliated with the Ministry of Awqāf and Islamic Affairs in Qatar. 
It is concerned with answering questions related to the Muslim faith, worship, 
transactions, ethics, behavior, and other matters.4 The small sample size of the 
selected fatwas goes back to the rigorous verification process. During this veri-
fication process I was committed to the following criteria: (1) excluding any 
fatwas that did not mention the name and the credentials of the Muftī (jurist) 
or the body of jurists responsible for issuing the fatwa; (2) excluding any fatwas 
mentioned on social media or blogposts due to the overrepresentation of fab-
ricated fatwas, fake news, unauthenticated post-sharing about Islamic scholars 
issuing controversial fatwas surrounding Syrian refugee women in particular;5 
(3) excluding fatwas that were acquired orally, no matter how prevalent they 
3 In the nineties, the notion of Sutra marriage started to gain cultural association with Muslim 
war victims and refugee women. It began with Bosnian women in the late 90s followed by 
Iraqis and recently Syrians.
4 More information about the fatwa center available at: <http://fatwa.islamweb.net/fatwa/
index.php?page=aboutfatwa>.
5 For instance, a fake news was disseminated among different media portals that the Saudi 
Scholar Muḥammad al-ʿArifī issued a controversial fatwa allowing what they referred to as 
Jihād al-Nikāḥ. More information available here: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v= 
JL1Nl7MyWPk>.
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were. The latter contained fatwas acquired through personally asking a scholar 
or those propagated during Friday sermons. This criterion also excluded fatwas 
mentioned by some of my respondents during the interviews.
Most references relied on two avenues to justify and encourage Sutra 
marriage for widows and divorced women. The first is by citing historical 
incidents where the prophet himself or his companions were eager to marry 
widows and divorced women (see for instance, AlHamoud, 2011). A second 
avenue was through citing religious texts from Qurʾan and Sunnah that 
encourage Muslims to protect each other, especially the most vulnerable like 
the poor, widows and orphans6 and emphasize the reward for taking care of 
them. For instance, it is reported on the authority of Abū Hurayra that the 
Prophet said: “Whoever removes a worldly grief from a believer, Allah will remove 
from him one of the griefs of the Day of Resurrection. And whoever alleviates the 
need of a needy person, Allah will alleviate his needs in this world and the 
Hereafter. Whoever shields [or hides the misdeeds of] a Muslim, Allah will shield 
him in this world and the Hereafter. And Allah will aid His slave so long as he aids 
his brother…” [al-Nawawī 40 Hadith, no. 36]. In another report, the Prophet said, 
“One who cares for widows and the poor is like those who fight in the way of Allah 
or those who spend their days fasting and their nights praying.” [al-Bukhārī Adab 
al-Mufrad, chapter “The Virtue of Those Who Care for Orphans”—Agreed upon 
hadīth]. A third report states that Umm Saʿīd bint Murra al-Fihrī related from 
her father that the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, said,  
“I and the guardian of an orphan will be in the Garden like these two (His two 
fingers).” [al-Bukhārī Adab al-Mufrad, chapter “The Virtue of Those Who Care 
for Orphans”]
In all the four fatwas below, the notions of Sutra (covering, protection 
or sheltering) and ʿIffa (chastity and modesty) were referenced explicitly or 
impli citly as “noble” grounds and a reason for marriage. The fatwas address 
cases involving widows, refugee women, or other vulnerable cases such as 
rape victims and women who lost their virginity due to unlawful intercourse. 
Following is a brief summary of each fatwa.
2.1 Fatwa (1): Marrying with the Intention of Providing Chastity7 
In this fatwa, the inquirer is referring to some Facebook pages that facilitate 
the marriage of Syrian women living in Egypt. He expressed his wish to provide 
6 In Islamic fiqh, an orphan is someone who has lost their father or both parents before the age 
of maturity.
7 The script of the fatwa was taken from: <http://fatwa.islamweb.net/fatwa/index.php?page=s
howfatwa&Option=FatwaId&Id=235441> (last accessed May 2018).
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chastity (ʿIffa) to a Syrian sister and asked whether this wish and intention are 
permissible and if the muftī (jurist) has any advice for him. The fatwa responds 
by confirming the permissibility of marrying a Syrian Muslim woman. In fact, 
it encouraged the inquirer to do so because the intention of providing her with 
chastity as well as emotional support in her hardship is an act that will be 
rewarded generously. 
2.2 Fatwa (2): Marrying a Widow with Orphans8
In this fatwa, the inquirer seeks guidance for his intention to marry a widow as 
a second wife but planning to keep it a secret from his first wife. He explained 
that he sought this marriage in order to take care of her orphaned children but 
then changed his mind last minute after realizing that his intentions weren’t 
“pure.” He came to the conclusion that he can support the orphans without the 
marriage or the secrecy. The fatwa responded by describing sheltering a widow 
and her orphans through marriage as a good deed that would be rewarded. It 
encouraged him to be honest with his first wife but clarified nevertheless that 
he is not obliged religiously to inform her.
2.3 Fatwa (3): Marrying to Cover a Sin9
In this fatwa, a woman was asking about the legal and religious obligation on a 
man she was in a relationship with and with whom she lost her virginity. She 
mentioned that he has always expressed his loyalty to her and his desire to 
eventually marry her, but his family ended up opposing the marriage. The 
woman is asking the muftī to encourage the man to take responsibility for his 
actions. The fatwa started by condemning both the man and the woman for 
their behaviour and asserted that even though the man is not religiously 
obliged to do so, he “should” marry her with the intention of applying Sutra to 
her and he would be rewarded for his deed. The fatwa quotes the hadīth 
“Whoever shields [or hides the misdeeds of] a Muslim, Allah will shield him in this 
world and the Hereafter…”
2.4 Fatwa (4): Marrying a rape victim10
In this fatwa, the man states that after proposing to a girl, she asked to meet 
him privately and confessed that she was raped at 17 and that she hasn’t told 
8 The script of the fatwa was taken from: <http://fatwa.islamweb.net/fatwa/index.php?pag
e=showfatwa&Option=FatwaId&Id=66438> (last accessed May 2018).
9 The script of the fatwa was taken from: <http://fatwa.islamweb.net/fatwa/index.php?pag
e=showfatwa&Option=FatwaId&Id=63748> (last accessed May 2018).
10 The script of the fatwa was taken from: <http://fatwa.islamweb.net/fatwa/index.php?pag
e=showfatwa&Option=FatwaId&Id=7994> (last accessed May 2018).
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anyone including her parents. He is asking for a religious opinion whether to 
marry her. The fatwa responds that, under the condition that he can trust that 
she is telling the truth, he should pray Istikhāra (the prayer of seeking guidance 
from Allah) and weigh in her religious devotion before he moves on with the 
marriage. The muftī stresses that there is no objection in marrying her especially 
that what happened to her was beyond her control. The fatwa also encouraged 
him, whether he decided to marry her or not, not to disclose her secret to 
anyone and also cites the hadīth “Whoever shields [or hides the misdeeds of] a 
Muslim, Allah will shield him in this world and the Hereafter…”
From the above fatwas, one can notice that they are motivated to a large 
extent by the muftī ’s assessment of advancing the women’s interest. Each  fatwa 
encouraged an action based on the assumption that it will provide emotional 
support to the woman during hardship, when it encouraged the inquirer to be 
honest with his first wife, even though he is not obliged to, or when it advised 
the inquirer not to disclose the rape victim’s secret. On the other hand, recall-
ing the relationship between Islamic jurisprudence and advancing virtue and 
ethics, there were also common issues between the fatwas and their under-
standing of the woman’s best interest, which create dilemmas for the contem-
porary understanding and application of social justice, especially for vulnerable 
groups such as uprooted refugees. First, the fatwas place a huge weight in their 
rationale and verdict on the “pure” intention of the man without identifying 
accountability measures to protect the women from future potential abuse. 
Second, they frame the marriage decision-making, or lack thereof, almost sole-
ly in the hands of the man and his discretion. Third, and most importantly, 
they portray the woman as a one-dimensional character lacking any depth or 
any form of varied experiences, agency or preferences. That is to say, the fatwas 
do not pay diligent attention to the individual women’s circumstances. For 
them, a rape-victim and the widow, a woman who lost her virginity and a refu-
gee, all have the same needs and are the same woman—“the” woman. This 
woman is often portrayed as the victim who needs to be saved (by “the” man).
In the following section, I try to add a “face” to “that woman” in the above 
fatwas while focusing on the experience of the refugee woman. In doing so 
I demonstrate that different women have different approaches and under-
standing of Sutra marriage; and in many occasions, defy the “victim” image 
that underlies the rationale and the verdict of many jurisprudential texts that 
address marriage and spousal rights.
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3 Sutra Marriage: Stories from the Field
Three women that I came across during my fieldwork: Maha, Marwa and Nour11 
presented three interesting and variant trajectories to what they themselves 
labelled as Sutra marriage. The three women are Syrian refugees who arrived in 
Egypt after 2012 and settled in the city of ʿĀshir min Ramaḍān (or of Al-ʿĀshir 
for short), a newly industrial but suburban city in Sharqiyya governorate and is 
considered to be part of greater Cairo. The three women had children from 
previous marriages and they all referred during their interviews to Sutra or 
Sutra marriage. Marwa and Nour are siblings and they are in close acquaintance 
with Maha. Despite all the commonalities, their stories present three different 
understandings and outcomes to their marriage experiences. 
4 Maha: Killing Two Birds with One Stone
Maha was in her 40s. She grew up in Damascus (commonly referred to as 
Shām) in a well-off area. Unlike many of the Syrian women that I have inter-
viewed, she went to law school where she met her first husband and got 
married after a “powerful” love story. When she got divorced, she refused to 
marry for 11 years because most suitors requested that her children stay behind 
with her family, which she firmly refused. After arriving to Egypt in December 
2012 and settling within the relatively large Syrian community in the city of Al-
ʿĀshir, like many of her counterparts, marriage proposals started to pour in. 
When I asked her if she was seriously considering marriage to an Egyptian and 
her motivation behind this marriage, her response was mainly focused on 
emotional and social support that results from having a male figure in one’s life 
in an Arab country. 
D: But you weren’t opposed to the idea of marriage?
M: No, because the situation was really tough to be honest. After my sib-
lings left (to Saudi Arabia) and my parents are old and all my sib-
lings are married, I thought that I have to get married.
D: And how did you generate income (before marriage)?
M: My parents
D: Oh, so you didn’t need marriage for financial reasons but socially and 
emotionally.
11 Pseudonyms were used to keep the participants identities anonymous. 
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M: I am very romantic, and there was a love story with my first husband, 
so it was a tough situation because 10 years… it is like they say “emo-
tional drought” …. God bless my children.
D: So, when you got married you didn’t feel obliged to?
M: I had to get married. Like they say marriage is Sutra. 
D: What do you mean marriage is Sutra?
M: I found that without (marriage) many men crossed the line with me. 
It is protection and support for me later on. And my kids too need a 
father.
Of course, I was intrigued by the concept of Sutra so I asked her to expand a 
little bit on her interpretation of its meaning and how she would explain the 
Egyptian men’s eagerness to marry Syrian women. Her response reflects not 
just a conscious understanding of the realities and driving forces of this notion 
but also a sense of control of the situation. That is, in this kind of marriage, she 
is also offering something in return not merely waiting to be saved or protected. 
D: … you mentioned that many (Egyptian men) wanted to marry you. 
Did you ask them why?
M: They say they want to apply Sutra to my children. They don’t say it 
explicitly, but we get it.
D: So what do they say?
M: They don’t say that “exactly.” Of course, they appreciate our tidiness, 
cleanliness, and beauty. But in some cases, they say it explicitly, like 
in Marwa’s case: so that he would protect her (apply Sutra) and her 
children and receive reward (religious oblation). Of course, it’s not 
just for that (the oblation) but it’s also for himself. It’s like killing 
two birds with one stone. On the one hand, he would receive a huge 
reward that he raised her kids and on the other, she is Syrian. She is 
going to make him happy and pleased. That’s the opinion of all of 
them (the Egyptian men) because they have witnessed similar ex-
periences before their eyes and they have noticed our different na-
ture (compared to Egyptian women). For example, with my 
husband, his friends would tell me: you switched him 180 degrees. 
Even his kids…
Overall, Maha’s marriage seemed to be a positive experience. Despite being a 
second wife and going through a few hiccups due to the first wife’s resistance, 
she expressed on multiple occasions that she carries respect to her current 
husband, that she has fallen in love with him and that she was trying hard to 
get pregnant for the second time with him. In fact, when asked explicitly about 
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her marriage experience in Egypt compared to that back home in Syria, she 
enthusiastically concluded that she is better off with her Egyptian husband 
and that in general Egyptian husbands are better than Syrian ones largely due 
to cultural and social habits. 
5 Nour: “Tasting a New Fruit in the Market”
Nour was the youngest. She was 25 years old when her husband got killed in 
Damascus a year and a half before our interview. She and her daughter were, 
hence, forced to catch up with her family in Egypt a few months later after ill-
treatment at her in-laws’ household. Just a few months after arrival, a family 
friend introduced them to an Egyptian man who is married with kids but was 
searching for a Syrian widow to apply Sutra to. They had the religious marriage12 
three weeks after they first met. She noticed a change in her new husband’s 
treatment and aloofness after the first month of their marriage that ended up 
with separation just four months into the relationship. Despite her young age, 
her negative experience and feeling of being used, Nour still demonstrated a 
sense of agency and responsibility in both her decision to marry soon after ar-
riving to Egypt and her desire to remarry again after the failure of the first at-
tempt. Her justifications reflected deep self-awareness of her social position 
and she was able to identify the best options and alternative to make the best 
out of the situation.
D: So he told you he is married and he wanted to marry again in secret?
N: Yes
D: And what was your impression?
M: That his wife will eventually know by time. Nothing can be hidden




M: Because I have special circumstances, I am not a normal girl.
D: Don’t you think that this is lowering one’s standards?
N: Dear, it’s not us. It’s the world around us that forces us (to think and 
act this way). Even if you are convinced, the society around you 
won’t be convinced.
12 So she would be his lawful wife religiously but socially she still stays with her parents until 
they prepare for the wedding and the new place. This facilitates his visitation and them 
getting to know each other. Having sex would be lawful but is socially frowned upon. If 
they separate, she is considered divorced but there are usually no documents to prove the 
marriage and divorce. 
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D: You are right
N: Excuse me, I’m sure your study showed you, but most of our society 
is not like that. Even if you convince yourself.
D: Do you mean that you might be convinced with one thing but the 
society obliges you to another?
N: Exactly. So why would I bother/pressure myself. If I wanted to marry 
a single man, no one would want my daughter […]
D: Oh so you mean you don’t care if you are a first or a second wife as 
long as your daughter is with you?
N: Yes dear. Excuse me but for women like us we don’t think about our-
selves, we think about our children. When you buy anything for the 
house do you think of yourself or your son? […] In my country, I had 
my rights and I was able to manage. Here I am in a strange country. 
Why would I work and humiliate myself, meet this and meet that, 
the good and the bad? No, I apply Sutra to myself and my daughter 
and find a human being who is honest and straightforward and of-
fers me a decent life. I’m not saying that I want a car and a big house. 
Middle ground. A decent life…. 
For Nour, she knew there are social restrictions that are not just present due to 
her gender and social status: a widow with a child, but also due to her forced 
migration status and being in a foreign country. She was convinced that a 
woman’s “natural path is to eventually get married.” Her forced migration sta-
tus, however, have turned this natural path, which might now comprise more 
limited and slightly different options given her current social status, into a 
solution, an opportunity, and even, one might argue, an advantage because of 
her gender. Based on her rationale, other solutions such as working, as a 
hairdresser, which was her job before she married her first husband, would 
keep her away from her daughter and expose her to a relatively foreign culture 
hence making her prone to exploitation and “humiliation” as she described it. 
For her, marriage was the “safe” or the “decent” option, if not the obvious one 
in her situation, especially given that her child was her priority. She expressed 
her dissatisfaction with the idea of Egyptian men seeking a Syrian woman per 
se and described some of them as “wanting to try the new fruit in the market.”
During our conversation, we were both trying to figure out the reason why 
her ex-husband called the marriage off. She hesitantly confessed that, after a lot 
of insistence from him and despite the traditions, she agreed to have sex with 
him once closer to the end of the first month. Soon after, his treatment and 
attitude started to change which later escalated to the separation. We debated 
a few theories to try to make sense of the situation. The “trying the new fruit 
in the market” explanation was obviously the first and the most depressing 
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amongst the potential explanations, especially after adding the intercourse 
factor. His care about his first family and fear from destroying it was also an-
other explanation. A common theme amongst all the potential explanations 
is that it seemed that Sutra, unlike the coming story, was not a strong enough 
reason for this marriage to survive. In fact, basing this marriage solely on Sutra 
created a fragile relationship, despite any noble intentions. 
6 Marwa: “He Gave Me the Choice and I Chose Sutra”
Like her younger sister, Marwa’s husband was killed in the war five years ago 
and soon after she moved with her parents to Egypt in 2012. Marwa seemed to 
be more resourceful and demonstrated higher ability to act on her own than 
her sister, despite having two kids and growing up in the same context. As soon 
as she arrived in Egypt, she searched for a job and was able to move among, 
and often fight for, a few decent office jobs that seemed to bring her great 
satisfaction. She had two experiences with Sutra marriage, one of which was 
incomplete. In this case, despite her father’s refusal, the Egyptian man, who 
was also motivated by the religious oblation from supporting orphans, 
promised her a monthly allowance for her kids. Three months in, however, he 
asked her hand in marriage again, hoping that his commitment over three 
months would make a good case for him. After being turned down for the 
second time, he withdrew his commitment and she had to search for a job 
again. In the second story, she meets her current husband who constantly 
reminded her and her family that he is doing this for the children. In fact, 
before they met each other in person, over the phone, he gave Marwa the 
choice between Sutra (here implying Sutra through marriage) and just financial 
support by giving a monthly allowance to her children. She picked the first 
without hesitation. In the excerpt below, Marwa was describing her conflict 
between agreeing to marry her husband whom she initially refused because of 
his looks and between what Sutra would bring her and her kids:
D: … and what were you looking for in a husband? Did you care about 
love?
M: Yes, I did care, but I cared more about commitment and religious de-
votion. I cared about Sutra too.
D: What is the meaning of Sutra?
M: In my opinion, Sutra means a man… when you say “that’s it!” no one 
is going to harass me, no one is going to impose themselves on me. 
That’s it! I am with this man and so I can rest mentally.
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D: Do you mean because he is going to be your support and back bone?
M: Yes… however up until that moment I wasn’t sure how I felt. I was 
destroyed but at the same time I had the motivation because of my 
children […] Of course my dad didn’t allow me to come outside and 
meet him when he came the first time. I stayed inside and then my 
husband said I just want to see the kids I don’t want to see her. I am 
here for the kids
D: Oh so he was referring to sheltering orphans?
M: Yes, and he didn’t request to see me and my dad really appreciated 
this gesture. He spoke with the children and gave my daughter mon-
ey, like allowance, and brought them sweets and he didn’t see me 
despite coming from a long distance. And then my father wanted to 
see him for a second time and of course I saw him that time but at 
this time I didn’t really approve of him.
D: Why? His looks?
M: Yes, he wasn’t good looking. Can you believe that? I was concerned 
about the looks! But now despite all the problems between us 
I think he has a peaceful face and he has nice hair too. So I started to 
see his good looks now.
D: After marriage?
M: Yes… slowly through his good treatment and concern about us. Even 
until now. Yesterday I was asking him about something and he said 
are the kids comfortable with it or not? I told him: “but I am not 
comfortable,” so he responded: “I married you for the kids.”
D: Does that make you happy or upset?
M: Sometimes it makes me happy and sometimes upset depending on 
the context. 
Marwa, unlike her sister, didn’t reject the idea of working to support herself 
and her kids. In fact, she met her husband because she was searching for a job. 
She has proven resilience and skill in acquiring jobs and expressed deep satis-
faction with her “printer, computer and very nice office.” However, despite try-
ing it and experiencing the satisfaction resulting from it, when given the 
option, she still preferred marriage over working. When her current husband’s 
first wife asked her: “didn’t you think about me? What would happen to me 
when my husband marries a second wife.” She simply replied: “No, to be hon-
est, I didn’t think about you” implying that was already in a much worse situa-
tion and needed to take care of her own self first. Marwa, like Nour and Maha, 
used her agency to assess the situation and her social position within it and 
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took the decision that best served her interest, which extended in the three 
cases to their children’s interest. 
7 Discussion
The trajectory of the three marriages, despite the common label of Sutra, had 
to do a lot with the man/husband’s circumstances, understanding and real 
reasons behind the marriage. In Maha’s case, both the husband and the wife 
were honest with each other about their intentions and need for intimacy. In 
such case, Sutra had served as a bonus that reinforced a second marriage 
against a resisting first wife and has potentially worked as a social justification 
for the husband who was a public figure. In Nour’s case, while it is hard to 
speculate the ex-husband’s real intentions, Sutra and the religious oblation 
was not a strong enough reason for the marriage to survive. The husband’s 
theoretical and moral understanding of Sutra marriage and his attempt to 
apply it clashed with his “other” social life and probably conflicted, in his mind, 
with modernist social dictates of the nuclear monogamous family. In Marwa’s 
case, on the other hand, Sutra was the glue that kept the marriage together 
thus far. The husband’s clear vision of marrying her for the sake of her orphaned 
children played a major role in giving both the husband and the wife a reason 
to keep going, despite all the problems as Marwa clarified. It was even a reason 
for Marwa to fall in love with her husband later on in the marriage and for him 
to hold on to this marriage despite his first wife’s constant call to get a divorce. 
The above stories point to the major role the husband and his understanding 
(or misunderstanding) of Sutra marriage play in determining the success of 
the marriage. That said, the women on the other hand demonstrated substantial 
control in making and calculating the initial decision to get married. That is to 
say, for the three women, the decision to marry using the rationale of Sutra had 
its mitigating social pressures, some stemming from patriarchy and others 
stemming from the uprootedness and their forced migration status. I argue 
here that they all point to the fact that those mitigated social structures par-
ticularly gender and refugeeness can offer the refugee women an advantage 
and an ability to manoeuvre traditions to serve their best interest. In other 
words, facilitated but not entirely determined by the religious Sutra rhetoric, 
their labeled “vulnerable” and “victim” status created by social factors, namely, 
their refugeeness, gender, ethnicity: Syrians (compared to other sub-Saharan 
refugees such as Sudanese, Eritreans and Somalis), and social position as wid-
ows/divorced-with orphaned children had provided them with an opportunity 
and a solution that are not usually available to other displaced demographics 
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in the same context. This statement complicates notions such as agency, vic-
timhood, vulnerability and exploitation to both the contemporary liberal fem-
inist and humanitarian discourses and to the justifications on which many of 
the Sutra marriage fatwas are built.
7.1 Liberal Agency and Moral Agency
Agency in liberal feminist literature and imagination is understood ultimately 
as the resistance to forms of domination and the capacity to realize one’s own 
interest against custom (Mahmood 2001). What I sought to demonstrate through 
my respondents’ narratives is that while a deeper look into those women’s 
testimonies reveals a strong resemblance to the above definition, especially 
regarding the pursuit of one’s interest, this notion of liberal agency captures 
only a thin layer of those women’s experiences. In other words, restricting 
ourselves to such definition of agency sharply limits our understanding of 
those women’s subjectivities and experiences that were formed by and within 
non-Western liberal cultural contexts.
The three cases above reveal that the women were still able to utilize 
relational autonomy13 and agency–in its liberal sense, to pursue their interest. 
A major fracture to this rhetoric, however, is that those women still prescribed 
themselves to the traditional marriage institution and many other “patriarchal” 
discourses. That was manifested in Maha’s statement: “a woman without a 
man is like a tree without leaves”; Nour’s conviction that the woman’s ultimate 
path is to get married; or Marwa’s decision to choose marriage over monthly 
financial support when given the choice by her future husband. Here, the post-
structuralist Foucauldian concept of Subjectification that was later taken by 
Judith Butler in her gender analysis, is particularly helpful. Subjectification 
draws attention to power (and norms in Butler’s analysis) as both subordinating 
or constraining and enabling. In other words, the modes that allow and create 
agency are in fact the products of power operations (they didn’t exist before 
the dominance of this power). Personal preferences and gender roles are social 
constructs dictated to a large extent by culture, upbringing and other social 
forces. For instance, Nour’s conviction that marriage is the natural path to any 
woman has helped form her options and preferences and shaped her 
understanding of marriage as “the decent” option for her situation. It has also 
13 Relational autonomy is the label that has been given to an alternative conception of what 
it means to be “a free, self-governing agent who is also socially constituted and who 
possibly defines her basic value commitments in terms of inter- personal relations and 
mutual dependencies” (Christman 2004, 143). Recognizing relational autonomy as an 
analytical tool helps us see those women as aware of their social position, aware of the 
social transaction or the mutual benefit created by this form of marriage.
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helped set her priorities when it came to her obligations to her daughter as 
well as her understanding of love and intimacy. 
This is not to deny the patriarchal and unjust conditions, such as fear from 
harassment or distress about personal safety, that underlie those women’s so-
cio-cultural milieu and shape their preferences and decision to marry. Rather, 
I want to pick up on Saba Mahmood’s argument which sought to problematize 
a question that has dominated scholarship, such as: “how do women contrib-
ute to reproducing their own domination, and how do they resist or subvert 
it?” (Mahmood 2001, 255). Here, I would like to recall the anti-colonial critique 
that challenges the assumption that the desire to freedom from subordination 
is universal and innate to human nature (ibid., 256). I argue that the decision/
desire to marry for those women is determined by a complex web shaped by: 
(a) explicit/liberal understanding of agency and weighing one’s interest against 
custom; (b) societal patriarchal dictations that re-articulate marriage as the 
decent and almost the only solution; and (c) those women’s moral agency. 
Such moral agency does not particularly aim to enhance one’s material interest 
or status but rather to “attain a certain kind of state of happiness, purity, wis-
dom, perfection, or immortality” (ibid., 210). In short, those women have per-
ceived marriage as an agentive act not just in terms of promoting their 
socio-economic interest or to manoeuvre social structure but also as a moral 
and virtuous act that complements their existence and understanding of their 
femininity and gender–which, recalling Butler (1990), should not be under-
stood as having an inner core or a value independent from the social.
7.2 Marriage, Intimacy and the Nuclear Family
Another conceptual challenge that the narratives of those women have im-
posed on liberal scholarship is the reconceptualization of the notion of mar-
riage. While not challenging the idea of marriage as an institution per se, many 
of the women have posed important challenges to some of the core principles 
of marriage as understood in a postmodern world. At first glance, and consis-
tent with the point made above about the multi-layered understanding and 
embodiment of agency, one could identify some pragmatic motives behind 
such challenges such as preferring and pursuing a polygamous marriage for 
reasons such as wanting to be only part-time wives which gives them more 
time for their children. Some others have also refused to register the marriage 
officially and limited it to a customary contract for some calculated reasons 
such as simplifying any potential separation especially in the event that they 
wanted to leave the country. However, beyond those pragmatic motives and 
throughout the narratives, one is able to trace malleable meanings of intimacy, 
romantic love and the nuclear family which pose challenges to the simplistic 
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explanations of gender inequality in non-Western, particularly in this case Is-
lamic, cultures. 
For instance, despite her negative experience, Nour was actually pleased 
with her ex-husband’s interest in applying Sutra to a widow and her orphaned 
children. As a researcher, I was astonished by the fact that she would be happy 
that someone is marrying her out of apparent charity. She clarified that she 
appreciated his honesty and noble intention and she was convinced that 
love, an important factor still, is a gradual process that will come later. When 
I reflected back on my astonishment, I could trace in my rationale elements 
of a colonized understanding of intimate relations that are often explained 
through convictions about the nuclear family as well as individualized per-
ceptions, commercialized romantic expressions and monopolized affec tions. 
This mal leable understanding of marriage and gender identity should not be 
understood merely in terms of strategic malleability, but that it also “emerges 
because of her traditionally ascribed gender identity not despite of it” (Taha 
2017, 117).
7.3 Reimagining Contemporary Jurisprudence
So far, I have spent time arguing for reimagining the meanings of agency, fam-
ily and marriage to understand the cultural complexity of those women’s con-
sciousness and articulation of autonomy, intimacy and gender roles. Now I 
want to direct the attention to how the above accounts and analysis are helpful 
to contemporary Islamic jurisprudence, particularly in two main ways. First, as 
was evident in the previous section, it destabilizes the orientalised portrayal of 
Third World refugee women, particularly Muslim refugee women, as passive 
victims of a primitive patriarchal legal system, here namely fiqh.14 Rather, the 
women’s accounts show how social restrictions and structures that produce 
vulnerability due to gender and forced migration have simultaneously opened 
new spaces and opportunities to, and have been utilized by, this social group. 
Moreover, the accounts offer refugee researchers tools to explore new areas 
and new meanings for notions such as shelter and resettlement. Thus, while 
the latter might not necessarily be used in explaining the rational of a reli-
gious verdict, it still provides the jurists and Islamic scholars with a common 
“language” with feminist and human rights advocates to engage in a meaning-
ful debate on gender dynamics, gender rights and gender-based violence in 
Muslim societies.
That said, as a postcolonial feminist myself, my objective from this paper is 
not by any means to deny forces of social oppression to women in Islamic, as 
14 Almost always confused with and is known as sharia in the West.
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well as other, cultures. There is some extensive work by specialized ethicists 
who identify areas of moral and ethical dilemmas surrounding Sutra marriage, 
particularly from the male-perspective and as a product of patriarchal forces 
(see for instance, Al-Khatib 2018). Rather, a second benefit from revisiting no-
tions such as agency, marriage and victimhood from a critical sociological per-
spective to contemporary Islamic Jurisprudence is to offer jurists a deeper 
sociological understanding of the realities of women and particularly refugee 
women in Muslim societies. Recalling Ramadan’s argument about the 
imperative of mastering the field of knowledge for which a fatwa is being 
developed, the process known as Ijtihād, or “when legal scholars working in 
the field of social affairs produce an informed opinion (fatwa) on a given 
subject where the texts are either open to interpretation or silent” that is both 
scripturally and ethically informed (Ramadan 2017, 14), should particularly 
benefit from such analysis. Hence, I would like to conclude by highlighting a 
few sociological insights that are relevant to this case study: 
 ‒ Understanding the larger forces and explanations that pushed the refugee 
women to marry in the first place. Refugee women have been often portrayed 
in sociological and anthropological studies as weak victims of war and vio-
lence and “thus in great need of protection from male family members or 
from foreign humanitarian aid workers” (Young and Chan 2015). It is impor-
tant to recognize that accepting this perception uncritically would lead to 
consolidating oppressive and marginalizing forces that continue to deter-
mine the experiences and the social position of women in Muslim countries 
in general and Muslim refugee women in particular (Hajdukowski-Ahmed, 
Khanlou, & Moussa, 2008). That said, it is also important to recognize the 
patriarchal elements that shaped those women’s understanding of Sutra. For 
instance, the three women agreed that marriage offers them a shield against 
sexual harassment. Harass ment could be due to their gender, uprootedness, 
or both. Thus, while Sutra marriage can be argued as a practical, “decent” 
and culturally relevant solution to many refugee women who are also single 
mothers, it cannot be viewed in isolation from other unjust conditions, such 
as fear from harassment or personal safety, that shape those women’s de-
cision to marry. Moreover, Mutaz al-Khatib, addresses some ethical issues 
surrounding the patriarchal inter pretations of Sutra marriage in Muslim-
majority societies that fail to engage meaningfully with issues surrounding 
conflict of interest, subliminal levels of exploitation and coercion, and limit-
ing the purpose of marriage to pure lust and physical needs (al-Khatib 2018). 
Understanding the double precarity of those women should contribute to 
a better assessment in weighing the benefits (manfaʿa) and harm (ḍarar) of 
marrying refugee women. Which brings us to the next point.
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 ‒ Emphasizing knowledge about trauma, mental health and the double precar-
ity status of many refugee women. Many, if not most refugees, whether men, 
women or children, experience traumatic events such as injury, destroying 
of neighbourhood, residence and personal belongings, torture and 
persecution, inhumane living conditions, witnessing the death of others 
and close ones (Porter & Haslam 2005). For women refugees, gender-based 
violence (GBV) is a particular threat. The latter is not just limited to physical 
and sexual violence but includes psychological and emotional abuse as well 
(Young and Chan 2015). As a result, many refugee women suffer from mental 
health symptoms such as depression, anxiety, and posttraumatic stress 
disorder (Guruge et al. 2009; Young and Chan 2015). Putting that in mind, 
one cannot rule out the idea that despite suffering from an abusive 
relationship, or even just an unhappy marriage due to factors such as 
incompatibility, marrying based on what is available, romantic void or 
feeling of unfairness due to a first marriage or the secrecy of marriage, some 
refugee women will still choose or feel obliged to stay in that marriage (Ho 
and Pavlish 2011). Hence, it is important when issuing fatwas like fatwa (1) 
discussed above, to put notions such as trauma and double precarity into 
account when considering the best interest of the refugee women. Double 
precarity is the product of two elements: the woman’s gendered uprootedness 
and the more than likely loss of her family and social support, as well as 
precarity resulting from the marriage itself. Many such marriages are often 
hidden from a first wife and even public spheres and in many cases, is not 
registered i.e. customary or ʿurfī marriage. The previous two criteria were 
present, at least at some point, in Maha, Nour and Marwa’s stories. While 
Maha and Marwa didn’t suffer major consequences from the precarious 
status of their marriages, other than complaints about not seeing their 
husbands enough, in Nour’s case, it didn’t make it any harder on her ex-
husband to “try the new fruit in the market” and to eventually walk away 
leaving her emotionally violated. In Nour’s story, however, the secrecy and 
the precarious status of the marriage extended the harm to the husband and 
his first family when Nour, who was full of vengeance and arguably still 
suffering from war trauma, eventually called the first wife and informed her 
about her husband’s “betrayal.” This puts us against the inevitable question 
of how much protection does protection marriage or Sutra marriage really 
offer to a refugee woman?
 ‒ Recognizing the blurry line between the man’s personal interest and his striv-
ing for religious oblation. Recalling the issues discussed above regarding 
conflict of interest and subliminal levels of exploitation, the case of Nour 
dem onstrates that the intention of Sutra is not always enough to secure 
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a “healing” solution to the refugee woman. In fact, more damage can be 
caused if the fatwa does not tackle the complex factors that inform the deci-
sion-making process of many men and women in current Muslim societies 
who are also highly influenced by modernity.15 Here, I am more accurately 
referring to the Muslim world’s shock as a repercussion of “European” mo-
dernity. Such shock has made the Muslim cultures’ absorption of modernity 
to be “extremely complicated and problematic” (Tagharobi and Zarei 2015). 
One of the repercussions of modernity in some Muslim societies, particular 
to our Egyptian case study, is the idea of the nuclear family or the monoga-
mous marriage that gathers a man, a woman and their decedents. The point 
of dragging monogamy and polygamy to this conversation is not meant to 
assess its rationale and ethics under contemporary conditions. Rather, this 
paper, as emphasized throughout, is meant to offer a deeper sociological un-
derstanding of the realities and the forces dictating contemporary Muslim 
societies for which fatwas are issued. A jurist’s grasp of the implications of 
modernity and its impact on the emergence of a new sense of self amongst 
Muslim men and women should thus be factored in when assessing the 
modern world’s social, particularly gendered, issues. More importantly, such 
implications should be considered in understanding and (re)defining the 
“ethical” and the relationship between the legal and the ethical in Islamic 
philosophy and jurisprudence. 
8 Conclusion
Marriage as a tool to mitigate insecurity and precarity is not a novel practice to 
Syrian women, with Bosnians and Iraqis before them. Studies on Tsunami 
survivors (Hyndman 2007) and North-Korean female border crossers to China 
(Kim 2014), elaborate interesting aspects of marriage as a survival tool for 
forced migrants and migrants with a precarious status. Still, marriage between 
Arab men and Syrian refugee women was proven to be a problematic issue that 
has drawn a strong media and advocacy attention over the past few years. 
Often described as exploitation due to the precarious status of many of the 
women especially those in refugee camps, these marriages were labelled and 
compared to forced marriages, sex trafficking and child marriage.
15 While it is hard to define, the term “modernity” was coined to capture the changes 
occurring in Europe due to industrialization, urbanization and democratization. One 
major change is a revolution in the human experience due to “the development of a new 
sense of self, of subjectivity and individuality. This idea distinguishes the modern 
individual from the traditional one” (Haferkamp, and Smelser 1992). 
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This paper does not aim to understate gender-based violence and oppres-
sion to women all across the globe, Muslim cultures included. Nor is it con-
cerned with passing moral judgements or ethical evaluation to the phenomenon 
and some of its repercussions, such as polygamy and the often-opaque marital 
rights. It should be noted here, however, that the jurisprudential culture and its 
ethical theories are not constant, nor do they spring from a void (Ramadan 
2017, 8). As Ramadan puts it: 
the historical circumstances and internal debates within Muslim com-
munities should not be overlooked. Relationships between political pow-
er, religious institutions, as well as internal conflicts between schools of 
thought and jurisprudence all had an impact on the way moral values 
were understood, organized and applied (ibid., 8). 
Hence, the objective of this paper was concerned with identifying and dissect-
ing social structures, hegemonic discourses and power relations that explain 
and shape both: gendered phenomena such as Sutra marriage as well as this 
jurisprudential culture in order to better inform the contemporary ethics of 
migration debates in a way that is inclusive and decolonized.
Along those lines, this paper is also a call to reflect on how the jurispruden-
tial culture that influences the ijtihād process and sets the parameter for Is-
lamic ethical theories often mirror hegemonic discourses and reinforce 
dynamics of social injustice. Thus, an equally important question that was left 
out of this paper is the dilemma of the-more-than-possible politicization of 
such moral parameters and the Islamic science of ethics. How could, for in-
stance, natio nalistic ideologies motivate the connection between certain legal 
norms and particular understandings of ethical principles? Marion Holms 
Katz’s analysis of the notion of Ḥayāʾ (modesty) and how its cultivation be-
came “a central trope of legal discussions of veiling in the modern period” is a 
case in point (Katz 2015, 26). While her argument was meant to clarify the evo-
lution of the relationship between jurisprudence and ethics in Islamic scienc-
es, her analysis draws attention to the problematic of how ethical parameters 
and moral theories can be utilized to reinforce political ideologies. 
In addition, a concurrent objective of this case study is to contribute to the 
body of literature that aims to resist the misrepresented, simplistic and orien-
talised narratives that portray Muslim women, and refugee women in particu-
lar, as the passive victims and the Arab man as the oppressive pariah (see for 
instance, Alhayek 2014). I have utilized an anti-colonial lens to offer a deeper 
reading to the case of Sutra marriage in Egypt. While not without tension, 
I propose that using an anti-colonial language when assessing the phenome-
non offers two benefits. First, it offers a critical language and a communication 
tool to respond to accusations from contemporary international humanitarian, 
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refugee rights and feminist discourses and conceptions. Such conceptions of-
ten stigmatize similar conjugal arrangements under notions such as exploita-
tion, sex trafficking and forced marriage. An anticolonial framework challenges 
the foundations of such rhetoric by questioning, as was argued above, the un-
derstanding of notions such as agency and victimhood. 
Second, an anti-colonial feminist lens proposes a gendered approach to ju-
risprudence that is more in touch with the reality of marginalized groups. 
While one of the objectives of the paper was to demonstrate the difference 
between vulnerability and victimhood and the fact that the refugee woman 
may enjoy a substantial level of “relational autonomy” in the initial decision of 
getting married, relying solely on religious oblation and the man’s “pure” inten-
tion from the marriage can be problematic to the trajectory or the end result of 
the marriage. A gendered approach to the fatwa then, should reinforce the role 
of the jurist beyond merely concluding the legal verdict to embracing a vision 
of “ethico-religious obligations” and include principles such as Ulfa (friend-
ship, affection, and intimacy) (Katz 2015) to guide and rectify the society’s in-
tellectual and moral assessments of when and how to apply (or not to apply) 
Sutra marriage to refugee, as well as other, women. Moreover, the fatwa should 
offer provisions that effectively allow those women to exercise their marital 
rights. Recognition of patriarchal social forces, trauma and precarity, the exag-
gerated power in the hands of the man due to the double precarity of those 
refugee women along with the modernity shock are some elements that facili-
tate and inform this end.
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Chapter 6
The Islamic Principle of Kafala as Applied to 
Migrant Workers: Traditional Continuity and 
Reform
Ray Jureidini and Said Fares Hassan
1 Introduction
The paper is an attempt to identify the continuities and discontinuities be-
tween the religious Islamic notion and practice of kafala (kafāla) and its con-
temporary application—with specific reference to the Gulf States where it has 
been most prominently legislated and practiced. While much research has 
been undertaken, mostly critical of the kafala as a system of oppression and 
exploitation of migrant labour in the GCC, there seems to be a consensus that 
there is no relationship at all between the traditional Islamic concept of kafala 
and its current application. In other words, it is argued that there is no evi-
dence of a “genealogy” that links the Islamic jurisprudence of kafala to its con-
temporary forms (Franz 2011, 98).
In a recent paper on the origins of the kafala related to migrant labour in the 
GCC, the historian, AlShehabi (2019), provides documentary evidence showing 
how the British colonial rulers, first in Bahrain and later other GCC states from 
the 1920s, introduced what was for them a system of sponsorship and surety, 
but which was perfectly compatible with and adaptable to the principles of 
kafala in Islamic law and custom. It was, he argues, a “cheap” means of control-
ling foreigners and having local citizens take responsibility for them. Thus, 
there was no conscious decision on the part of the Muslim rulers of the region 
to apply the traditional form of kafala under new circumstances in the GCC 
that required massive numbers of foreign companies and workers. Rather, in 
this situation, the conflation of colonial rule and Islamic custom came togeth-
er serendipitously. Notwithstanding this historical backdrop, we think it is 
worthwhile to attend to some of the nuances of the “old” kafala and the “new” 
kafala in order to see more precisely: 1) how it came about; 2) what are the 
similarities (apart from the name); 3) why the old kafala was modified into its 
present-day arrangements.
It is argued that the modern Islamic state, through the right of the leader 
(waliy al-amr and his siyāsa sharʿiyya), has the right, the power and authority 
© Ray Jureidini and Said Fares Hassan, 2020 | doi:10.1163/9789004417342_007
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to modify rules and regulations from traditional practices in accordance with 
the public interest (maṣlaḥa). This is a political dimension that has not been 
alluded to in previous accounts of the kafala as applied to contemporary man-
agement of migration workers in the Middle East. There is a considerable de-
gree of criticism of the contemporary use of kafala. One author, for example, 
considers contemporary practice of kafala as an “insult to Islam.” (Kakande 
2015, 15). Others have equated kafala with “modern day slavery” (Chidiac 2014). 
It may be argued, however, that the contemporary problems of kafala are pri-
marily because of the abuse of the principles rather than the principles them-
selves. In this sense, is there a continuity of a normative set of social 
arrangements, but that the exploitative potential has overtaken the ethical 
guidelines of trust, care, responsibility and obligations in relation to the pres-
ence and employment of foreigners? From the law and religious dicta through 
fatwas, we provide evidence of traditional ethical continuity, some traditional 
elements in the codified law, but non-compliance in contemporary practice—
a perennial problem.
2 Similarities and Dissimilarities
The term “kafāla” has a wide semantic scope in Arabic. Its root, kāf – fā⁠ʾ 
– lām (ل�
ك��هخ ), means to feed, support, vouch for or warrant; hence “kafala” 
refers to bail, guaranty, security or sponsorship (Wehr 1994, 976). Accord-
ing to Lane’s nineteenth century Arabic dictionary, kafala meant “respon-
sibility; answerableness; amenability; or suretyship; the conjoining of 
responsibility to another” (Lane 1872, 3001). Likewise, the kafīl is “one 
who is responsible, answerable, amendable, or a sponsor or surety” 
(ibid.). In the Islamic tradition, Kafala is a significant concept that has its 
social, moral and business dimensions. In Islamic family law “kafala” re-
fers to a formal agreement to provide temporary support for an orphaned 
child until adulthood. Such support does not confer inheritance rights 
and is best understood as a form of legal guardianship rather than adop-
tion. (Franz 2014, 97)
Businesswise, Muslim jurists extend the meaning of kafala to a business 
contract where someone formally guarantees somebody else in terms of 
delivering goods or carrying financial responsibilities (e.g., Ibn Rushd 1999, 
vol.1, 636-ff; Ibn ʿĀbdīn 2003, vol.7, 553-ff). More generally, kafala was intended 
to provide a framework of social solidarity based on trust and cooperation 
among people in various realms of their interactions.
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Kafala thus originally refers to a contract where a guarantor conjoins a 
guaranteed person (makfūl) and assumes liability for that person in various 
specified terms. Kafala is meant to provide an assurance of the fulfillment of 
an obligation of the guaranteed person. This can be to guarantee the payment 
of the guaranteed person’s financial liability (kafala bi-al-māl) (as in a surety 
guaranteeing the repayment of a debt). It could also be to guarantee the pres-
ence of a certain person at a specified time and place (kafala bi-al-nafs) or the 
appearance of a certain person, as in the case of a lawsuit (kafala bi-al-wajh) 
(as in guaranteeing bail money). It could be a guarantee for the delivery of 
goods (kafala bi-al-taslīm) or a guarantee for the purchase of goods sold (kafala 
bi-al-darak). In short, the guarantor assumes responsibility for a certain liabil-
ity due by the guaranteed that will include the kafīl as a representative of the 
guaranteed (makfūl) in front of the state and other government institutions 
and take responsibly for any breach of the law perpetrated by the guaranteed 
(see Bālī 2013, vol.1, 970ff; Ibn ʿĀbdīn 2003, vol. 7, Chapter on Kafala).
Thus, kafala contracts were used to protect the weak and vulnerable by in-
stituting the patronage of a prominent local who provided whatever protec-
tion was required—a form of community responsibility for financial, legal or 
political representation (Franz 2014, 99). These forms or applications of kafala 
can still function in contemporary times. However, while the Majella (Otto-
man codified Shariʿa law) refers to kafala contracts of the various types men-
tioned above, there is no mention of kafala in the enactment or employment 
of labour (ibid.). Similarly, there is no mention of kafala contracts in analyses 
of Ottoman slavery arrangements (ibid.), although similar practices with non-
Muslim foreign labour were evident in the port of Istanbul from the late six-
teenth century (see Kanchana 2018, 8).
The earliest account of kafala in relation to labour in the Arabian Gulf seems 
to have been loose arrangements from the turn of the twentieth century to the 
1940s (Longva 1997). Pearl divers, for example, were bound to a kafīl who 
owned the dhow boats that were used. This has been identified more as a “cul-
tural legacy” (Hamza 2015: 94; Gardener 2010). As noted for Kuwait, there was 
no formal legal reference to kafala until the Aliens Residence Law in 1975, de-
spite the requirements from the 1950s and 1960s that foreign businesses re-
quired a local Kuwaiti partner with 51 percent ownership and that migrants 
should be “vouched for by a respected citizen of Kuwait” (Longva 1997: 78).
As such, the similarity between the classical Islamic usage of kafala and the 
new form as applied to the management of foreign workers has been seen as a 
merely linguistic one that lends it a “veneer of legitimacy,” i.e. the presence of 
a kafīl as guarantor (now sponsor) who would guarantee the legal residency of 
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the foreigner who will abide by the rules of a contract and the laws of the 
country. As Franz observes, 
If the current use of the kafala system for migrant labour did descend 
from these earlier forms, it diverged dramatically in the context of nation 
states and neoliberal market forces and transformed into a system 
whereby non-nationals are bound to nationals for the purposes of work 
or business. (Franz 2014, 100)
The most highly critiqued issues of the contemporary kafala have indeed 
centered around the power, control and exploitation of the kafīl over foreign 
employees as well as business establishments. The criticisms have primarily 
been based on international human and labour rights law and conventions 
(International Labour Organization 2013a; Kapiszewski 2001).
On the other hand, investigating the technical usage and application of the 
classical Islamic kafala system, it is clear that an essential element of the clas-
sical system is that kafala is considered a contract without benefits on the part 
of the guarantor. That is, the service of the guarantor (kafīl) is meant to be free 
of charge. 
Nothing in the Ottoman or fiqh contexts referred to the use of such 
contracts for the purpose of rewarding the guarantor. Such a situation 
would in fact have constituted a legal breach since any payments made to 
the guarantor for providing kafala would have constituted ribā (usury), 
forbidden in Islam. (Foster 2001, 143)
It is in this sense that the new kafala may seem to violate a key traditional 
Islamic condition and may be seen more as a business-oriented system rather 
than one of trust and protection. A kafīl sponsors a worker and represents him/
her on behalf of the state on the condition that this specific worker will sign a 
contract to work for him or for others in return for certain benefits. It is not a 
pure kafala system. It is a kafala-cum-ijāra (sponsorship-cum-hiring) system, 
and in this sense the kafala-makfūl relationship has been reversed where the 
makfūl guarantees the fulfillment of a labour contract with the kafīl who pays 
the makfūl for his/her labour, presumably making a profit from the labour. This 
new relationship is no longer kafala. The question remains, however, to what 
extent is this form of contract Islamically justified and reasoned?1
1 Although it is not pursued here, it should be noted that, while foreign companies require 51 
per cent ownership by a national (individual or company), not all kafīls/sponsors of migrant 
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However, let us look more closely at the distinction between the principle 
and the practice. Although the original idea may have been for GCC citizens to 
take responsibility for the presence of foreigners, particularly professionals in 
the energy industries, the system quickly metamorphosed into one where the 
kafīl was not held responsible or accountable. For example, the kafīl is the one 
responsible for the obtaining of a work visa and residency permit. However, if 
the residency permit was not renewed, the employee becomes an illegal 
resident liable to arrest, detention and deportation, not the kafīl. Thus, the 
original idea of the kafīl taking responsibility for the makfūl does not resonate 
in the new form. As Franz notes, the kafala as adapted to migrant labour, “vio-
lates both the letter and spirit of the legal institution,” where “something once 
associated with social protection has become more restrictive and punitive” 
(Franz 2014, 101).
As an example, it was the 1959 Kuwait Alien Residence Law and its several 
amendments (1963, 1965, 1968, and 1975) that made all migrant workers virtu-
ally dependent on their Kuwaiti employers for their entry visas, work, and resi-
dence. However, neither the content of the kafala nor the relationship between 
the kafīl and the migrant worker were clearly explained in the law (Alajmi 
2007). Longva suggested it may have been because, “The [kafala] practice was 
well-anchored in Kuwaiti tradition and was, therefore, widely understood and 
taken for granted by the native population” (Longva 1997, 79). This suggests 
that the origins of the modern kafala was a more cultural, customary heritage 
rather than one based upon Islamic jurisprudence.
Current practice of the kafala system has been critiqued for its exploitation 
of migrant workers, to the extent of describing it as a slave system (Rodriguez 
2014). It puts severe restrictions on labour mobility, and has prevented the 
 development of a local labour market. Kafīls may withhold workers’ payments 
while demanding longer hours and preventing access to legal rights by with-
holding workers’ passports, contract substitution and the like (Jureidini 2014). 
Kafīls may also lease their kafala against payments. Workers may be forced to 
pay recruitment charges to the recruitment agency, thus burdening the  workers 
with more expenses, feeding a system of bribery and corruption and binding 
them into a form of labour indebtedness and forced labour (Jurei dini 2017a). 
There are many other forms of exploitation and malpractices of kafala (and 
where the kafīl profits) that are against the law and indeed frowned upon from 
an Islamic perspective.
workers in the Gulf States are nationals. They can also be non-nationals who have residency 
(iqāma). This means that a kafīl/sponsor can also be a non-Muslim. Further empirical research 
into the topic should take this into account.
 97Kafala as Applied to Migrant Workers
In an answer to frequent questions on the Islamic legal framework of re-
cruiting foreign workers through kafala in Saudi Arabia, the Permanent Com-
mittee of Scientific Research and Fatwas published a long research paper to 
provide legal reasoning for the legality of kafala and the parameters that should 
be considered in its application. The committee started its presentation by 
confirming that recruiting foreign workers is part of the state policy to care for 
the interests of its people. Consequently, the administration of labour 
recruitment is subject to the approval of the King, as the head of the state and 
the one in charge of the affairs of Muslims, i.e. the waliy al-amr (al-Lajna al-
Dāʾima 1994, 39–60).
According to Islamic law, the waliy al-amr can issue laws to regulate people’s 
lives (Taj, 1995, 33), including businesses in a way that protects the rights of 
contractors and the needs of the society, provided that these laws do not con-
tradict a Qurʾanic injunction or a Prophetic instruction. Given his powers, the 
waliy al-amr may exercise ijtihād and enact laws that command people to fol-
low a certain set of regulations (and not others, even if those others are reli-
giously permissible in themselves). People should abide by these regulations, 
or otherwise they will be of “the transgressors” (al-Lajna al-Dāʾima, 41). These 
regulations may provide rules of business such as work times, work places, 
work permits, job descriptions, etc. If such regulations exist, then people must 
follow them, otherwise they may be subject to certain penalties. This under-
standing of the rule of the waliy al-amr is formulated in the legal maxim, 
“taṣarruf al-imām ʿalā al-raʿiyya manūṭ bi-al-maṣlaḥa,” i.e. the imam’s power 
over his people is based on his effort to maintain their interests (al-Suyūṭī, 
1983).
Based on these arguments, the kafala/sponsorship laws are considered part 
of this siyāsa. It is argued that the regulation of the process of kafala or hiring 
foreign workers is a task of the waliy al-amr or his representative. The regula-
tion defines who should be recruited, conditions of their recruitment, rights 
and duties of both kafīls (sponsors / employers) and the makfūls (sponsored / 
employees). The main function of this regulation is to guarantee the interest of 
the work itself, the maintenance of security, the prevention of chaos and ten-
sion in the work environment. Once these regulations are set, both sides, em-
ployers and employees, should follow the contractual conditions and commit 
themselves to its conditions. In so doing, they follow the Qurʾanic injunction, 
“O, you who believe, commit yourselves to your contracts”; and to the Prophet-
ic directive, “Muslims must commit to their conditions, and whoever neglects 
them, he is from the transgressors.” If they do not abide by them, then the waliy 
al-amr may discipline them in the way he thinks appropriate (al-Lajna al-
Dāʾima, 41).
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3 Kafala-cum-Ijāra
It has been argued that the kafala contract controls the movements of workers 
and subjects them to a set of draconian practices (e.g. keeping their passports, 
delaying their payments, forcing them to work more hours, etc.) that are 
against international labour law. To what extent, however, are these practices 
Islamic? 
To discuss the laws of kafala, one needs to turn to the section on ijāra in Is-
lamic law texts. The definition of kafala shows clearly the relationship between 
the new form of kafala and ijāra. Kafala refers to the permission given by the 
state to a certain individual/company to sponsor/hire non-natives to work for 
them through a contract to be signed and approved by both parties. This con-
tract should state at least the names of the employer and the employee, the 
nature of the work, and the salary agreed upon. This contract is very similar to 
an ijāra contract in Islamic law. Jurists define ijāra as a contract to provide a 
lawful specific service to be performed in a specific span of time in a specific 
place for a specific wage/cost/benefit (al-Nahhām, 2011)—in short, “the trade 
of a particular service for a specific return” (Bālī 2013, 589).
Discussions of the kafala system in legal debates follow the same line of ar-
guments in Islamic contracts in general and contracts of ijāra in particular in 
the sense that contract conditions are binding, business ethics have to be ob-
served and elements of gharar (an element of contracts or exchange, usually in 
finance, associated with deception, risk and uncertainty—of dubious legiti-
macy) have to be eliminated. Reviewing ijāra sections in Islamic legal texts re-
veals that the ijāra contract requires precision, clarity, eligibility and approval. 
Missing one of these elements may invalidate the whole contract. Further-
more, the kafala system is more or less identical with the legal discussion of 
the ajīr khāṣ (private employee) (al-Nahhām 2011).
Generally, contracts are binding and sacred in Islamic law, provided they do 
not violate the principles of Sharīʿa and the public interest. The contractual 
relationship is not seen from within the exclusive realm of the contractors but 
also on the consideration that Allah oversees this relationship, not only as a 
guarantee of honoring the contract and maintaining contractual justice, but 
also as the Actual Disposer of Affairs (Shimizu 1989). A contract in Islam thus 
has a religious component within it, even if not stated explicitly in the contract. 
This has to do with two main points. First, contracts are based on the usufruct 
principle, namely, everything belongs to and is owned by Allah and man is only 
a trustee with usufruct rights (Doi 1984, 355). This means that the contracting 
parties should assume the presence of Allah as the Actual Contractor and that 
the subject matter of a contract has to be legally permissible. Second is the 
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element of moral commitment that starts with the elements of intention and 
motive at the moment of undertaking the contract. Ibn al-Qayyim argues, 
“the motive behind the contract is an essential consideration and affects its 
validity” (Coulson 1984, 45). In other words, the individual conscience plays a 
significant role in the genuine accord of wills and mutual agreement among 
business partners. “The attitude of [Muslim] jurists endeavors to understand 
the total context or the real situation by examining the real intention of the 
individual. That is to say, it seeks for substance, and is not overly concerned 
with formalism…” (Shimizu 1989, 16).
In addition to the morality of the motive, moral commitment can also be 
observed through the principle of taqwā—literally, the fear of God and piety. 
The Qurʾan says, “Men, We have created you from a male and a female and di-
vided you into nations and tribes that you might get to know one another. The 
noblest of you in Allah’s sight is atqākum (the one who fears Him most), Allah 
is wise and all-knowing” (Qurʾan 49:13). In Islam, taqwā is the standard for the 
judgment of human actions. In action, taqwā means faithfulness or a desire to 
love all things universally in a social sense. This understanding is the more sig-
nificant of the two connotations in considering the function of community, 
because the most precious relationships of human beings in a community are 
those founded on the basis of love or brotherhood. These relationships create 
a voluntary regard for others more than one’s self, leading to unity and stability 
of a community. Taqwā always involves a sense of love and sympathy for others 
(Shimizu 1989, 43–44). In this sense, it creates a subconscious respect for com-
pliance to certain principles that may be beyond the reach of formal enforce-
ment.
In addition to the sacred, binding and moral nature of the contract, Islamic 
law stipulates that the contractors should not have conditions that may result 
in deceiving one of the contract parties, a kind of moral hazard. In technical 
terms, a contract should not have gharar, such as a practice or condition that 
may cause a profit for one party but a corresponding loss for another (Coulson 
1984, 44). Thus, one of the reasons why gharar should be eliminated is that its 
absence is a precondition for confirming the equilibrium in a contract. Con-
tracts are never legally bound until the real equilibrium (among the interests 
of contractors, the wellbeing of the community and the Will of the Divine) is 
ascertained. Thus, the kafala system can be Islamically reasoned and justified 
if it is framed in line with rules of contracts as established in Islamic law. If 
there is a breach of these rules, jurists will argue against these as malpractices. 
As an example, in certain instances, employers have used the system to hire 
workers but exploit them by asking them to work for another employer, pro-
vided that the worker pays him either a percentage of his earnings or a set 
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amount of money each month. In other instances, the employer hires workers 
with a certain wage, but once these workers arrive in the country, arrange-
ments are made for them to work for another company with a higher wage, the 
kafīl taking the difference into his own pocket. In both cases, muftis from the 
Saudi General Committee for Iftāʾ and Research made the following comments: 
First, this form of contract contradicts the laws of the land as enacted by the 
waliy al-amr to preserve rights, to maintain security, and to prevent problems. 
Second, it includes earning money in return for the kafala that is, if not a 
ḥarām, at least a doubtful practice that Muslims are supposed to stay away 
from. Third, there is a form of gharar and ambiguity in the contract as some-
times the exact salary is unknown, the money for the sponsorship is unknown, 
and the employer will pay little money (visa, transportation, etc.) in return for 
a large sum of money to be paid in return (al-Lajna al-Dāʾima 1994, 56). Other 
fatwas also stressed the unlawfulness of the breach of contract in the kafala 
system, especially the case when a sponsor would ask his employee to work on 
his own and give him money in return for his sponsorship (al-ʿUthaymīn 1979, 
214–5; al-Dawīsh, 377–8).
The argument of the illegality of this transaction is intriguing. Jurists argue 
that the kafala contract, if not involving direct work arrangement between the 
two parties, becomes a contract of irfāq and tabarrauʿ, that is, charity, good-
ness and compassion. Because of this, the kafīl should not ask for money. His 
services should be provided for free. If there has to be some money to be paid, 
then it can only be the costs the sponsor incurred to secure the needs of his 
“brother” (fatwa.islamweb.net, fatwa no. 137333). But even this is a problem be-
cause the labour law in Saudi Arabia forbids workers to be charged for recruit-
ment costs and fees.2 The visas obtained on a sponsorship principle are not 
commodities that one may trade in. They are just permits from the govern-
ment to bring labourers to work for someone (fatwa.islamweb.net, fatwa no. 
101777). Another reason is the element of deceit and cheating to the state, as 
the sponsor’s action defies the purpose of the kafala system (islamqa.com, 
fatwa no. 101220).
A direct question from a kafīl regarding the taking of money from the makfūl 
was put to the Saudi General Committee for Iftāʾ and Research. It was in 
2 “An employer shall incur the fees pertaining to recruitment of non-Saudi workers, the fees of 
the residence permit (Iqāmah) and work permit together with their renewal and the fines 
resulting from their delay, as well as the fees pertaining to change of profession, exit, re-entry 
visas and return tickets to the worker’s home country at the end of the relation between the 
two parties.” (Article 40, Saudi Labour Law, 2005); similarly, in the UAE (Article 18, UAE Labour 
Law No. 8, 1980) and Qatar (Article 33, Qatar Labour Law No. 14, 2004).
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relation to employees who wanted to remain in the state even though he could 
no longer employ them:
I am the sponsor of a number of Afghani workers and have no work for 
them at the present time. They, thus, engage in other work in the country 
and live in my house without paying rent. They keep the money they gain 
from work for themselves, whether it is a small or large amount. However, 
they pay me three thousand riyals for renewing their two-year residence 
permit and referring to the concerned authorities. I have asked them to 
return to their country, but they have entreated me not to withhold their 
Rizq (sustenance). Am I sinful for this? (Asadov 2015, 46)
The principle concern of the fatwa committee was that the kafīl should not 
receive any money just for extending their visas, for that is the kafīl’s respon-
sibility.3 Other similar inquiries met with fatwas strictly prohibiting the taking 
of money from the makfūl.
In addition to the fatwas, the practice of sponsors profiting from selling 
work visas to workers abroad and not providing employment has come to be 
known as “visa trading” or “free visas” (free of a job, not free of cost). Although 
widespread in the GCC over many decades (Fargues & Shah 2017), these prac-
tices are not condoned as a part of the kafala but are strictly illegal and perpe-
trators have been prosecuted, fined and blacklisted (see, for example, Sophia 
2015; Qatar News 2014; Gulf Times 2018).
Interestingly, there is some similarity in the principle restrictions governing 
kafala as a means of fostering an orphan child.4 Here, the kafīl also must not 
take money for rearing an orphan, but at the same time, the orphan is not to 
assume a blood identity with the family, particularly with regard to inheri-
tance. Rules regarding marriage of fostered orphans also suggest the same 
form of distinction or separation. Kanchana notes that in kafala fostering,
There is no change in the family name and the child does not get inheri-
tance rights. The objective is to protect the original identity (including 
family relationship and religion) and the inherited property of the child. 
While kafala care could imply benefits such as access to the wider family 
3 Interestingly, Asadov argued that the “highly moralistic approach” of the Saudi scholars issuing 
the fatwa was not helpful in reconciling the law with the reality; that the fatwa could have 
acknowledged that money could not be legitimately received for the visa extension, but for 
rent and thus “serve the interest of both” (Asadov 2015, 47). 
4 “Many Muslim-majority countries do not recognize adoption and they instead facilitate a 
fostering arrangement, called kafala” (Kanchana 2018: 7).
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and the social networks, it also stresses the child’s dependence on the 
adoptive parents’ benevolence. (Kanchana 2018, 7)
The separation and dependence are similar to kafala in relation to foreign 
employees, where rights of citizenship are denied, but for different reasons 
(Dito 2014). As Lori (2012) notes, kafala has two key structural elements in the 
Gulf States. First, there is a government centralization where the sponsorship 
laws are administered through the Ministries of Interior that regulate entry 
work permits (visas) and residency, “without any outside intervention by the 
courts or other institutions.” Second, citizen sponsorships of foreign individuals 
or corporations constitute “a built-in enforcement mechanism for temporary 
residency by holding citizens directly responsible for the residency violations of 
non-citizens.” In this way, the “mechanisms for enforcing temporary residency 
are widely dispersed while authority over residency decisions remains highly 
concentrated” (Lori 2012, 12). And as Fargues notes, the demo graphic imbalance 
has meant that “decades of intense, but temporary, migration have resulted 
in citizens and non-nationals growing as two separate entities without a new, 
mixed, population emerging from their co-existence” (Fargues 2011, 280). 
These fatwas and similar malpractices of the system show the disparity 
between the Islamic principles of kafala and exploitative practices and 
demonstrate the power relationship between the local citizens and foreign 
workforce. To treat these issues on the state level, many GCC states have been 
discussing the kafala system and introducing various amendments and reforms 
to their laws, hoping to create more equilibrium in the relationship between 
the businessman, the worker and the interests of the state. 
One of the recent attempts in reforming the kafala system is in Qatar (see 
Jureidini 2017, 2014). By way of background, the original 1963 kafala legislation 
(Law 9, Governing Aliens Entry and Residence in Qatar) was drawn up with 
skilled professionals in mind, making it clear that foreigners can be granted an 
entry visa for work provided that they filled a technical expertise that Qatar 
requires. Second, that foreigners must have Qatari kafīls who are able to hire 
and care for them. Third, that the kafīl is required to sign a statement of the 
good conduct of the makfūl and make a commitment to present the employee 
to the Qatari authorities at the end of the contract and also commit to pay for 
their repatriation home. Reference to kafala, kafīl and makfūl were included 
right up to the 2009 legislation (Law 4, Regulating the Entry and Exit of 
Expatriates in Qatar and their residence and Sponsorship) with a more explicit 
requirement of an exit visa to be approved by the employer and which came 
under much criticism that it violated the right of freedom of movement (see 
for example: Human Rights Watch 2012; International Labour Organization 
2013; Amnesty International 2013, 2016).
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Despite the practices of preventing employees from leaving the country at 
will, the legislation requiring an exit visa was again mainly aimed at profes-
sionals and business people who may be in a position to defraud or leave the 
country with large debts that would not be repaid, perhaps the result of bitter 
experience. Article 19 states that the kafīl must “be qualified to bear the obliga-
tions of the sponsorship as imposed by law and employ the expatriate under 
its own supervision.” Provisions were also made distinguishing between a kafīl 
al-iqāma (the residency sponsor) and kafīl al-khurūj (the exit sponsor, in case 
the residency sponsor was unavailable to sign off, or deceased). In either case, 
the kafīl is responsible for any debts of the makfūl and to “present a certificate 
from the authorized administrations that there is no claims or court decisions 
against him.” Article 20 made clear that the residence or exit kafīl would only 
be responsible for the debts of the expatriate and no more. It states that the 
kafīl (in both of its categories as kafīl al-iqāma (sponsor of one’s stay/visit to 
Qatar) and kafīl al-khurūj (sponsor of the makfūl in case of his departure) 
should not carry the responsibilities or be charged money more than what the 
makfūl owes. For example, if the makfūl has to pay 500 in debt, the kafīl is re-
sponsible for these 500 only, not more. In addition, there should not be any 
further conditions than those already due on the makfūl. For example, if the 
makfūl has to pay his debt in installments, it remains that way and the kafīl 
cannot be asked to pay it in a lump sum. The kafīl’s responsibility for the debts 
of the foreigner was thus quite clear and consistent with the traditional kafala 
requirement. Of course in practice it was most unlikely that a kafīl would allow 
a situation where he would be required to pay the debts of a foreign makfūl. 
Indeed, it was precisely through the mechanism of the requirement of permis-
sion for an exit visa that allowed a sponsor to legally detain a foreigner when 
there was any form of dispute between them.
The most recent reform was Qatari law no. 21 in 2015 (Regulating the Entry, 
Exit of Expatriates and their Residence), which came into force in December 
2016.5 Reading this law closely, one can notice the following: First, there was a 
change in the level of language used. The term “kafala” and its derivatives have 
been eliminated from the whole document. They were replaced by the term 
wāfid (newcomer; in Arabic tradition, the “wāfid” has to be dealt with generously 
and honorably), rather than makfūl, which if not a positive term, is at least a 
neutral one that does not carry negative implications, other than that the 
5 This is the latest amendment to the law regulating the entry, exit and residence of expatriates 
in Qatar, administered by the Ministry of Interior. The first was in 1963 (Governing Aliens Entry 
and Residence in Qatar) and amended in 1973, 1984, 1998, 2002, 2004 and 2009 (see Malaeb 
2015).
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person is not a citizen of the country. Also the kafīl (sponsor) is now called al-
musatqdim (the one who summons the newcomer; sometimes translated as 
the recruiter, but this gets confused with recruitment agents so is less used). 
The “exit visa” was replaced with a “travel notice,” but still requiring employer 
approval and the foreign employee can change employers at the completion of 
their contract. The musatqdim can make objections, but the onus is on them to 
provide valid reasons before grievance tribunals that have been established. 
Second, as before, the law is not only about low-skilled workers but it covers all 
non-nationals coming to Qatar, a matter that makes workers equal to other 
categories of non-nationals at least on the theoretical level. Third, there is no 
reference to any Islamic terms per se, a matter which recalls the role of the 
waliy al-amr in determining certain regulations as binding, even if these regu-
lations are not referred to in the Qurʾan and Sunnah. Fourth, the law estab-
lishes criteria for deportation, reconciliation and penalties, in an attempt to 
present a balanced position. To what extent the law is balanced or provides 
protection to the “newcomer” is a debatable matter, but the reform law and 
other commitments have satisfied the International Labour Organization that 
in November 2017 withdrew its complaint threatening a commission of in-
quiry. 
More importantly for this discussion, the Qatar authorities have made clear 
that the kafala system has now been abolished in favour of a system that relies 
solely on the contractual relationship between the employer and employee 
(see International Labour Office 2017). Although it may be argued that a num-
ber of elements of control (and exploitation) over foreign workers have not 
been abolished, the conceptualization and emphasis on contractual relations 
is more explicitly ijāra, but articulated in secular terms.
4 Conclusion
The Islamic tradition of kafala, be it a kafala of an orphan, of a stranger, of a 
needy person, or for a business transaction, seems to be categorically different 
from the new forms of contemporary practices of kafala in the GCC working 
environment. Still, however, there are certain elements of continuity between 
the two systems of kafala, in the sense of the continuity of the guarantorship of 
the kafīl to the makfūl. Traditionally, kafala means to transfer the duties of the 
makfūl to the kafīl. Thus, if the makfūl has to pay money or to deliver a certain 
commodity, the kafīl stands in for the makfūl and becomes responsible for the 
delivery of the money, the commodity or the person. If the makfūl does not 
deliver, the kafīl carries the responsibility. The same concept of guarantorship 
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remains in the new kafala form, though in a different mode. The kafil becomes 
responsible for the makfūl in terms of facilitating and regulating his/her 
life in the country. This kafīl-makfūl relationship is not a business-based 
contract (where the kafīl offers kafala in return for certain benefits). It is, on 
the contrary, a “contract” which is based on voluntary cooperation and social 
solidarity, where no benefit should be gained by the kafil. This principle has a 
great impact on the Islamic legal discussion of contemporary forms of kafala. 
Many fatwas, as those presented in this paper, show clearly that any request or 
expectation of compensation is not Islamically permissible. 
This paper suggests that the new forms of kafala, if to be examined from an 
Islamic perspective, is perhaps better discussed not as a kafala per se, but as a 
kafala-cum-ijāra system. That is, a contract that combines these two systems 
of transactions and which is now articulated in a secular manner, as in the new 
Qatari legislation. Although this suggestion requires more discussion from the 
perspective of Islamic law, it is sufficient given the scope of this paper to argue 
that the kafala system is a new form of ijāra contract that attempts to maintain 
a customary tradition in the modern world of labour recruitment. To support 
this understanding, one can note that recent collections of fatwas always dis-
cuss questions on kafala under the chapters of ijāra (al-ʿUthaymīn, 1979; al-
Dawīsh, nd).
Islamic law provides a theoretical framework that seeks to maintain the 
rights of all contracting parties in a way that keeps the balance among them, 
not only as work-partners, but also as human beings with moral commitments 
towards each other and toward God. Contracts may be the governing criteria in 
formal business discussions in the courtroom, in case of disputes, but inten-
tion and taqwā (i.e. real motives and conscience) are the ones to be accounted 
for before God.
In addition to the religious legal dimension in thinking about modern 
forms of kafala, the role of the state should be also underlined in this context. 
The state can interfere to regulate economic businesses in a way that should 
protect the rights of contractors and the needs of the society. Ibn Taymiyyah 
argues that “Indeed waliy al-amr (those in charge of the affairs of Muslims—
governors or their appointed representatives) has the right to force certain 
workers in certain professions to meet people’s needs … he would set for them 
the cost of their work, equivalent to a similar job…” (al-Salūs 2001, 64ff).
To what extent this religious-moral-legal foundation is practiced on the 
ground offers a different question. Exploitation, fraud and harm observed in 
the practice of modern forms of kafala go against the philosophy of Islamic 
contracts. It is therefore perhaps incumbent on critics of the contemporary ap-
plication of kafala to invoke and address the nuances of those Islamic ethical 
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principles that should still have resonance within contemporary economic ar-
rangements in Muslim countries such as the Gulf States.
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Normativity of Migration Studies Ethics and 
Epistemic Community
Sari Hanafi 
Human rights must by definition be universal because they are the rights 
of every human being, but I also see their universality as possible only 
through an overlapping cross-cultural consensus, and not by univer-




Much scholarship highlights the importance of using indigenous paradigms 
for social science and of stripping social science from some hegemonic trends 
influenced by “Western materialistic and colonial ethos.” While several schools 
of thought have pushed in this direction, this approach has some excesses, 
including positing antagonistic binary categories (tradition/modernity, East/
West, immanent nature/transcendent supernatural, reason/faith, rational/
irrational, English language/vernacular language, universalism/contextualism, 
etc.). In previous work, I have criticized the outcome of the Islamization of 
social science (Hanafi 2016a) and its use of post-colonialism as the only 
perspective (Hanafi 2016b). In this article, I argue about the conceits of such 
trends harbored within the intellectual, spiritual, and political configurations 
of today’s debate about social science and ethics.
In the concept paper for the seminar “Migration and Islamic Ethics: Issues 
of Residence, Naturalisation and Citizenship,” organized by the Center for Is-
lamic Legislation and Ethics, the organizers point out the following: “Since the 
postcolonial era, much of the contemporary literature on the compatibility of 
Islamic values and “modernization” processes, such as globalization, demo-
cracy and citizenship have focused upon Muslims residing in Europe and the 
US. The compatibility is often studied under a secularist framework, implying 
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that many aspects of modernization are incompatible with religious frameworks” 
(emphasis added). I do not think talking about compatibility under secular-
ist framework helps us to understand the difference between current knowl-
edge production in migration studies and what would be a social science of 
migration informed by Islamic ethics. In addition, this is very different from 
the series of questions that were raised in the concept paper, such as, “What 
are the basic criteria upon which an individual can be considered a “citizen” of 
a certain country from an Islamic ethical perspective? How similar/different 
are these criteria from the contemporary legal frameworks adopted by Western 
countries? Which frameworks seem closer to the Islamic ethical perspective” 
These questions are well formulated, as they are not juxtaposed in antagonistic 
polar opposites. 
In this article, I will raise three questions to echo this debate: first, can one 
talk about an epistemic social science community that possesses certain nor-
mative stances? If yes, what would these stances be? Would binary categories 
generated by the two above-mentioned perspectives inform us about the way 
social science should head to reach a context where Muslims live in the world? 
I chose the topic of migration as a particularly salient topic in the twenty-first 
century, which is rife with major waves of forced and voluntary migration, rac-
ism, Islamophobia and ethnic diversity. I conducted a content analysis of 74 
recent academic articles: 24 articles in English, selected from the library data-
base of the American University of Beirut and 26 in Arabic, selected from Al 
Manhal database, and 24 in French, mainly from the French journal Revue Eu-
ropéenne des Migrations Internationales. I chose two keywords: “migration” 
and “religion,” to locate how religion is viewed in migration studies, and how 
Islam in Western society becomes an immigrant religion. However, for the ar-
ticles in Arabic and French, I was obliged to drop the word religion to yield and 
select more recent articles. It is not assumed that academic journals are singu-
larly important, but they do impact public and policy debates on migration.
In the following section, I will start by defining two moments in social sci-
ence: the global/universalistic moment and the normative moment. Then I 
will explain the empirical sample and its “sociological markers” which include 
some quantitative measures of variables such as discipline, language and insti-
tutional affiliation. Finally, I will show the outcome of my content analysis.
1.1 Two Moments in Social Science
I distinguish between the global/universalistic moment and the local/norma-
tive moment in knowledge production of the social sciences. First, within the 
global/universalistic moment, this Aristotelian moment of Reason insists that 
social science is like any science and hence needs techniques of conducting 
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research. This requires a nomothetic approach to produce data that will allow 
for comparability with studies in other contexts. This comparability is the 
equivalent of laboratory experimentation in the “hard” sciences. The second 
moment is the local/normative moment where the notion of consciousness, in 
the words of Hawari  Al-Adi (2014), became impor tant. The subjectivity of 
actors and the influence of culture/religion became compelling, requiring a 
more idiographic approach that seeks to fully understand the causes of social 
events, while taking into account the local culture. Of course, normativity can 
also come from the global and we can draw a more complex matrix that will 
not be tackled here. For some time, there has been a positivist debate about 
the social research that hides its normative moment of consciousness. 
However, since the 1960s it was developed more openly. For instance, the Presi-
dent of the International Sociological Association, Georges Friedmann (1961) 
insisted on the normative moment, suggesting that true sociologists share fun-
damental values, and the new sociologist has become “the moralist of indus-
trial society.” As we will see in the analysis below, social scientists, at least in 
migration studies, combine a Weberian ethic of conviction (defined here as 
liberal, multiculturalist and with a neo-enlighten ment framework) and an 
ethic of responsibility.
2 Sociological Markers of the Articles under Review
This section introduces some of the main characteristics of the sample articles 
by quantifying the sociological markers of each of them. While 74 articles 
were submitted to content analysis, only 46 (in Arabic and English) were 
included in the statistical analysis (French articles were excluded as their 
analysis was added later). More than the half of the articles are in Arabic and 
published in journals located inside the Arab region (see Tables 7.1 and 7.2). 
All but 4 articles are single-authored. Eighty five per cent of them are written 
by academic faculty, while the remaining are professional researchers (Table 
7.3). The authors are mainly sociologists and political scientists, but some are 
from other disciplines (Table 7.4). More than half the authors are affiliated to 
institutions located in the Arab World, especially in Algeria and Morocco. The 
US and Germany are the most important two Western countries (Table 7.5). 
Most of the articles were published in the last 5 years (Table 7.6).
Most of the articles are largely desktop critiques of existing literature, while 
a quarter are based on fieldwork, using mainly qualitative methods (except for 
articles using secondary data, mainly those in Arabic) (Table 7.10). A few are 
essays without references (Table 7.7). In terms of geographical scope of the 
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article, more than half are case studies about one country, while the rest are 
dealing either with particular regions or international (Table 7.8.).
Both Arabic and English articles in the sample deal with the different modes 
of incorporation of migrants. The English articles focus on religion as practice 
and institutions in host societies, the public perception of migrants and politi-
cal problems in the host countries. As Martikainen (2014, 78) noted regarding 
the literature in English language: “In the 2000s, the input of political science 
in the study of Muslim minorities has become stronger and in this context 
state–church/religion relations have been seen as significant in explaining dif-
ferences between immigrant receiving countries and how they handle their 
immigrant-origin Muslim minorities.” The Arabic articles focus more on the 
causes of migration, policy, refugees and security. More than half of the articles 
dealing with religion have dealt with Islam as a religion either alone or com-
paratively with other religions (Table 7.9). 
3 Content Analysis of Themes
The analysis will not address the quality of the scholarship, neither in terms of 
the methodologies that have been deployed, nor on the validity or reliability of 
data, nor be concerned with the manner in which they provided descriptions 
of public opinions, the benefits of migrants for sending countries, or their 
ethnographic accounts. The interest is more about the normative statements 
and arguments produced by this scholarship, whether as topic choice, starting 
hypotheses or finalizing conclusions. This is why the analysis shows more 
topics related to migrants’ host societies than to their origin societies. 
Generally speaking, most of the articles in my sample combine two Webe-
rian ethics: the ethic of conviction and the ethic of responsibility. Weber ex-
plains these two political ethics in his essay on politics as a vocation (Weber 
2008). The first, as a free agent, the individual should be able to choose au-
tonomously not only the means for an action, but also the end: “this concept 
of personality finds its ‘essence’ in the constancy of its inner relation to certain 
ultimate ‘values’ and ‘meanings’ of life” (Starr 1999, 410). The ethic of convic-
tion thus drives value-rational action, which is defined by Weber as being “de-
termined by a conscious belief in the value for its own sake of some ethical, 
aesthetic, religious, or other form of behavior, independently of its prospects 
for success” (ibid.). 
While the ethic of conviction “recognizes a given hierarchy of values as the 
context for a moral endeavor, the ethic of responsibility acknowledges value 
obligations, but assumes the absence of any given hierarchy of values and the 
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inevitability of value conflict as the context for a moral endeavor” (Starr 1999, 
407). This means that the ethic of responsibility focuses on the possible conse-
quences in the application of certain values. Having said that, “an ethic of 
conviction and an ethic of responsibility are not absolute contrasts but rather 
supplements, which only in unison constitute a genuine man—a man who can 
have the calling for politics” (Starr 1999, 408).
The below analysis of the articles concerning migration will inform us as to 
how researchers have negotiated both their ethic of conviction and responsi-
bility while not necessarily being in conflict with Islamic ethics. By that I mean 
they do not reject revelation, nor do they make mention of it. I argue here that 
a great number of researchers in social science who deal with migration issues 
constitute an epistemic community that negotiates with and constantly 
combines both two ethics. We will see that since the 1990s, there has been a 
qualitative and quantitative leap in studies concerning immigrants’ religion, 
acknowledging their colonial past and their religious diversity.
The sample of articles shows that they espouse the major long-standing 
normative claims of liberalism, multiculturalism and the neo-enlightenment. 
Liberalism is understood as neutrality in the public sphere, the universal ap-
plication of human rights, the requirement to treat all subjects equally and the 
prioritization of economic and political liberty (Hansen 2011). Multicultural-
ism here means the politics of recognition and acknowledgement of cultural 
specificity and communitarian life (as distinct from assimilation). As for the 
neo-enlightenment, it is a continuation of the enlightenment as an expansion 
of its original project of secular-liberal, pluralist, democratic, egalitarian, inclu-
sive, rationalist and humanitarian society. It is more a way of life rather than a 
political movement (Zafirovski 2010), and a culture where the production of 
performative, problem-solving ethical orientations supersedes the application 
of overarching moralities coming from on high (Osborne 2003).
This sample of articles in migration studies demonstrates, as well as com-
bines, the above ethics with the ethics of responsibility that has resulted in fa-
voring migrant-admission policies, especially for refugees in host societies. 
They call for further integration into host societies and call upon migrants to 
exert more effort into the integration process. 
Paradigmatically, we have witnessed a clear move from the republican para-
digm that “forces” the migrant to be assimilated and even integrated to another 
paradigm that acknowledges the migrants’ lived experiences, their diversity, 
and the role of religion in their day-to-day life. Below I will select from the 
sample of the 74 articles some quotes that show the normative stand of the 
scholars. From these articles, three synthesis ones will be highlighted: 1. Peggy 
Levitt’s (2003) “‘You Know, Abraham Was the First Immigrant’: Religion and 
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Transnational Migration”; 2. Sophie Bava’s (2011) “Migration-Religion Studies 
in France: Evolving Toward a Religious Anthropology of Movement,” and 3. 
Piché’s (2013) “Les théories migratoires contemporaines au prisme des textes 
fondateurs.” 
3.1 Acknowledging the Role of Transitional Religion
First, it is interesting to note the relative absence of the theme of religion in the 
French social science literature while there is more in Arabic and much more 
in English articles. While Chaaban Sakib (2013) was interested in giving us an 
historical account of how Islam in Africa is a major and crucial factor that 
shaped Arab-African relations, Peggy Levitt (2003) in her survey of studies 
published about religion and transnational migration was more interested in 
the contemporary religion in the diaspora that grew out of diaspora studies in 
general, as well as in the examination of religion’s role in heightened globali-
zation. She argues that there were debates “whether religion functions as a 
discrete, homogenizing force in its own right or if it is an arena within which 
individuals assert particularistic, localized identities in the face of globalization” 
(Levitt 2003, 850). Also other researchers document “the macro-level con-
nections between global religious actors that cross national boundaries... 
Research on the religious practices of transnational migrants is connected to 
the literature on global and diasporic religion because transnational migration 
households, congregations and communities are sites where diasporic, global 
and transnational religions are created” (Levitt 2003, 857).
The role that religion plays in enabling transnational membership began to 
be accounted for in early 1990s: “Recent work on global religions brings to light 
the ways in which [migrants] create international connections that engender 
universal identities. Because, … religion is a global societal system as transna-
tional in its operation, as the economy or the nation-state, it is no surprise that 
migrants use religious institutions to live their transnational lives” (Levitt 2003, 
861).
These transnational lives provide the possibility of plurality beyond the 
community: “Religion and, in particular, religious movements operating in 
broad geographic contexts, engage in increasingly homogenized forms of wor-
ship and organization creating global communities that locals then join. Fol-
lowers can choose from an array of membership options which reach far beyond 
their communities and cultures and transform local religious life” (Levitt 2003, 
862).
Research shows that there is a diversity of lived religious experiences that 
have their impact not only in the host society but also the society of origin: 
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The hybridized or creolized religious beliefs and practices that the 
migration experience gives rise to emerge where local and global religious 
influences converge. Global religious institutions shape the transnational 
migration experience at the same time that migrants chip away at and 
recreate global religions by making them local and then starting the 
process anew. Transnational migrants bring particular incarnations of 
global religion with them, create new forms by combining what they 
bring with what they encounter, and then reintroduce these ideas, 
practices, identities, and social capital or what I call social remittances—
back to their sending communities. (Levitt 2003, 851)
Some scholars highlight the increase of the impact of religion and religiosity: 
“there has been an increase not just in practitioners of Islam in Europe, but 
overall religiosity due to migration” (Martikainen 2014, 79). In the same vein, 
though with more normative statements about accepting Islam in Europe, 
Valerie A. Lewis and Ridhi Kashyap argue, 
it is important not to view high levels of religiosity as an anomalous out-
come, but as a potential indication of multiple pathways to immigrant 
adaptation within British society. Because the “actively practicing” Mus-
lim community is diverse in both ethnic and socioeconomic back-
grounds, institutional supports which afford equal religious opportunity 
(for example, easing restrictions on setting up places of worship and 
community centers) may enable plural forms of religion catering to this 
diversity to take shape. In the long run, the development of local religious 
infrastructure, training in government settings that respect religious 
diversity, and legal changes that put Islam on more equal footing with the 
state-sanctioned Anglian Church, will nurture a British Islam in healthy 
public discourse and reduce public hostility against Muslims. (Lewis and 
Kashyap 2013, 64)
In this same vein, Alexandros Sakellariou criticizes Greek authority for not 
allowing the construction of mosques in Greece: 
This anti-Islamic political discourse has practical ramifications for 
Muslim communities in Greece from the moment it influences policy 
formation: they still enjoy less freedom to practice their religion than 
those of other faiths, clearly reflected in the lack of a proper place to 
worship and a cemetery to bury their dead. While they are considered a 
threat to national identity and to Greek society in general, […] Such 
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anti-Islamic rhetoric has had a profound impact on the Greek Muslim 
community, precluding them from worshipping in any normal fashion, 
and making the public resistant to the construction of new mosques. 
(Sakellariou 2017, 514)
Some scholars report that high religiosity is also a source of civil and political 
engagement: 
Different dimensions of religiosity affect immigrant attitudes in a number 
of ways. It was public religiosity such as mosque attendance, rather than 
internalized religious beliefs, which had the greatest impact on my 
respon dents’ integration outcomes. Thus, we need to differentiate be-
tween the exoteric (ritualistic/public) and esoteric (spiritual/inter-
nalized) domains of religion to accurately evaluate its impact on social 
and political phenomena. […] The self-narratives of my informants 
suggested that Muslim immigrant women in Southern California are 
engaged in two interrelated integration strategies. On the one hand, they 
are engaged in a selective integration process whereby they become 
involved in the civic and political institutions and processes of the US, 
but psychologically and culturally remain distanced from the wider US 
society. Muslim immigrant women rely on the resources and values of 
their religious community and the teachings of religious institutions to 
determine which domains of American society to selectively integrate 
into and at what level. (Ozyurt 2013, 1617)
Other researchers see high religiosity as a burden (13 articles), not in a 
normative way, but simply describing public opinion as suspicious of migrants’ 
religiosity or as may lead to difficulty for integration: “Religion can be a highly 
insulating force, driving a wedge in nations and making migrant assimilation 
difficult” (Golomski 2016, 451).
3.2 Institutionalization of Migrants’ Religion
Theorists of post-secularism, Jürgen Habermas, William Connolly and José 
Casanova, most notably, among others, pointed out a new presence of religion 
in the public sphere. Martikainen (2014) argues that Casanova relates the 
emergence of public religion—or “deprivatization”—to “the fact that religious 
traditions throughout the world are refusing to accept the marginal and priva-
tized role which theories of modernity as well as theories of secularization had 
reserved for them” (Casanova 1994, 5). 
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For Habermas, the moral intuitions of faith should be part of public dis-
course and be allowed to contribute to the common good. For him, the signifi-
cance of public religion is in developments towards a new, “post-secular” 
society. Post-secularity has three characteristics: the relativization of European 
secularism; religious pluralization, whereby churches and other religious orga-
nizations increasingly create their own “communities of interpretation” in the 
public arena; and finally a realization of the permanence of a new, originally 
Immigrant Other, whose values are traditional and collectivist and strongly 
associated with religion. Post-secularity, argues Habermas, implies that society 
remains organized by secular legal institutions and law, which nevertheless are 
obliged to enable religion to maintain “a public influence and relevance” 
(Habermas 2008). These new notions within post-secularism will recently 
have impact on migration scholarship, even if post-secularism, according to 
Adriana Pabst (2012) is still within the framework of secularism. 
Within this framework, Foner and Alba argue that religion as a belief system, 
institution, and community has played a major role for both first and second 
generation immigrants and served as a bridge to inclusion in their new society 
in the US, but not in Europe (Foner and Alba 2008). This position was chal-
lenged by Martikainen’s (2014) work in Finland showing that Muslim 
organizations are increasingly seen as locations of active citizenship and as 
arenas of social integration. In contrast, Bassam Tibi (2010) provides an 
ethically responsible warning by requesting both Islamic institutions in Ger-
many and the official German authority to work together to overcome a per-
ceived “ethnicity of fear’: “This study presented a positive alternative to the 
negative scenario, namely the promotion of a European Islam as a variety of a 
civil Islam such as the one that exists in Indonesia. This vision could become 
reality, if both parties were committed to it. The notion “an ethnicity of fear” 
has nothing to do with panicking. It is an ethically responsible warning” (Tibi 
2010, 150). He also criticizes the German dual system that kept Jus sanguinis 
and the new law of nationality (Tibi 2010). In fact, the issue of who bears 
responsibility is an important topic that has been dealt with by some scholars. 
For example, Abdel Wahid Akmeer (2014), while criticizing European policy 
toward Muslims, insists on a role for Islamic institutions in Europe in organizing 
the community and facilitating their integration in the host society.
Religious institutions play a role in communitarian solidarity: “Empirical 
studies have also shown that believers not only possessed a greater ability to 
emigrate, but a greater desire to do so as well. As the “church of migrants” be-
comes increasingly just that, the infrastructure of the church itself has expand-
ed abroad, accommodating the needs and wishes of its migrant congregation” 
(Strielkowski, Bilan, and Demkiv 2016, 2). Peggy Levitt argues beyond the role 
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of institutions by highlighting the contribution of the Birmingham School. 
This school “explores identity construction and the role of consciousness and 
subcultures in encouraging collective solidarity at the social margins” (Levitt 
2003, 854). One may argue here that the reference to religion and culture is 
very important in explaining how the two enhance the sense of solidarity in 
migrant communities, as it was in the Islamic history between migrants (al-
muhājirūn), but also between them and the hosting community in Medina, 
later known as the helpers (al-anṣār).
4 Post-Coloniality
Some scholars highlight the continuing legacy of empire that has also strongly 
influenced diaspora studies: 
These explore how discursive practices and identities are constructed 
and imagined during the colonial, national and post-colonial periods. 
While this work generally tells us a lot about the transformation of 
religious life in the immigrant context, it has less to say about the ways in 
which migration continues to transform sending-country life. It tends to 
treat migrant and non-migrant religious life as discrete entities rather 
than as occurring within the same transnational social field, and 
influencing each other. (Levitt 2003, 854) 
Other scholars point out the reason religion has been used by colonial authori-
ties: “While religion often can be used by colonial authorities to control 
migrants, they also can find these ideologies difficult to manage and manipulate, 
at times causing serious issues” (Hansen 2011, 881). 
Methodologically, many articles in my sample consider the migrant voice in 
their research and acknowledge the context of the colonial past. In his study of 
Islam and the North African Second Generation in France, Jean Beaman (2015, 
45) confronts the mainstream idea that French Muslims are an obstacle to in-
tegration or in some way not compatible with the ideals of a secular French 
Republic. He conducted an ethnography of 45 Maghrebi immigrants to France. 
His questions centered on their religious practices, their understanding of 
their degree of marginalization, and how they view the two as connected, or 
not. The respondents viewed their religiosity not as in conflict with their 
French identity, but, rather, as supportive of it. One of the answers supplied 
Beaman with the title for his article, viewing themselves “As French as Anyone 
Else.”
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4.1 Marginalization and Alienation in Host Society
There is a major gap between social science production in migration policy 
and the attitude of the European majority toward migrants. Scholars often 
develop normative conclusions about the problems that migrants have in host 
societies and the alienation that migrants feel. Sayad’s (1999) concept of 
“double absent” became very paradigmatical, even though Sayad did not 
consider the relevance of the question of religion in the context of migration 
(Bava 2011).
In a country such as France, migration studies moved from a republican 
stance, encouraging of assimilation, to a more complete acknowledgement of 
multiculturalism: 
During this period—the late 1980s—which witnessed the beginnings of 
academic inquiry into multicultural society, sociologists and political sci-
entists took an interest in the religion of the “immigrant” Other. These 
were the first studies of Islam in suburban France in hostels and prayer 
rooms; furthermore, they comprised the assumption that immigrants 
needed to be able to practice their religion in decent conditions and to 
experience their cultures fully within French society. [However], they did 
not analyze immigrants as full-fledged protagonists of their religion, nor 
did they observe the diversity of religious options available because of 
migration or simply on the transnational religious market. One might 
consider that sociologists made too strong an assumption that migration 
was permanent and, therefore, saw religion as one of many transplanted 
values that would (or must) adapt to the French secular model. (Bava 
2011, 499) 
Bava goes on in describing a paradigm shift:
Many studies already initiated by anthropologists by the end of the 1990s 
have opened the way to learning about Islam as it is experienced (the 
conditions in which halal meat is produced, how al-ʿEid al-Kabīr festival 
is organized in French urban space […], the meaning believers invest in 
their religious practices […], and the links between economic networks 
and religion […]. What motivates these researchers is no longer an 
approach to integration, but the objective of actual knowledge of 
migrants’ Islam by exploring elements of continuity between the 
migrants’ countries of origin and those to which they migrate.” (Bava 2011, 
499)
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In Germany, debate has revolved around the violence against migrant commu-
nities. Schrempf criticizes the recent wave of hate crimes, and calls for more 
contact between migrant and host communities in order to effectively combat 
xenophobia (Schrempf 2001). 
Other Arab authors discuss secret/illegal migration, which is driven by 
unbearable economic conditions, the apparent economic and social ease of 
those who migrated, the revenues of illegal migration, the trust in illegal 
 migration networks, and most importantly the restrictions on legal migration. 
ʿAbd al-Qādir Muḥammad Wild-Dādā provides an example of the French gov-
ernment’s consideration of migrants as the scapegoat of its internal problems, 
like unemployment, crime, drugs and even terrorism, while neglect ing to cred-
it the economic contributions of migrants. He discusses the dangerous public 
discourse of intolerance, discrimination, terrorism, and racism, which entail 
more restrictions on legal migration. However, he did not study the association 
of religion with these discourses or with terrorism. He proposes several solu-
tions, including dealing with migrants not as a commodity needed for the 
economy, or as a source of trouble and as victims of crime networks, but as a 
source of economic growth. He went so far as to call for the erasure of borders 
(al-Dāh 2013).
Another Arab author, Hala al-Hifnāwī, considers that the failure of inte-
gration of the Muslim minority of Europe is one of the factors driving 
extremism, though there are several other factors (unemployment, economic 
and political marginalization, the absence of moderate religious education, 
the support of European countries of Israel and the United States war in Iraq). 
The solution, according to the author, is to pursue integration policies that 
balance the Muslim identity of migrants, and the European identity of the host 
population, and to stop the discriminatory practices in Europe against Muslims. 
The author suggests that any imbalance between the different identities leads 
to extremism. That is why she suggests policies that take into consideration the 
balancing of identities of Muslim minorities in Europe (al-Hafnawi 2015, 4).
In a review of the Hashem Fayad’s book The Immigration of Labor from 
Maghreb to Europe: Netherlands as a Model by, Abdelkader Latrach (2015) notes 
that there has been an increase in research interest in the Arab World on inter-
national immigration. According to him, the rise in international migration is 
due to the expansion of migratory patterns across the world, and the emergence 
of new societal, demographic, cultural, legislative and economic problems in 
the receiving countries as well as the sending countries. The author assesses 
the field, shedding light on what constitutes an immigration study: an historical 
context of the emergence of international migrations, an analysis of its effects 
on the reality of the receiving countries, their population, social, cultural and 
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security dimensions, the study of the relationship between migrations, and the 
development of brain drain. Latrach highlights the importance of the analysis 
of the historical context of the phenomenon and the demographic aspect of 
migration, yet he criticizes the book, stating that the colonial history does not 
solely dictate the direction of immigration, but the phenomenon of the 
globalization of international immigration flows, the strategies of groups and 
individuals, and institutional differences also play a major role in the formation 
of those directions. The book also considered the integration of Moroccans 
into Dutch society as weak, but this is not due to the multiplicity of organizations 
of Moroccans, but to the lack of diversity in their areas and the absence of 
initiatives to open up to Dutch culture and to bring Moroccan culture closer to 
Dutch culture. In addition, integration is also related to the vision of the other, 
be it in educational programs, media, political party programs or social policies, 
or political discourse related to issues of security and identity. Here we see 
both the author of the review and the book consider that the Moroccan 
institutions (community centers abroad and the administration in charge of 
dealing with emigrants) are mainly responsible for the lack of integration. 
Also, the book considers that one of the central issues raised by international 
migrations is the rise of racism. This racism is due to growing hostile attitudes 
towards immigrants in general and Arab and Muslim immigrants in particular, 
and has led to the emergence of a declared “Islamophobia.” This situation 
coincides with the contraction of employment opportunities in the European 
labour markets and the decline in social policies, which leads to the raising of 
political slogans hostile to Arab immigrants based on the difficulty of 
integration of Arabs and Muslims in European societies—thus creating the 
problem of the integration of immigrants one of the priorities of governments 
in many European countries. Finally, the review article discusses the positive 
role of immigrants on the sending country. The author discusses how some 
aspects of religiosity make difficult the integration and increases racism in the 
Netherlands (Latrach 2015).
Another author, Mohamad Saidi was interested in the question of the inte-
gration of young Belgians of Moroccan origin into Belgian society after the at-
tacks in Paris. According to this author, these young people have failed 
academically, are unemployed, and many live as part of fractured groups iso-
lated from both their parents’ culture and the wider society around them. They 
suffer from issues of social stigma, social exclusion, religious extremism, 
identity rupture, and academic failure. The article’s main argument is that the 
phenomenon of poverty, marginalization, policies of exclusion and 
discrimination, and even the dominant Islamic religious culture there (which 
tends in some respects to extremism and the rejection of the other), are not 
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sufficient to explain the rebellious tendencies and non-integration that drive 
them to religious extremism. They suffer from an identity based confusion and 
an insecurity which leads them to create fragile social and societal affiliations, 
thus leaving them unable to satisfy their feelings of insecurity and dissatisfac-
tion, and therefore also unable to belong to the Belgian society. The greater the 
sense of identity confusion caused by self-isolation or social exclusion, the less 
plausible is the development of values of pluralism, coexistence and the inte-
gration of these young people into Belgian society (Saadi 2017).
In my sample, few Arab scholars were interested in the situation of migrants/
refugees in the Arab world. ʿĀshūr Raḥūma wrote about refugees in South 
Darfour who suffer major human rights violations due to governmental and 
organizational failures to accommodate their basic human rights (Raḥūma 
2016). Nabīl al-Sahlī made similar statements about the reason why Lebanese 
authorities treated the Palestinians from Syria poorly (al-Sahlī 2014). In the 
same vein, in his article “South-South Migration and Security Risks: Political 
Islam and Violent Extremism in the Shadow of Globalisation in Bangladesh” 
Hasan Mubashar argues how migration to Saudi Arabia by many Bangladeshis 
led to the creation of ISIS in Bangladesh, but he also argues against a mere se-
curity solution, and calls for “a long soft campaign to counter propaganda of 
Islamists who undermine state and peace. The government also needs to scale 
up countering messages for violent extremism coming through the Internet 
and social media” (Mubashar 2017, 312).
Other scholars call for investing in Islamic rules and regulations, as they 
constitute “a valuable source for protection of the rights of refugees, migrants 
and asylum seekers. In addition to contractual responsibilities, they could 
serve as a faith-based guarantor of the rights of refugees, particularly women 
and children. Further exploration of respected Islamic sources could result in 
new mechanisms in this regard” (Rahaei 2009, 4).
4.2 Against Security and Selectivity Paradigms
Although the theme of radicalization in Europe and North American was 
present in many articles (12 articles), many scholars argued against the 
securitization of migration. Falco criticized some extreme statistical studies 
that argue against receiving refugees and migrants from Islamic countries and 
point out that more “radical” individuals in the Muslim community are less 
likely to migrate than the more moderate (Falco and Rotondi 2016). Other 
scholars argue that closed borders will not end the illegal migration and 
criticize the reason why the European Union deals with illegal migration as a 
security problem and links it to terrorism and crime. This emphasis, according 
to him, should shift from the problem of helping the southern Middle East in 
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solving economic, political, and social problems (Farijeh and Farijeh 2018; Ha-
roush 2015).
For some, there is no need for help from Europe; changes are already occur-
ring locally: “the Arab Spring revolutions have succeeded in bringing political 
change. This change can open the door to political freedom and economic 
prosperity that can put an end to Arab migration, especially among young 
 people” (Abdul-Rahman 2013, 245).
All migration policies of the twentieth century are based on a postulate 
considered immutable: immigration is a privilege and not a right (Piché 2013). 
Many scholars have challenged that and the selectivity introduced by the liber-
alism and logic of a globalized labour market (e.g. Kabbanji 2011). With the in-
creased number of asylum seekers, many scholars argue for burden sharing 
between all countries. Four prominent French scholars in a report delivered to 
Directorate General for International Cooperation and Development of the 
French Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs call for multilateralism (Badie 
et al. 2008). Generally speaking, the journal of Revue Européenne des Migrations 
Internationales has adopted a human rights approach against the security and 
selectivity paradigms. Many articles in this journal have provided excellent 
fieldworks about the frontier zones that become places of police repression 
against refugees who wait a long time to be granted refuge (e.g. Agier 2014). A 
special issue of this journal was about migrant minors. For instance, Jacqueline 
Bhabha argues, 
Whether they are asylum seekers, independent migrants, trafficked youth 
or children smuggled for family reunion purposes, or whether their status 
is unclear (between categories or within several), all young migrants 
need protection and assistance of one sort or another—safe accommo-
dation, and protection from exploitation, from the risks of criminalization, 
from deprivation of food and medical care at a minimum. (Bhabha 2014, 
37)
It is noteworthy that this journal is published by the Migrinter, a research 
laboratory specialized in international migration, hosted by the Maison des 
Sciences de l’Homme et de la Société de Poitiers (France). Adopting the “mi-
gration project” as a paradigm that privileges to present migrant voices and 
their points of view, this research center was for a long time consulting with 
the Ministry of Social Affairs (the French institution which deals with the 
questions of migration and naturalisation) and the Institute of High Stud-
ies of Defense. Its researchers have kept their critical edge while conducting 
some policy studies. At the European level, the recent EU report Research on 
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Migration: Facing Realities and Maximising Opportunities (King and Lulle 2016) 
displays a summary of the findings of six projects funded by EU. All push for 
more integration of migrants and refugees in European space, with more plu-
ralism and increased admissions.
5 Academics as Activists 
Some members of this epistemic community have become active in volun-
teering to help refugees learn languages and apply to universities. Holmes and 
Castaneda point out that anthropologists and Syrian refugees in Germany have 
begun ethnographic experiments on verbal and musical dialogue, weekly 
socializing in a neighborhood café, dialogical courses in the department of 
anthropology involving Syrian refugees and university students, activism to 
push the university to admit Syrian refugees, and collaborative writing and 
publishing to participate in the war of position more actively together. In 
addition, many of the faculty and students volunteer regularly in housing, 
health care, registration, and other services for refugees. These efforts have 
complemented other forms of horizontal political solidarity that have emerged 
(Holmes and Castaneda 2016). The conference that was organized at the 
American University of Beirut in November 2017 witnessed many initiatives 
conducted by the faculty in receiving refugees. Indeed, there is a long tradition 
of connection between academics and religious scholars who championed the 
cause of immigrants. One example would be clergymen Father Jacques Ghys of 
the missionary order of the White Fathers who established an academic 
journal in early 1950s Hommes et Migrations (“Men and Migration”) and who 
created Amana (Assistance Morale Aux Nord-Africains), an association for aid 
and mutual assistance for North Africans with a focus on literacy training.
5.1 The Counter-Paradigm 
So far, I have argued that there is a sort of mainstream epistemic community 
that combines the ethic of conviction with responsibility and that normatively 
supports acknowledging the migrants’ causes. However, some exceptions can 
be found. Some conservative scholars who call for no innovation in the fiqh 
related to economic matters when migrants are in non-Muslim majority coun-
tries (Bardaweel 2016). For example, some Lebanese scholars (and politicians) 
have used the fear of permanent Palestinian settlements as a scarecrow, while 
declaring both their support for Palestine, and opposition to imperialism and 
Zionism. In the language of the Lebanese novelist Elias Khoury “they love 
Palestine and hate the Palestinians.” It is as if they were telling us that the 
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liberation of Palestine was possible only through the further debilitation and 
humiliation of the Palestinian refugees.
6 Conclusion
When migration studies scholars are normative, they combine the Weberian 
ethics of conviction and of responsibility in order to make sound social/
political judgments. This combination leads to a refusal of positions that are 
too permissive in the sense that any means are justifiable to secure particular 
ends (for example, refuting overemphasis on the security approach in relation 
to migration). This combination often puts social scientists in a dilemma 
that sometimes encodes paradoxes: protecting local employment v/s open 
borders for refugees/migrants; multiculturalism v/s some migrant cultural 
habits that contradict some basic principles of human rights. This cannot be 
discussed by simply invoking famous dichotomies of scholars of Islamization 
of social science or post-colonial studies (community v/s individual, tradition 
v/s. modernity, revelation v/s reason, history v/s present time, central v/s 
periphery, etc.). This is only possible by bringing in some complexity, nuance, 
precision and caution and by constructing a more appropriate framework 
for understanding the mix of micro and macro that characterizes the global 
situation today.
Coming back to what I posit in the introduction, I distinguished between 
the global/universalistic moment and normative moment in social science. 
I argue here that for religious science it has similarly two moments which re-
quires its own technics of interpreting revealed text and religious tradition. 
While I expect mainly a separation of methods for the first moment, I don’t for 
the local/normative moment. I expect collaboration between social science 
and religious ethics as each can be informed by the other. Social scientists 
combine ethics of conviction (defined here as liberal, multiculturalist and with 
neo-enlightenment framework) and ethics of responsibility, while Islamic eth-
icists would provide what would be a primordial constant in Islam that should 
be taken into account in this normative moment. These different ethics will 
enter into tension that should be resolved through dialog, mutual learning and 
beyond a mere legalism or rationalism. Here the connection between social 
scientists and religious scholars are very important. Both should be allied to 
developing a thought that takes into account the benefit of their society and 
balances determinism and utopia. Social scientists need to learn about peo-
ple’s traditions in order to understand their spirituality, emotion and habitus, 
and religious scholars need to understand how people perceive what is good 
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and bad in everyday life and their ʿurf (customs) in order to establish fiqh al-
wāqiʿ (social and political jurisprudence that changes in accordance with the 
external reality).1 In this regard, Abbas Barzegar provides in this volume an 
excellent example how Muslim humanitarianism that was developed through 
“synthesis between living traditions of aklhāq, adab, and fiqh in Islamic terms 
as well as a type of ‘practical theology’ in Western terms.” He argues: 
Muslim humanitarianism can inform emerging Islamic legal and ethical 
approaches to civic engagement, democratic culture, and global citizen-
ship by virtue of the fact that existing custom (ʿurf) of Muslims in these 
spaces has now come to prioritize humanistic principles that transcend 
national, ethnic, sectarian, and ideological agendas. At the same time, 
these practices are thoroughly fused with the larger aims and objectives 
(maqasid) of Islam and the Shariʿa and thereby have become part of the 
customary understanding of Islamic truth by millions of Muslims around 
the world. 
As discussed above, our results show that, in my sample, scholars support the 
claim of migrants for keeping the specificity of their religious differences and 
acknowledging their biographies and histories and pace of integration. Instead 
of being praised, however, there has been a trend of Don Quixote phantas-
magoric battles with these scholars, taxed by many postcolonial and knowledge 
Islamization scholars for being inattentive to the lived experience of Muslims, 
including their spiritual life and their colonial past. Having said that, it is time 
also for social science, mainly, but not only, in the West, to put more effort into 
accounting for the voice of the migrant community and to read and to cite 
from the research produced in the South and in local languages.
I argue here, at least in regard to migration studies, that the requested new 
paradigms are there. The real discussion would be how to reconcile the 
competing values of liberalism, multiculturalism and neo-enlightenment with 
local culture and religious ethics. This cross-fertilization between both sets 
makes migration studies robust. Basically, yet with many exceptions, the litera-
ture calling for the Islamization of social knowledge does not deliver many 
tools for connecting social science with Islamic ethics. While focusing so much 
on the primary assumptions concerning secularist, materialistic or utilitarian 
biases, they forgot that the main mission of social science is being critical, i.e. 
1 In the text of Qaradawi who coins the concept of fiqh al-wāqiʿ, this concept is defined as an 
approach “based on a scientific and objective study of the nature [of a phenomenon], a study 
that reveals all its dimensions and elements, [clarifies] their advantages and disadvantages, 
and [highlights] the relevant influencing factors” (Al-Qaradawi 1999, p. 23). 
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it has the capacity to question the current social and political powers from any 
intentional and unintentional bad consequences. One may look at the tra-
jectory of migration studies, as it went from encouraging assimilation to 
acknowledging diversity and lived-experience, instead of trying to untie social 
scientists’ shoelaces every minute, hoping for them to trip. The engagement 
with social science should be by providing a critique, rather than a criticism. 
This means that instead of trying to challenge its production based on a set of 
independently defined values and categories, one is to proceed immanently to 
different migration theories, from within their own terms and categories in 
order to show how they relate to one another, and whether they are mutually 
consistent. Good critique should be empirical and not based on conspiracy 
theories. In the time of post-truth discourses, especially in social media, critical 
sciences have been dismissed as ideological, useless and therefore unworthy of 
public funding (Piovani 2017). Now should be the time for consolidation, rather 
than dividing academics between universalists vs contextualists. In the 
direction of consolidation, one may find common ground with contemporary 
reformists such as Ali Shariati, Abdolkarim Soroush, and Abdullahi Ahmed 
An-Naʿim who called for Islamic liberalism (Mir 2017). 
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Table 7.9 Frequency of keywords by language 
Language
Arabic English Total
Voluntary migration 0 7 7
Remittances 0 1 1
Sexuality 0 1 1
Refugees 6 1 7
Human trafficking 3 0 3
War and ethnic/ 
 international conflict
2 1 3
Refugee camps 1 0 1
Crime 1 0 1
Social conflict 2 2 4
Border 3 0 3
Perception 0 4 4
Internal migration 2 1 3
Impact of host society 0 2 2
Security 5 2 7
Impact of place of origin 2 3 5
Family 0 1 1
Policy 7 1 8
Gender 2 0 2
Causes of migration 12 2 14
Labour market 2 0 2
Demography 0 3 3
Cultural effect 1 3 4




Political problems 1 4 5
Psychological problems 0 2 2
Ethnicity 0 2 2
Racism 0 1 1
Religion 4 6 10
Total 23 18 41
Percentages and totals are based on respondents.
Table 7.10 Methods used (multiple responses) 
 N   Percent
Using existing data 17 33.30%
Content analysis 10 19.60%
Multiple methods 7 13.70%




Focus groups 1 2.00%
Total 51 100.00%
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Chapter 8
How do Muslim States Treat their “Outsiders”?:  
Is Islamic Practice of Naturalisation Synonymous 
with Jus Sanguinis?
Radhika Kanchana
1 Naturalisation Practice in Muslim States Today
Aḥmad al-Ṭayyib, the Grand Imam of the renowned Al-Azhar Sunni Arab insti-
tution of learning in Egypt, made four points at the Islamic-Christian confer-
ence in Cairo (28 Feb–1 Mar 2017). This came to be called the Al-Azhar 
Declaration, which asserted that Islam is compatible with religious pluralism. 
He upheld the principle of equality of rights and duties for both Muslims and 
non-Muslims within a “national constitutional state.” He insisted that the con-
cept of “citizenship” was part of the foundations of Islam, citing reference to 
the Prophet’s Constitution of Medina in the first Muslim society. 
The Al-Azhar Declaration challenges the prevailing popular perception that 
Muslim countries are relatively closed societies, especially in relation to non-
Muslims in their territory. Islam’s principles supposedly do not live easily with 
contemporary international law and norms that demand, for example, more 
secular and egalitarian values and institutions. The present paper concerns the 
treatment of “the other” by focusing on the practice of naturalisation in states 
with majority Muslim population or states that define themselves as Islamic. 
How states deal with foreigners who eventually become residents is an impor-
tant question in the discussion on ethics relating to migration. This prelimi-
nary research is part of a broader project to empirically explore the subject. It 
concerns the practice of Muslim states on naturalisation since the mid-twenti-
eth century, to see whether the Jus sanguinis citizenship principle is generally 
a “by default” occurrence, or if they show other nuanced arrangements in law 
and policy.
The focus is on Jus sanguinis to ascertain the potential access of foreigners, 
especially non-Muslim, to acquire citizenship and ensuing rights in Muslim 
countries. Individuals are granted citizenship of a nation either Jus soli (those 
that are born there and automatically acquire the status), or Jus sanguinis 
where one or both parents are citizens. Alternatively, they can acquire citizen-
ship by a deliberate process—through naturalisation. Naturalisation is a key 
© Radhika Kanchana, 2020 | doi:10.1163/9789004417342_009
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mechanism by which a state either facilitates or blocks the incorporation of 
new candidates for citizenship. Thus, the content of the national provisions to 
grant access to naturalisation is important. A society’s degree of access to citi-
zenship shows its level of inclusiveness or exclusiveness. Jus soli and Jus san-
guinis are the two dominant regimes that inform states’ choice in granting 
citizenship. Jus soli ascribes citizenship automatically to everyone born on the 
territory: the USA is a primary example of a liberal Jus soli. Jus sanguinis as-
cribes citizenship automatically to individuals born to parent/s that are citi-
zens of the state. It is also known as the citizenship “by descent,” meaning via 
blood or ethnic affiliation. Many states follow a combination of the two, rough-
ly termed as Jus domicile. Jus sanguinis becomes particularly relevant when the 
naturalisation criteria over-emphasize this principle for the allocation of citi-
zenship. In effect, this restricts state membership with the stress on ties before 
birth.
I approach naturalisation and the access to citizenship in this paper as the 
progressive process for an individual to belong and to consolidate rights in the 
local society where he/she resides, irrespective of prior or current affiliations. 
The concept of citizenship, broadly constituting three key dimensions namely 
legal status, participation and membership of an individual in a political com-
munity, is itself far from frozen. It is evolving—in its definition, the specific 
rights and duties it entails and the regulating institutions. States with majority 
Muslim populations or that follow Islamic law similarly experience new articu-
lations of citizenship. For instance, Kiwan observes that the Arab uprisings 
from 2011 demonstrate reformulations of citizenship identities (2005, 311): 
“Emerging constructions of citizenship across the Arab world are being ‘rei-
magined’ in relation to intersecting identities of ethnicity, religion and nation-
ality, as well as age, gender, and socio-economic status.” She refers here to the 
disaffected youth, the women, the Islamists stepping in to close the gap left by 
the non-performing regimes, and the refugees.
More scholarship exists on Muslims’ integration or as minorities in the 
mainly Christian and Western democracies. Much less scholarship has been 
forthcoming in the converse case regarding non-Muslims in Muslim states 
from the perspective of Islamic law and empirical studies. Contemporary Mus-
lim states generally follow the Jus sanguinis principle for citizenship. While 
“democratic citizenship” in the dominant parlance allegedly does not find an 
easy resonance in Islam, Islamic law has traditionally allocated a secondary 
status of dhimmi to the non-Muslim, most evident in the millet system of the 
Ottoman period. The objective here is to investigate how “open” is the gate of 
citizenship to the outsider in contemporary Muslim states, from the background 
of Islamic doctrine, existing international norms and contemporary practice.
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The paper looks at the naturalisation provisions of 18 Muslim states with 
attention to their historical and socio-political factors. It first observes the gen-
eral trend of the naturalisation provision to foreigners in a cross-section of 
Muslim states and then in the six Arab-Gulf states in closer detail (Oman, Sau-
di Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain and Kuwait), drawing from my dissertation 
research (Kanchana 2016). 
2 Membership of the Other in an Islamic Society
Muwāṭana is the nearest term in Islamic texts that best resonates with the 
concept of citizenship, in the sense of “democratic citizenship” as we widely 
understand it (Parolin 2009). Whereas, Jinsiyya, something like a nationality 
certificate (Davis 1995) and Wataniyya, or nationalism in the Western sense, 
i.e., attachment to a territorialized sovereign nation-state (Longva 1995: 214) 
are two other terms with similar connotation that often cause confusion. Thus, 
muwāṭin is a citizen in the legal sense. There is allegedly a discord with this 
concept in Islam. For example, Fetni (in Ciprut 2008) argues that “citizenship” 
does not exist in “traditional” Islam, as a relationship between the individual 
and the state. She instead proposes the notion of “Islamic citizenship” 
resembling a club, where membership is through the faith because the idea of 
“individual” does not exist in the “umma” or the collective ethos: “Islam is a din 
wa dawla⁠ʾ. That is, religion and state go together in the goal to better propagate 
Islam or the message of peace and warning. Therefore, “membership” is 
exclusive to the faith-community, making non-Muslims the outsiders by 
default. 
However, Islam concedes protection and rights to non-Muslims based on 
their residence status in an Islamic territory. Early Islamic dogma famously rec-
ognized and accepted, although in a somewhat qualified manner, religious 
pluralism in Islamic societies by giving Jews and Christians freedom to practice 
their religion. Islam also provided for crossing ethnic lines. For instance, Arabs, 
Kurds, Berbers and Turks who were fused together within a global and univer-
sal Islamic community (umma), have acted as its political leaders in the past 
(Shatzmiller 2005: 285).
Islam in the written text officially relegates non-Muslims living in dār al-
Islām (or lands under the Islamic rule) to the status of dhimmi. Under the 
 Islamic law, or the Shariʿa, which directs the social behaviour of  individuals 
in an Islamic society, the Qāḍis or judges granted this alternative dhimmi 
 status. The status applies only to the ahl al-kitāb (“People of the Book”) who 
also followed religions with divinely revealed scriptures—in other words, with 
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monotheistic beliefs like the Jews, the Ṣabiʾans of Harran and the Christians 
(the kitābis). The non-Muslim could remain within their own religious com-
munity both physi cally and under their own laws and regulations. The dhimmi 
(under the “pro tected” status) and the mustaʿmin (allowed to conduct busi-
ness) were foreigners in an intermediate category, between a believer and a 
non-believer. The millet system in the Ottoman period during the late Middle 
Ages was a clear example, which legally defined and protected religious mi-
norities within the empire: 
In exchange for official tolerance and legal recognition under the law, all 
male, free, and sane dhimmis were required to pay a poll tax (jizya) and 
those who were land- and property-owners were also obligated to pay the 
tax known as kharāj. (Martin in Shatzmiller 2005: 5)
Religious pluralism thus existed in the normative sense in Islamic societies 
and elsewhere, like the pre-colonial Muslim-ruled states in India. In social 
reality, the dhimmis under the Ottomans appear to have enjoyed fair treatment 
if they did not contest the preponderance of the Muslims. “Dhimmis were 
granted independence in the practice and maintenance of their own religious 
and social affairs so long as they did not impinge upon Muslims” (Martin in 
Shatzmiller 2005: 5). In this sense, they were second-class citizens. Hourani 
(1947) noted that nationality was a less important marker than religion, 
language and ethnicity in his identification of thirty-one minority groups in 
the Middle East.
However, tradition or religious text alone did not influence all the Muslim 
states in an identical fashion, even in specific domains like legal practice. The 
Pew report (2013) observed that modern-day states, which favoured applying 
the Shariʿa especially to family law (“for human relations of a private and 
familial nature,” such as marriage and inheritance) appear in this order: South 
East Asia, South Asia, the MENA and Central Asia. Fetni (in Ciprut 2008) also 
highlights the diversity of other examples. For example, Turkey separated with 
the Shariʿa for its national law; the Gulf States as “the new nations in the Ara-
bian Peninsula allowed Shariʿa law to remain practically intact’; and most 
states in the larger trend adopted a combination of the Western legal system 
and the Shariʿa. Therefore, multiple factors are needed to explain the varied 
trajectory of the Muslim states concerning citizenship allocation practice; 
these can include indigenous legal and political cultures, postcolonial contexts, 
experiences under communist rule and secularisation (such as in Central Asia 
and Eastern Europe). The Ottoman law of 1869 was the first nationality law 
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that set the precedent concerning citizenship, allegedly inspired from the 
French law of 18511 (Parolin, 78).
3 Prominent Evidence of Jus Sanguinis in Muslim States: But 
Diversity in Context and Application
In 2017 Kuwait mounted a massive campaign to capture foreigners who had 
forged citizenship documents. In one case, a Syrian had fraudulently acquired 
Kuwaiti citizenship 22 years earlier, had enjoyed a job in the public sector and 
established family with a Kuwaiti wife (Gulfnews: September 19, 2017). Typically, 
foreigners gave money or entered into an agreement with a Kuwaiti national to 
obtain forged documents claiming to be a son or member of his family. This 
enabled him “to obtain a birth certificate, then a national identity card and fi-
nally a passport. The Interior Ministry revoked the citizenship of those proven 
guilty and in some cases also revoked the citizenship of their children. In 2016, 
the Criminal Court sentenced another Syrian to 15 years in jail, to be followed 
by deportation and a fine equal to the salaries he received in government job. 
The Kuwaiti accomplice got 5 years in jail (ibid.).
The several cases of citizenship acquisition through forgery involving 
nationals in Kuwait might indicate a similar occurrence in the other neigh-
bouring Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, which also impose unusually 
strict limitations on naturalisation. We will discuss this region later in more 
detail. 
Some of the key problems identified with contemporary Muslim-majority 
countries such as the high incidence of statelessness and large refugee popula-
tions are closely associated with the granting of nationality. In addition to the 
officially stated naturalisation rules, practices with regard to marriage, adop-
tion and freedom of religion are also relevant for the acquisition of nationality. 
The world’s Muslim population is geographically spread out, estimated at 
nearly a quarter of the global population in 2015 (Pew Research Centre 2017). 
Only about a fifth of the Muslim population lives in the Middle East and the 
North Africa regions. The largest number lives in the Asia-Pacific region. Indo-
nesia has the highest number, followed by India. 
The context is generally harsh for non-Muslims in Muslim countries espe-
cially as non-locals or newcomers, to enjoy equal rights in the host countries. 
At first glance, citizenship allocation in Muslim countries appears to suggest 
1 The 1851 reform in France reinstated Jus soli for a child born of foreign parents in France, who 
themselves were born in the country (double Jus soli).
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that Jus sanguinis is something natural or typical for them, confirming the 
wide perception that they are conservative societies. This is because predomi-
nant Jus sanguinis practice tends to point to closed societies. Muslim countries 
are presumed to be non-modern societies that explains this highly restricted 
access to citizenship. To what extent are their citizenship practices similar or 
antithetical to the more “liberal” practices elsewhere in the world?
The following analysis limits itself to the contemporary practice of Muslim 
states regarding non-Muslim residents and their access to citizenship, by 
looking at nationality legislation and the Jus sanguinis principle. First, we note 
the general trend among a cross-section of selected Muslim states. Next, we 
will explore the case in the Arab-Gulf states.
3.1 The Wider Practice among the Muslim States: Strict Nationality Law 
Provisions
In contemporary practice, the majority of the Muslim states clearly follow Jus 
sanguinis combined with a Jus soli variant, but where the stress is on the former 
(see Table 8.1).




Jus sanguinis; Jus soli Naturalisation rules
Morocco
Nationality Code (last 
revised 2007)
Jus sanguinis via father (via 
mother if father unknown or 
stateless); No Jus soli (or if 
unknown parents)
Residency 5 years; Must be 
approved by Cabinet 




Jus sanguinis via father or 
mother; Jus soli if father and 
grandfather born in the 
country
Residency 5 years; Knowl-
edge of Arabic; Allows Dual
Niger
Nationality Code 1984
Jus sanguinis via father Residency 10 years
Somalia
Citizenship Law 1962
Jus sanguinis via father (whose 
father is Somali); or who is 
ethnically Somali
Residency 7 years; Dual 
(2012 Constitution)
Turkey 
Law 2009 (revised) 
Jus sanguinis via father or 
mother; No Jus soli





Jus sanguinis; Jus soli Naturalisation rules
Lebanon
Decree No. 15, 1925 
(revised 1960)
Jus sanguinis via father; Jus soli 





Jus sanguinis via father or 
mother (if born in Iraq; if born 
abroad could apply if father 
unknown/stateless or does 
not establish filiation)





Law 1991 (revised 2013)
Jus sanguinis Residency 5 years
Iran (Islamic Republic of 
Iran)
Based on Civil Code 1928 
(revised 2006)
Jus sanguinis via father; Jus soli 
conditional (one of the 
foreign parents also born in 
Iran; born to foreign father to 
confirm upon maturity, other)
Residency 5 years; Other 
acquired credit such as 
military service, Children 




Jus sanguinis via father or 
mother; Jus soli
Residence for a continuous 
period of one year before 
application and a period of 
four out of seven years 
prior to the one year period 
before the application; 
Dual 
Indonesia
Nationality Law 1946 
(revised 1958)
Jus sanguinis via father; No Jus 
soli (only between January 1, 
1946 and August 1, 1958)
Residency 5 years or 10 if 
not continuous
State legislation regulates the granting of nationality. In addition, norms relat-
ing to the nation-state’s sovereignty and the local legal and regulation systems 
determine the nuances in the actual practice of muwāṭana or citizenship, re-
sulting in variations in content and in practice. Table 8.1 shows the nationality 
policy of some states to observe important common elements: 1) Jus sanguinis 
is a predominant condition, while Jus soli is under very limited conditions such 
Table 8.1 Jus sanguinis in selected muslim-majority states—access to naturalisation (cont.)
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as when a child has unknown parents (except Pakistan).2) At least in the text, 
naturalisation eligibility provisions generally appear to meet reasonable stan-
dards, such as in the residence period requirement. 3) Gender hierarchy is at 
work as Jus sanguinis usually passes via the father. Women have limited abil-
ity to acquire nationality (other than via marriage) and to transfer it to their 
children or to foreign spouse. This is an important contributor to the extent 
of statelessness found in the region. 4) The laws normally demand language 
proficiency of the country but none explicitly mention religious affiliation. 5) 
Naturalisation rules are more applicable at the age of maturity; 6) Sometimes 
states confer citizenship on those who have given exceptional service to the 
country; and 7) These states mostly do not tolerate dual citi zenship.
Despite the diversity among the Muslim-majority states we reviewed, Jus 
sanguinis evidently dominates as the language of belonging or the link to iden-
tity. From Morocco to Indonesia, the states extend from the west to the east in 
different regions. In Africa: Morocco and Tunisia, Niger and Somalia (also 
Egypt); in Central Asia and Caucasus: Turkey, Kazakhstan and Iran; in West 
Asia: Lebanon and Iraq (also Jordan, Syria, Yemen), and in Asia: Pakistan and 
Indonesia (also Malaysia).2 In addition to the diversity in geography, the states 
represent diversity also in economic development, experience of colonialism, 
sectarian affiliation, political regimes, and popularity. 
Should we conclude that the integration of migrants has less relevance in 
Islamic countries and that the citizenship concept is essentially associated 
with the liberal discourse, at least in the civic rights sense? Parolin (2009: 127) 
observes that citizenship attribution in an Islamic country is commonly via Jus 
sanguinis by paternal origin and that the sequence of membership is at three 
levels: in the kin group, the religious community and the nation-state. Further, 
“most Arab legislation provides for special naturalisation rules for nationals of 
other Arab countries (co-ethnic preference) and a few for foreign Muslims (co-
religious preference) (usually they both imply the same, the confessional as-
pect)” (ibid.). In the larger picture, the religious lens, rather than the ethnic or 
the cultural one, appears to define the “other.” Parolin concludes that the citi-
zenship rights of minority-others in Islamic countries, “only imply residency 
rights and nothing more” (ibid.). We noted important similarities in our se-
lected group. The larger evidence suggests that the co-ethnic or co-religious 
preference (or in combination) dominates in the allocation of citizenship to 
outsiders. However, it would be relevant to seek more nuanced explanations 
2 Malaysia—Jus sanguinis requires both parents to be citizen; no Jus soli.
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that reflect the complexity rather than merely the simplistic dhimmi-based 
logic for acts of closure.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to explore deeper, for instance, into the 
specific contexts and the political considerations about the choices of the 
Muslim states over time. Some factors that stimulated diversity in the policy 
practice (or convergence) of these states might include phenomena such as 
pan-Arabism, regional and internal conflicts often associated with the trans-
formation tied to the nation-building processes, and ideological stance against 
perceived Western imposed standards or institutions. Perrin (2014: 230–1) 
highlights the relevance of the colonial experience with reference to countries 
in the Maghreb, “the political use and construction of ethno-religious determi-
nants by the colonial powers during colonization and by the subsequent re-
gime after independence.” Some of these states for instance, followed the 
French model after their independence from colonization such as Egypt, Alge-
ria and Morocco.3 The affected population includes local minority groups (in-
cluding co-religionist or co-sectarian) such as the bidūn (those without 
nationalities) of nomadic origin in Kuwait, as much as groups from the out-
side, such as the long-residing Afghans in Iran. She proposes further that, “Re-
luctance to grant citizenship is rather based on a mix of immaturity in 
nation-building, of a closed and ‘naturalist’—if not ethno-religious—concep-
tion of the nation, and of suspicion and fear toward difference and aliens,” but 
she notes that the rejection of diversity is increasingly questioned today (Per-
rin 2014: 234). Thus, citizenship practice was often a political gesture, linked to 
interstate relations, national balances and sensitive issues of belonging.
There has been a positive trend for reform in the national legislations in re-
cent years. Two examples of positive reform include Egypt which, in 2004 
modified its personal status law to allow women to confer citizenship to their 
children; and Algeria in 2005 provided that the double Jus soli provision to 
establish nationality origin applies to both males and females, although the 
individual must still hold Muslim personal status. The North African states in 
particular, took measures for granting nationality rights to reduce statelessness 
and gender inequality. At the broader level, however, we could observe dis-
crimination in the naturalisation law practiced in the Muslim states based on 
gender, ethnicity (such as Arab race, or language) and religion. Van Waas (2014, 
24–30) notes discrimination to be widely common on the grounds of gender, 
ethnicity, religion and disability in her study on the nationality laws in 17 
3 Perrin notes: the French Protectorate used Jus soli (for the indigenous) and Jus religionis to 
distinguish between the settlers and the natives. The latter made it also possible to separate 
the Muslims and the Jews from the indigenous.
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Middle East and North African countries (MENA). These violate the Interna-
tional Covenant on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, par-
ticularly that the state parties should guarantee the right of nationality to 
everyone, without distinction as to race, colour, or national or ethnic origin 
[Article 5 (d)(iii)]. Moreover, she emphasizes that the “letter of the law can be 
only half of the story” (p. 31) and that there is an effective gap between rights 
and the actual practice of granting nationality.
This is evident through the stringent naturalisation provisions that make 
acquisition difficult as an adult (for example, the use of language that provides 
for a generally large margin of discretion)4 and the neglect of mechanisms for 
procedural safeguards (such as right to appeal, system of checks and balances 
and jurisdiction for the courts on nationality matters). As van Waas sums up, 
“in other words, MENA states’ naturalisation practices can be highly challeng-
ing, often unpredictable and are especially problematic in those states with 
large stateless populations” (ibid.). 
The religious denomination plays out as an important condition for natu-
ralisation in most of the Muslim countries. Perrin (2014) remarks that although 
religion is quasi-absent from the citizenship laws of Libya, Algeria, Tunisia, 
Morocco and Mauritania, the constitutions from “the Great Maghreb” region 
proclaim a Muslim identity and a belonging to the Arab world (with the official 
language as Arabic). She adds, “in practice, it (religion) may be important in 
getting Citizenship through naturalisation and marriage” (p. 233). In our se-
lected group, Lebanon, Iraq, Pakistan and Indonesia apply the Shariʿa for the 
family law domain. Therefore, religion could have an indirect effect at least, 
where states constitutionally provide for an “officially favoured religion” and/
or a religious/Shariʿa law. Similarly, some states gave access to citizenship to 
individuals with an Arab origin, even though it was not a legal condition.
3.2 The GCC’s Citizenship Policies: “The Gate Is Not Open” 
We explore the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states’ practice in a closer 
detail in this section, which is a relatively extreme case in the contemporary 
context. The six member states namely, Oman, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, 
Bahrain and Kuwait stipulate demanding conditions for naturalisation in the 
formal text as well. They define themselves as Islamic states and stand out for 
having large proportion of foreigners of diverse origin in their populations as 
4 For instance, Lebanon applies it as a matter of clear policy: “it is not definite that a foreigner 
who meets [the conditions for naturalisation] will be granted Lebanese nationality” (cited in 
Frontiers Ruwad Association, Invisible Citizens: Humiliation and a life in the shadows. A legal 
and policy study on statelessness in Lebanon, 2011: 70; Ministry of Interior, General Questions).
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“temporary guests,” who are indefinitely excluded from integration in the local 
society with the citizenry. As per their current nationality laws and practice, 
citizenship is almost impossible to acquire for the resident expatriates. All the 
GCC states introduced their nationality laws in the 1960s and the 1970s, with 
the exception of Saudi Arabia, which was the first to introduce them in 1954. 
The Arab-Gulf states’ citizenship policies are exclusionary and involve 
largely ambiguous provisions. They endorse an ethno-cultural model and in 
practice, they privilege affiliation to Islam. Table 8.2 underscores a key common 
element regarding the nationality laws of the Gulf states for naturalisation that 
are essentially applicable to males: that the primary condition requiring an 
unusually long period of residence in the territory5 effectively discourages 
naturalisation. Jus sanguinis is the overarching principle in defining eligibility 
5 Saudi Arabia, at least in the text specifies a shorter period, and its criteria for qualification 
including for permanent resident are not clear.
table 8.2 Nationality law in the GCC states and the length of residence for naturalisation
Law Residence requirement
Oman 2014 Nationality Law 
(repeals 1983 law)
Residence for 30 years
UAE 1972 Federal UAE 
Nationality Law
Residence for 30 years, 20 of those years 
 occurring after January 1, 1972 (3 years residence 
for citizens of Qatar, Oman, and Bahrain; 7 years 
residence for citizens of Arab descent)
Bahrain 1963 Nationality Law 
(revised 1981)
Continuous residence for 25 years since 
 September 16, 1963 (15 years for persons of Arab 
descent)
Qatar 2005 Law (revised 
1961)
Consecutive residence for 25 years
Kuwait 1959 Nationality Law 
by Emiri Decree
Residence for 20 years (15 years residence for 







Residence for 10 years but conditions vague
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for naturalisation, by blood and descent only. Jus soli or nationality by birth 
does not apply, except for instance, if the child is born of unknown parents. In 
addition, the Arab Gulf states favour Jus sanguinis based on male lineage, 
where the father can pass on citizenship. The mother can transfer citizenship 
only in limited cases,6 such as in the case of an unknown father or if the father 
is stateless. 
The UAE in 20117 and Saudi Arabia in 20078 made positive reforms whereas 
Kuwait became more exclusionary.9 The ascription of citizenship on the basis 
of gender is a common element under the prevailing logic of cultural tradition 
and is a broader practice also in other Muslim countries, as we saw earlier. 
Naturalisation access for a foreign woman is through marriage. Native men can 
pass nationality to foreign spouses, however conditions might vary in different 
GCC countries and the process is not always transparent. A native woman 
cannot pass her nationality on to a foreign husband.10 The woman might also 
lose her Gulf-citizenship and privileges. In addition, the Gulf states do not 
tolerate dual citizenship unless specifically approved.
A review of some historical and socio-cultural factors might help us to un-
derstand the Arab-Gulf states’ citizenship policies. As Longva (2000) suggests, 
“contributing to the way citizenship is conceptualized and put into practice 
is: history, tradition and above all, the circumstances under which the state is 
created and legitimacy is maintained” (p. 97). Longva writes that the notion 
of citizenship (her work concerns Kuwait but is broadly relevant to the rest of 
the Gulf region) “is implicitly but nonetheless inherently conceptualised by 
most Kuwaitis not on terms of universal and abstract rights and duties but in 
the deeply cultural and particularistic terms of identity and loyalty” (p. 196). 
The Gulf States were essentially tribal and traditional desert societies that 
transformed in a rapid fashion to wealthy, modern nations from the turn of the 
1960s. Citizenship in the Arab-Gulf States is largely based on the jinsiyya prin-
ciple, as “an identity or membership linked to the territorialized state/and a 
community” (p. 193). Citizenship and access to it in the Gulf is hence generally 
6 Qatar does not let mother confer citizenship to children without exception, even if the 
result is statelessness.
7 UAE allows a child (boy or girl) of native mother and non-national father to apply for 
citizenship after 18 years.
8 Saudi Arabia allows sons of a native mother and non-national father to acquire citizenship 
at the age of majority.
9 E.g., it removed a clause that previously allowed children of Kuwaiti mothers and stateless 
fathers to acquire nationality.
10 Omani law reduced the residence period requirement for a foreign man married to an 
Omani to 15 years, but subject to the conditions that the marriage occurred with prior 
approval of the Ministry of Interior and there is a son born from the marriage.
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conceptualised on creed/or a religious-ethno-cultural basis. In addition to this, 
important state-centred explanation of practices in the region, Longva (2000) 
further suggests that citizenship also implies entitlement rights in an “enti-
tlement state” (including political rights in the case of Kuwait) (p. 193). The 
entitlement focus of citizenship in the GCC is an accrual of membership in 
an autocratic welfare state, in contrast to a participative model that is more 
prominent elsewhere.11 The current Gulf regimes maintain the “ruling bargain” 
and sustain their political legitimacy, by maximal wealth distribution within 
a limited native membership to ensure citizen loyalty. Thus, the Jus sanguinis 
nationality laws effectively maintain citizenship as an exclusive privilege of 
the local-national.
An important problematic aspect with respect to naturalisation in the 
region is that the implementation of the nationality rules is a non-transparent 
process. The royal authority or the relevant agency (normally the Ministry of 
Interior) grants citizenship usually by a highly discretionary exercise. Even if 
the procedure for naturalisation exists in the legal text, its application in prac-
tice is hazy. In addition to the residency period, other general conditions in-
clude knowledge of Arabic language, good character and sufficient financial 
capacity. However, there is ample anecdotal evidence about numerous cases 
where expatriate applicants never succeeded in their applications for naturali-
sation. This was despite their qualifying on all the specified criteria as per the 
local rules including long term residence in the respective host country and 
Arab descent with affiliation to Islam. This was a familiar story during earlier 
fieldwork in the region. Typically, applicants for naturalisation waited for an 
unspecified number of years to receive a decision after the submission of their 
files. 
On the other hand, there are also successful instances of citizenship ac-
quired via the more discretionary exercise of authority, such as an Indian cook 
who had worked for an important family in Oman for many decades being re-
warded with citizenship. Exceptions therefore, include hand-picked individual 
cases and by a selection process that is non-transparent. There are still no clear 
rules or practices12 in the Gulf region as to qualifications and procedures for 
naturalisation. For example, naturalisation criteria in Saudi Arabia does not 
mention religion, the Basic Law requires a citizen to be Muslim. In Bahrain, the 
11 Allegedly associated with the Western notion of the citizenship 
12 2005 Amendment in Qatar introduced eligibility guidelines for naturalisation, prior to 
which, the law only provided that that the Emir would grant naturalisation at his 
discretion.
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text mentions that the person must be of good character, with a good command 
of Arabic, and have real estate registered in his or her name in Bahrain. Permis-
sion can only be granted from the ruler of Bahrain. The lack of consistency and 
common rules for the granting of naturalisation is glaring. In contrast, there is 
a clear perception amongst both the expatriate and the national populations 
in the region that naturalisation is an unlikely phenomenon. Hence, stories, 
such as the Syrian in Kuwait cited earlier, of individuals resorting to indirect 
and false methods to acquire citizenship might not surprise us much. On the 
rare occasions of successful naturalisation, the process and the information 
remain a black box. The news is usually sensitive and kept confidential. Hence, 
information about the successful cases of citizenship acquisition in the Gulf 
is unclear. The applicable criteria, as well as the actual numbers in a specific 
period are rarely made accessible to the public.
Moreover, the Gulf States have also used naturalisation strategically as a se-
lective instrument on several occasions, to manipulate the ethnic and nation-
ality composition in the population on the basis of geo-political calculations. 
The Bahraini regime’s controversial practice to grant nationality to some Sun-
ni-denomination communities to undermine the Shia dominance in the local 
population is a prominent example. It supposedly gave nationality liberally to 
the expatriates of Pakistan and of other origins at specific times in the past 
decades. Kuwait also used this strategy in the 1960s and the 1970s to naturalize 
mostly Sunni tribes from other parts of the Arabian peninsula, “as a counter-
weight to the urbanised Kuwaiti liberals, leftists and Arab nationalists” (Kin-
ninmont 2013, 53). The Palestinian population13 spread throughout the Gulf 
region is another example of the selectivity of the nationality grant. Other in-
stances of the GCC states’ wide scope for arbitrary exercise over citizenship 
used against their own populations include, the cases of Kuwait’s Bedouins 
and Bahrain’s revocation of some its nationals’ citizenship since the protests in 
2011 (the Shiʿa dissenters). Granting nationality is clearly the discretionary do-
main of the supreme authority vested in the executive power of the Ruler. In a 
more recent trend, the GCC states have extended “temporary citizenship” to 
sports-professionals from the African, Central Asian or other developing coun-
tries (including to individuals with desired talents in other domains). While 
the practice again exemplifies the instrumentalist aspect to grant citizenship 
to foreigners, it also underlines its essential exclusionary element. It is an ex-
ample of selective citizenship as a temporary grant, in exchange for the 
13 The Arab League put a ban on naturalizing Palestinian refugees in the Arab countries to 
avoid undermining the right of return cause.
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individual’s anticipated value to enhance the Gulf nations’ performance and 
reputation records in the international arena. The state withdraws citizenship 
when the player leaves the sports team.
Therefore, the GCC states grant citizenship highly selectively. “No GCC coun-
try has made any significant policy changes addressing the situation of their 
long-term and second-generation migrants since the modest changes in citi-
zenship law of Saudi Arabia” (Baldwin-Edwards 2011: 43). The GCC states have 
actually tightened their nationality rules.
4 Conclusion
Random comments such as, “In a Muslim country, citizenship is impossible to 
acquire as a foreigner!’” are indicative of a relatively pervasive impression as if 
it were a self-explanatory phenomenon. I heard it often from the expatriates of 
different nationalities during my doctoral fieldwork in the Gulf region, where 
naturalisation is especially arbitrary and the local regimes are authoritarian. 
This general impression that naturalisation is difficult and officially unwel-
come to a non-Muslim resident applies to most Muslim-majority states. 
We looked at naturalisation provisions from a mixed set of 18 Muslim-ma-
jority states. While the laws and provisions appear reasonably fair as per inter-
national norms (the six GCC states are an exception, which impose more 
extreme requirements), the actual citizenship acquisition for foreigners is dif-
ficult and unpredictable. In general, the naturalisation phenomenon in Mus-
lim countries shows a less objective basis with an emphasis on Jus sanguinis 
and co-religious preference. Most nationality laws do not mention Islam in 
their official criteria, but apply it in effect. Perrin’s (2014, 234) observation con-
cerning the Maghreb states in North Africa is applicable to most of these states: 
“While express mentions of Arab ethnicity or Islam are scarce on the books, 
they seem to be important criteria when granting citizenship.’
However, we do not see a uniform rule or a consistent practice among Mus-
lim states. Foreign Muslim residents are also not granted naturalization more 
liberally, except when the host state favoured for other reasons (for instance, to 
influence the demographic composition in the population). In addition, it 
might be easier to explain the Arab-Gulf states’ much harsher rules as due to 
the nature of their absolute monarchies. Moreover, their policies and practices 
on naturalisation and citizenship emphasize a priority to exclude, and to max-
imize their flexibility and power over foreign workers. Yet, such discrimination 
is no different from examples that involve non-Muslim states both in the past 
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(Germany) and in the contemporary period (Japan) where restrictive naturali-
sation is on a highly selective basis.
The notion of citizenship and integration of the “outsider” in the classical 
texts have largely suggested that full membership should be limited to the ad-
herents of Islam. However, the larger textual body and Muslim practices over 
time have shown some provision for flexibility and accommodation to reflect 
changing societal and ethical concerns. The Al-Azhar Declaration and signifi-
cant scholarship have asserted that Islam or the Shariʿa does not preclude plu-
rality. Further, Islam in its practice is not monolithic and history gives us ample 
proof of its adaptation. Therefore, the invocation of Islam’s supposed reluc-
tance to integrate the Other to explain the contemporary Muslim states’ pro-
clivity for restrictive naturalisation policies would be insufficient. We observe 
an amount of commonality in the Muslim states’ naturalisation practice with 
a tendency to exclude the outsider. However, a more careful look already sug-
gests more consideration of politics in the discrimination. 
States’ choices in their local contexts, including for potential reform, reflect 
exigencies as much as doctrinal inspiration. For example, the Arab-Gulf region 
shows variations in the practice of granting citizenship and reflects the local 
regimes’ delicate ruling bargain and their perceived imperative for greater con-
trol over the foreign population to maintain their legitimacy. We see evidence 
of randomness in granting citizenship involving, for instance, the native Bed-
ouin in Kuwait as well as expatriates (whether Muslim, Arab, or other faith and 
identities). To conclude, this research affirms the evidence that Muslim states’ 
naturalisation provisions incline towards highly selective practices, but they 
also show a certain receptivity to diversity.
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Chapter 9
The Obligation to Migrate and the Impulse to 
Narrate: Soviet Narratives of Forced Migration in 
the Nineteenth Century Caucasus
Rebecca Ruth Gould 
In the year 622/3, ten years after he first heard the Qurʾan recited to him, Mu-
hammad was made an offer he could not refuse. The Quraysh of Mecca, a city 
where he had passed most of his life, had grown hostile to him on account of 
the popularity of his teachings with the poor, women, and other disenfran-
chised members of society. Muhammad’s calls for social justice and purity of 
worship were perceived as a threat to the social order. The Meccan elite in 
particular saw Muhammad’s growing popularity as a threat to their power. 
When the residents of nearby Yathrib offered Muhammad a sanctuary if he 
wished to relocate there, he agreed, on three conditions. First, he insisted that 
all of his followers, including his family, would be welcome to migrate to this 
new city. Second, that all the migrants would be given food and a place to sleep 
until they were able to look after themselves. Third, that he and his compan-
ions would become full-fledged citizens of Yathrib, so that if any of them were 
attacked by the Meccans, all of Yathrib would come to their defense.
Muhammad’s stipulations were accepted and the migration began. So as 
not to arouse suspicion among the Meccans who preferred to see him and his 
followers harmed than to leave their city peacefully, the movement was gradu-
al. As for Muhammad himself, after all of his followers had arrived safely in 
Yathrib, he escaped Mecca in the middle of the night accompanied by Abū 
Bakr, having spent three days in a cave in order to evade a plot to kill him. 
Throughout Islamic history, the narration of these events, well known to every 
Muslim in countless variations, has served as a perpetual reminder that con-
version meant abandoning “one’s home in order to fight for the cause” because 
“salvation lay in going forth for heroic ventures and a new world ahead, not 
patiently staying by one’s fields or camels” (Crone 1994, 383).
Known as the hijra, from the Arabic root meaning “to cut off from friendly 
association” (Q 4:34) the migration to Yathrib is among the most important 
events in Islamic history (Watt 1941). In keeping with its allegorical style, the 
Qurʾan makes no mention of the city to which Muhammad and his followers 
migrated. At the same time, the historical event of the migration is clearly 
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reflected in the text, for it abounds in praise of the muhājirūn (emigrants) and 
in condemnation of those who did not migrate. “Whoever emigrates for the 
cause of Allah will find on the earth many spaces and abundance,” reads one 
memorable verse (Q 4:100). By contrast, the angels of death will interrogate 
those who refuse to migrate. “Was not the earth of Allah spacious [enough] for 
you to emigrate therein?” (Q 4:97) will be asked of those who, contrary to the 
example of the Prophet, chose to stay at home. Through such verses, an his-
torical event was rendered as allegory, and the stage was set for later memori-
alizations of Qurʾanic stories. 
According to Islamic tradition, pious Jews and Christians prophesied Mu-
hammad’s hijra long before its occurrence. After conquering Yemen, the Himy-
arite king Tibān Asʿad Abū Karib made his way to the Hijaz with the intention 
of leveling Yathrib, the city where his son had been killed, to the ground. The 
king was dissuaded from destroying this town by two Jewish rabbis who warned 
the king, “if you persist in your intention [to destroy Yathrib], something will 
happen to prevent your carrying it out and we fear that you will face speedy 
retribution” (Kitāb Sīrat Rasūl Allāh, ed. Wüstenfeld 1858–60, 14). At first, the 
rabbis were hesitant to divulge the reason for their warning. Finally, they ex-
plained that Yathrib was designated as the site of a future hijra for a prophet of 
the Quraysh, and that it would become his home and resting place. The use of 
the term hijra in this context by Muhammad’s biographer Ibn Isḥāq (c. 704–
770) is an anachronism, for the concept of hijra as migration was introduced 
with Islam. However, Ibn Isḥāq’s anachronism is central for grasping the con-
cepts elaborated here, for it demonstrates how, in Islam, hijra is a means 
through which history is transmuted into cultural memory. It is also an early 
illustration of the process through which the obligation to migrate has been 
made coterminous with the impulse to narrate throughout Islamic history.
Further adding to its epoch-making status, the year of the hijra, 622/3, marks 
the beginning of the Islamic calendar. The migration bisects the two major 
categories of Qurʾanic revelations, those that were revealed to the prophet in 
Mecca, which pertain primarily to spiritual matters, and those that were re-
vealed to the prophet in Yathrib, which pertain to politics and ethics. Finally 
and most importantly, the hijra marks the date when Islam became a religion 
with an institutional foundation. So long as Muhammad and his followers 
were based in Mecca, his teachings pertained primarily to personal piety, and 
could be rejected or accepted at will or in part, without any obvious social con-
sequences. Following the migration, these same teachings came to be endowed 
with political as well as spiritual import. In recognition of the Prophet’s new 
political orientation, Yathrib’s name was changed to Madinat al-nabi (“the city 
of the prophet”) following the arrival of Muhammad and his followers. 
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A constitution was drafted and laws were proclaimed (see: Arjomand 2009). 
Gradually, Islam was coming to be conceived of as a religion of the state, as 
well as a matter for the soul.
Muhammad’s migration from Mecca to Medina was to play an unparalleled 
role in subsequent Islamic history, as an event in its own right, but particularly 
as a template for narrating subsequent migrations from lands under non-Mus-
lim rule. At least a century passed before the event itself acquired its singular 
status, as a paradigmatic story rather than, as in the Qurʾan, a perpetually re-
curring obligation. In its capacity as a narrative trope, the prophet’s hijra pro-
vided a framework through which trauma and defeat could be made legible. 
Time and again, the traumatic journey of Muhammad and his muhājirūn was 
invoked by Muslim writers to give substance to the geographically and demo-
graphically more expansive displacements of later periods of Islamic history, 
including the Mongol invasions of the thirteenth century and the Spanish Re-
conquista (1492). Most notably for present purposes, the inaugural hijra from 
Mecca to Medina shaped local memories of the ethnic cleansings that scarred 
the former Soviet Union, particularly in the Caucasus, during the 1940s. For the 
displaced Muslims from the Caucasus discussed in this chapter, the ancient 
concept of hijra was used to address the traumatic legacies of Soviet deporta-
tions. 
In its Qurʾanic signification as migration away from a territory that has, 
whether through conquest or corruption, fallen outside the abode of Islam, 
hijra is obligatory on all believers. Several hadith attest to its compulsory sta-
tus. The first, cited by numerous jurists, insists that hijra “will not end until re-
pentance (tawba) does, and repentance will not end until the sun rises in the 
west” (Abū Dāwūd 1995/6: 3: 2479). Another hadith lists hijra among the five 
commandments that, along with acceptance (samʿ), obedience (ṭaʿa), striving 
(jihād), and unity (jamāʿa), is obligatory on all believers. (Ibn Ḥanbal 4: 130) 
And yet even in the context of these citations, hijra is often understood as a 
figurative rather than literal migration. As the tenth century jurist Qāḍī an-
Nuʿmān put it, anyone who has made a journey to Islam (man dakhala fī al-
islām) is a muhājir (an-Nuʿmān 1951, 1194). Another scholar, the Ḥanafī jurist 
al-Ṭaḥāwī (843–933), elaborated a concept of a “second hijra [hijrat al-sūʿ]” 
which the believer can perform while remaining physically at home, at any 
point in time, and under any type of rule (al-Ṭaḥāwī, 1533).
Although the division between the muhājirūn and those who remain be-
hind is lucid in the Qurʾan, the ethical and legal meanings of the obligation to 
migrate have been continuously contested within Islamic political thought. 
This debate raises questions such as: What constitutes an Islamic territory? 
How can we know when this territory has ceased to belong to the abode of 
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Islam (dār al-islām)? What is the relationship between the abode of unbelief 
(dār al-kufr) and the abode of faith? These unresolved questions have struc-
tured much of Islamic political thought across the centuries. They influence 
how migration generally, and hijra specifically, has been understood over the 
course of Islamic history. While serving as a reminder that “salvation lay in go-
ing forth for heroic ventures,” hijra increasingly became a discourse on the con-
dition of being Muslim in a non-Muslim world, and a commentary on the 
extent to which the Islamic community (umma) could be spatially imagined 
and materially mapped. Hijra’s meaning has accordingly shifted dramatically 
across time and space, along with the shifting boundaries of Islamic empires. 
Many different conceptions of hijra have animated and conditioned religious 
belief, for, in Muslim-minority societies, the believer’s relations with the non-
Islamic state substantially shapes the conditions under which the obligation to 
migrate is performed. These pages offer a perspective on hijra’s trans-historical 
meanings based on nineteenth and twentieth-century sources, while consider 
its role in the making of literary and cultural history in the Caucasus.
In light of its responsiveness to changes in history, the hijra concept illus-
trates the internal diversity of Islamic narratives and of Muslim cultural mem-
ory.1 Patricia Crone calls hijra “one of the rare Islamic notions of which we can 
unequivocally say that they take us back to the beginnings” (Crone 1994, 383). 
And yet, even as the concept powerfully evokes Islamic beginnings, it is worth 
remembering the many radical transformations that hijra has undergone along 
its journey to the postcolonial present. 
At every stage of its development, hijra’s meanings have been shaped by the 
political circumstances within which the concept was implemented, as well as 
by internal developments within Islamic political and legal thought. With the 
beginning of Muslim modernity, which almost always transpired under the ae-
gis of colonialism (see Rabbat 2014), the ethical and legal content of the Is-
lamic obligation to migrate underwent a dramatic shift. Whereas the Qurʾan 
interprets the relation between the muhājirūn and those who remain behind 
allegorically, scholars during the Ummayad period (661–750) began to under-
stand the hijra as a single event, referring to Muhammad’s migration to Medi-
na. Although it could be reenacted and commemorated in many different 
ways, hijra in this singular meaning could never fully be reproduced. 
As the singular event of the hijra became a relic of the past during the 
Umayyad and particularly Abbasid periods, its contemporaneity faded from 
1 Another instructive example of a modern resignification of a Qurʾanic concept is fitna 
(temptation, discord, rebellion), which acquired in later periods of Islamic history an emphasis 
different from its earliest usages in the Qurʾan (see Fisher 1994).
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view. Hijra was transformed from a narrative for the present into a story about 
the past. In the words of Muhammad’s beloved wife ʿĀʾisha, “the believer used 
to flee with his religion to God and his Messenger, but as for today, God has 
made Islam victorious, and the believer can worship God wherever he wants” 
(al-Qāsim 1968, 254). While ʿĀʾisha affirmed that the obligation to perform 
jihād remained, according to this tradition, the obligation to perform hijra had, 
to all intents and purposes, reached an end.
The dynastic concept of hijra as history prevailed over the Qurʾanic concept 
of hijra as allegory for many centuries.2 With the beginnings of modernity, 
ʿĀʾisha’s statement that “God has made Islam victorious” resounded with irony, 
since Islam was anything but victorious in political terms. The declining politi-
cal status of Islam motivated a turn back to hijra’s Qurʾanic meaning, as an 
open-ended and repeating journey incumbent on all believers. In addition to 
signifying the historical migration to Medina, as it had done since the earliest 
Islamic beginnings, hijra acquired a new meaning: the obligation to migrate 
away from lands that had been conquered by non-Muslims, many of which 
had previously been under Muslim rule. This obligation acquired greater po-
litical salience following the conquests by Mongols in the late medieval period, 
Spaniards in early modernity, and then, most irrevocably, by Russian, British, 
and French imperial armies and the anticolonial movements these incursions 
generated during the nineteenth century. 
1 Hijra in the Caucasus
As a land removed from traditionally Islamic centers of power, the Caucasus 
did not figure centrally into Islamic legal or ethical discourse on hijra prior 
to the encounter with colonial modernity. Darband, Tiflis, and Shirwan were 
destinations for conquest, jihād, not for willed or forced migrations, prior to 
modernity. In keeping with Muhammad’s widely-reported injunction to seek 
knowledge “even as far as China” (cited in al-Makkī ed. trans. Renard 2004, 
119) individual Muslims from the Caucasus did migrate for religious reasons, 
as they did across the Islamic world. One of the most famous early mod-
ern seekers of knowledge was the eighteenth-century scholar Muḥammad 
al-Quduqi, who left Daghestan for Syria due to his frustration with local Mus-
lims who in his view were uncritically imitating the customs of their ancestors 
2 By “dynastic” I mean to imply what Crone (1994) calls the “classical” concept of hijra that 
prevailed in the first century of Islam. For the difference between the conceptualization of 
hijra in the two periods (also see Madelung 1986). 
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and ignoring the precepts of Islam (for al-Quduqī’s biography see Gould 2015). 
When it came to mass migrations, however, and most notably in connection 
with the Safavid deportations of hundreds of thousands of Georgians and Ar-
menians, mass population movements were organized by the state. 
During early modernity, the populations in the Caucasus who experienced 
the most intensive forced deportation were primarily Christian Georgians and 
Armenians, not Muslims (Herzig 1990). Colonialism introduced new relations 
between Muslims and non-Muslims, and, in the Caucasus as elsewhere, these 
new relations grafted new meanings onto the old concept of hijra. In its vari-
ous local adaptations, the concept was understood by Muslim and non-Mus-
lim peoples across the Caucasus to signify “the mass migrations of Muslim 
populations from the Caucasus” (Manning 2012, 145) to Ottoman lands during 
the nineteenth century. Hijra from the Caucasus radically and permanently 
altered the demographic makeup of Circassia, Abkhazia, Chechnya, Ingushe-
tia, Georgia, and Daghestan. From Amman to Damascus to Istanbul and all the 
way to the diasporic communities scattered across North America, the conse-
quences of the colonial era migrations from the Caucasus to Ottoman lands 
are being lived, and mourned, to this day. (For a comprehensive account of 
colonial-era hijra, see Bīnū 2007. For recent engagements with these migra-
tions in Anglophone scholarship, see Karny 2000 and Richmond 2013.)
Whereas the inaugural migration from Mecca to Medina is narrated as an 
act of piety performed under duress, colonial-era migrations from the Cauca-
sus to Ottoman territories were undertaken in response to imperial mandates 
and threats. In Daghestan, among communities that sustained Islamic textual 
traditions dating back to the medieval period, the discussion of hijra directly 
engaged with—and to some extent adapted—Islamic legal theory. Beyond the 
Daghestani context, hijra more generally came to signify migration away from 
lands that had fallen under foreign rule. The concept was at once deeply rooted 
in Islamic traditions and dense with meaning beyond this context, including 
among Armenian Christian muhājirs. 
By 1864, with the Circassian defeat, the entire Caucasus was officially incor-
porated into the Russian empire. Immersed as they were in the politics of Ot-
toman and Russian imperial collusion, the colonial government officials who 
coordinated and carried out the migrations frequently deceived the target 
populations concerning the terms of their displacement, and misrepresented 
the conditions they would face when they reached their destinations. In Sovi-
et-era local literatures, these deceptions were memorialized as violations of 
the rights and humanity of those who migrated. Defeated mountaineers were 
forced to migrate and given only two possible destinations: to the Russian 
interior or to Ottoman lands (Toledano 2009, 83). Through such political 
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maneuverings, hijra came for Muslim mountaineers to signify yet one more 
aspect of coercive colonial rule. Far from evoking the “heroic ventures” with 
which it was associated in the early days of Islamic expansion, hijra was now a 
handmaiden of colonial rule.
Pondering the reconfiguration of hijra that coincided with the global de-
cline of Islamic sovereignty and the military ascendency of European empires 
sheds light on contemporaneous transformations in the Muslim understand-
ing of migration. Looking backwards in time will help clarify the frameworks 
through which hijra came to signify in modernity. The schools of Islamic law 
responded to the challenges introduced by the declining fate of Islamic sover-
eignty in different ways. Given their different approaches to the legal and ethi-
cal dimensions of migration, Ḥanafī, Ḥanbalī, Mālikī, and Shāfiʿī interpretations 
of hijra each merit separate study in the context of their separate geographies. 
Without assaying a thoroughgoing treatment of hijra across the Islamic world, 
I will here focus on one specific Shāfiʿī trajectory, before turning to the literary 
transformation of hijra memory in Soviet-era depictions of forced migration in 
the nineteenth-century Caucasus.
2 Hijra as Jihād
Whereas hijra throughout the Caucasus signified primarily forced migration 
from the early modern period to Soviet rule, Daghestan presents an important 
exception to this general pattern. The territory of Daghestan overlapped with 
the polity in the Caucasus that most successfully withstood colonial rule Imam 
Shamil’s imamate. This state functioned for a quarter of a century, from 1834–
1859, as, among other things, a bulwark against Russian rule. The relative sta-
bility of the imamate generated internal splits within the Daghestan community 
concerning the obligation to migrate to lands under Muslim rule. The jurists in 
Shamil’s service took the position that every Muslim in the region was obliged 
to migrate to his imamate. To reside outside the imamate was, in this view, to 
reside in dār al-ḥarb (the abode of war). In light of the less stringent under-
standing of hijra that was dominant in the Shāfiʿī legal school prevalent in Da-
ghestan, this interpretation appears to represent an innovation, attesting to 
the new meanings the term acquired during the nineteenth century. And yet, 
as much as the rigorous, even literalist understanding of hijra was respon sive 
to modern conditions, Daghestani historiography from the period also engaged 
increasingly with narratives of Islamic beginnings. Alongside reviving its 
Qurʾanic associations, the jurists working under Shamil developed a concept of 
hijra that was closely bound up with his conception of jihād.
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The poet and jurist Yūsuf al-Yakhsāwī (1795–1871), best known to history as 
one of Imam Shamil’s most articulate opponents, tried to use the Shāfiʿī under-
standing of the obligation to migrate to his advantage. (For al-Yakhsāwī’s biog-
raphy, see al-Durgilī 2004: 64/88; al-Ghumūqī 2014: 624–5; al-Qarākhī 1946.) 
Once, while he was in Mecca for the purpose of performing the hajj, al-Yakhsāwī 
issued a request for a legal opinion (istiftāʾ) to a local mufti concerning the le-
gitimacy of Shamil’s imamate. Prior to the formation of the imamate, 
al-Yakhsāwī recollected that “the people of Daghestan did not live under any-
body’s power…they were Muslims, and their leaders and judges knew the con-
tents of the book of God, and what had to be done.” With the encroachment of 
the tsar’s armies into Daghestan and the simultaneous appearance of a new 
imam, however, the situation changed. Daghestan was besieged on all sides. 
The new imam began demanding that Daghestanis must perform hijra by en-
tering the region under his control. Wishing to remain independent of any 
ruler, al-Yakhsāwī marshaled the resources of Shāfiʿī legal theory to debate the 
obligation to migrate in a fashion that the new imam would have difficulty 
contesting: 
Do we have to perform hijra?... In our present condition, we are able to 
live according to our religion, and that we keep to the firm bond of God. 
This is possible either because we manage to keep apart from the Infidels, 
for we are a powerful people, or because the Infidels are generous to us, 
for they fear that we might associate with the muhājirūn [emigrants, in 
this case to Shamil’s imamate]. Does he who abstains from hijra therefore 
become an unbeliever? Not performing the hijra is not counted among 
the things that lead to unbelief. (Kemper 2002: 268)3
Al-Yakhsāwī’s insistence on the permissibility of living within territories that 
have fallen under colonial rule was contested by his Meccan correspondent, 
who, although also a Shāfiʿī, was persuaded of the necessity of residing in the 
core Islamic lands (dār al-Islām), and declared that all Muslims were duty-
bound to engage in jihād against the infidels rather than to accept peaceful 
cohabitation with them. Al-Yakhsāwī’s interpretation of hijra in terms that le-
gitimated his preference for staying at home was repeated time and again in 
the nineteenth-century Islamic juridical discourse concerning migration and 
3 Arabic manuscript labeled (in Russian): “Letter from Yusuf of Aksai to scholars in Mecca with 
the request to confirm whether the activity of Imam Shamil conforms to sharia” (Rossiiskaia 
Akademiia Nauk, Dagestanskii Nauchnyi Tsentr, Institut Istorii, Arkheologii i Etnografiia, 
Makhachkala, Daghestan), fond 16, op 1, No 174, p 1. Translated in Kemper 2002: 268.
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mobility. Both among scholars who argued for migration and for those who 
argued for staying behind, banishment from the Islamic community was con-
sistently treated as the greatest tragedy that could befall a Muslim. 
Al-Yakhsāwī wished to remain in his native village rather than migrate to 
Shamil’s imamate and become subordinate to what he regarded as its coercive 
forms of governance. Others did not wish to migrate to Ottoman lands or to 
Russia’s interior. Few Muslims who wished to stay at home saw their wishes 
honoured. Even when it was not legally mandated, or enforced at the point of 
a gun, migration was incentivized and often coerced by the colonial state. 
Mountaineers who remained behind lived to regret their decision, if indeed 
they lived at all. 
Given the region’s long history of violent migrations, it is unsurprising that 
the Caucasus offers a particularly rich set of archives and literatures for the 
study of migration, and in a range of genres. In Arabic, Russian, Georgian, and 
Chechen, hijra texts—often invoking this specific term and variations of it—
narrate many possible relations between literature and history. Hijra in the 
Caucasus encompasses the mountains in the north to the lower-lying regions 
of the south, the defeat of indigenous anticolonial resistance movements dur-
ing the 1850s and 1860s and Daghestan’s ill-fated uprising of the 1870s. The 
term acquired new meanings during the Soviet repressions of minority eth-
nicities, as well as during their memorialization. Of course, hijra was never a 
static concept. Yet even a scholar well-versed in its many meanings may be 
surprised by just how potent and flexible hijra imagery turned out to be over 
the course of the long nineteenth century.
Colonial-era hijra narratives are primarily in Arabic. They are composed by 
Muslim scholars who filter their personal experiences and opinions through 
the prisms of Islamic pasts. Soviet hijra narratives are primarily in Russian and 
Caucasus vernacular languages, including Georgian, Chechen, and Abkhaz. 
The nineteenth-century Arabic literature of hijra includes prosimetric autobi-
ography, poetry, and political and legal theory. Soviet Russian and vernacular 
hijra literature is largely in prose, and includes historical novels that inaugu-
rated their respective literatures.4 Diasporic hijra literature, composed by mi-
grants from the Caucasus once they reached their destination, proliferates to 
this day in Arabic, Russian, English, and French.5 
Hijra narratives in the Caucasus comprise an internally variegated yet 
intertextually linked whole. In the process of (re)constructing this literary cor-
pus, I build on prior efforts to develop an anthropological approach to literary 
4 An exception to the general tendency toward verse is Galaktion Tabidze’s poem, “Muxajiri.”
5 In this category, fictional writing such as Idilbī 1991 can be included.
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texts from the Caucasus (Gould 2016). My approach brings migration texts 
from a range of Caucasus literatures into conversation with each other, and 
uses these texts to shed light on two centuries of colonization and 
decolonization in the Caucasus. An anthropological approach to literature 
enables us to look beyond the construction and deconstruction of canons as 
literary systems isolated from the broader world, and to understand how texts 
impact and inflect the worlds to which they refer.
3 Hijra as Banishment 
While hijra was regarded as a singular event in early Islamic history, parallels 
between the circumstances of Muhammad’s migration and the experience of 
Muslim mountaineers in the aftermath of colonial conquest gave new meaning 
to the teaching concerning the obligation to migrate. These parallels were 
reinforced and intensified with repeated narration. As in the age of Muhammad, 
but in contrast to most of Islamic history, in colonial modernity, the regions to 
which a Muslim residing in territory under non-Muslim rule could migrate 
were rapidly contracting. The abode of Islam had radically contracted, and the 
social infrastructures that facilitated such migrations in prior eras had 
correspondingly deteriorated. 
For Muslims in the nineteenth century Caucasus, hijra meant migration to 
lands under Ottoman rule, including present day Syria and Jordan, where 
many Daghestanis and Chechens reside to this day (Bīnū 2007). These lands 
were vast, but the constellations of power and authority that governed such 
migrations made them more traumatic than for any preceding period in Is-
lamic history. Whereas hijra was classically an obligation for which the entire 
Muslim community shared the burden, Ottoman involvement in migrations 
from the Caucasus was driven by mercenary rather than spiritual concerns. For 
migrants to Ottoman lands during the colonial period, hijra was less an act of 
piety which connected them to the wider Islamic community, than a necessity 
imposed by colonial conquest.
In his Soviet-era reconstruction of these events, the Chechen historical nov-
elist Abuzar Aidamirov (1933–2005) conveys the complex position of the mi-
grants—whom he appropriately calls muhajirs (as the term was rendered in 
Chechen and Russian)—between Islamic norms and bereavement towards 
the homeland they were now compelled to abandon after it had come under 
colonial rule. “A faithful Muslim was performing a pious act—abandoning the 
land of the giaours,” Aidamirov narrates, using the Turkic term for infidel, 
giaour. Even when these modern Chechen migrants recognize that their 
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trauma was prefigured in the life of the Prophet, nonetheless “saying farewell 
to one’s homeland left a tragic impression” (Aidamirov 1996, 409). While nar-
rating these events through the narrative templates afforded by the migration 
of the Prophet helped migrants connect their plight to the founding narrative 
of early Islamic history, modern hijras were performed under conditions even 
more harrowing and more coerced than those undertaken by the Prophet and 
his companions. 
The divided loyalties of the government officials who organized the 
migrations further complicated the meaning of migration from the Caucasus 
to Ottoman territories. The enigmatic life and legacy of Musa Kundukhov 
(1818–1889), who served both the tsar and the Ottoman sultan during succes-
sive stages in his career, illustrates these ambiguities well. The son of an Osse-
tian nobleman (aldar), Kundukhov entered the Pavlovskii Cadet Corps at the 
age of twelve (Kundukhov 1937). Before he reached the age of twenty, Kunduk-
hov was already working as an interpreter to the Emperor Nicholas during his 
visit to the Caucasus in 1837. Over the course of the next two decades, this 
ambitious Ossetian officer rose to the rank of major general in the tsarist army. 
In 1860, a year following Shamil’s surrender and thus of the end of his imam-
ate, tsar Alexandre II (r. 1855–1881) created the Terek province, which included 
Chechnya and Ingushetia within its domain (figure 9.1). Kundukhov was ap-
pointed as the first governor.
During his tenure as a governor, Kundukhov began to make preparations for 
what would be his most durable and damaging legacy: the forced migration of 
many thousands of Circassians, Chechens, and Ingush to Ottoman territories. 
Although the land they were given to live on was, in contrast to the fertile land 
that they had been promised, barely habitable, the beleaguered mountaineers 
were powerless to contest decrees that originated in St. Petersburg, or even to 
ask for what they needed to survive. Although these forced migrations were a 
disaster for the muhajirs on all counts, they were a success for the tsarist ad-
ministration, Kundukhov included. After he arrived in the Ottoman empire, 
Kundukhov soon parted ways with the mountaineers, changed his name to 
Musa Pasha, and embarked on a career in the sultan’s army. Musa Pasha rose 
high in the ranks of the Ottoman army, and even commanded a battalion 
against the Russians during the Turko-Russian war of 1877. 
For the early part of his life in the service of the tsar, sources agree concern-
ing the general contours of Kundukhov’s biography. It is only after Shamil’s 
surrender, when Kundukhov began to organize mass migrations to the Otto-
man empire, that the representation of Kundukhov and his legacy diverges 
depending on who is telling the story. When Kundukhov’s story is told from the 
vantage point of official Russian sources, the narrative differs starkly from later 
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Ingush and Chechen reconstructions. In what, notwithstanding its partiality 
towards its subject, is among the most detailed accounts of Kundukhov’s life 
on record, Kantemir describes the forced migrations of the 1860s as evidence 
that “this talented administrator and brave warrior had completely relin-
quished his political acumen” (Kantemir 1939, 10). Without acknowledging the 
tragic consequences of his actions or further clarifying their meaning, Allen 
and Muratoff argue that Kundukhov’s organization of the forced migration 
marked a “break with the Russian authorities” (Allen, Muratoff 1953, 547). Most 
sympathetic of all is a modern scholarly account that identifies Kundukhov’s 
“disgust with Russian policies towards the local population” as the stimulus 
behind his campaign for the departure of the mountaineers to Ottoman lands 
(Khodarkovsky 2011, 4). 
If Kundukhov was in fact seeking to rectify the damage done by tsarist poli-
cies, it is telling that these noble efforts left no trace in local Caucasus litera-
tures, historiography, or in local memory. In all of these contexts, Kundukhov 
is remembered in a negative, or at best ambiguous, light. The contemporary 
Chechen historian Ibragimova has documented in meticulous detail how in 
Figure 9.1 Map of Terek province
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1861, four years prior to the first major deportation, Kundukhov comman-
deered an expedition against the Chechen mountaineers that resulted in the 
destruction of fifteen mountain villages (auls), as well as the massive resettle-
ment of Chechens residing in the mountains onto the plains (Ibragimova 
2010). “All of the buildings, in the auls and the homesteads [khutorov] have 
been burned to their foundations,” Kundukhov proudly informed his Russian 
superiors, “all the hay was charred, not only in the auls, but even in the 
mountain heights, which surprised the Chechens, who witnessed the 
conflagration of their inaccessible declivities and lofty heights” (Ibragimova 
2010, 295).6 
Adding to the portrayal of Kundukhov as a perpetrator of injustice, 
Ibragimova refers to an event in 1845 when Kundukhov publicly shot a Chechen 
elder who had killed a distant relative of his thirteen years earlier (Ibragimova 
2010). As Ibragimova notes, the only punishment Kundukhov faced for this 
murder was a brief arrest. The colonial administration took the position that 
“for the sake of peace in the region, it was necessary to treat the event as a mat-
ter pertaining [only to] local custom” (Lapin 2008,156). Assessing his overall 
impact, Ibragimova sums up Kundukhov’s legacy as one of “mercenary…ca-
reerism” (Ibragimova 2007, 36).
Historians widely acknowledge that Kundukhov acted in tandem with local 
Chechens who were in the service of the tsar, as when he organized the depor-
tation of twenty-three thousand Chechens to Turkey in 1865 in cooperation 
with Usmi Saadulla, a former deputy (nāʾib) in Shamil’s imamate (Khojaev 
1998,172). Kundukhov also encouraged members of the mountaineer elite to 
simulate a desire to migrate to Ottoman lands in exchange for bribes, after hav-
ing promised them secretly that they could return home if they were not 
pleased by the lands that were allotted to them (Ibragimova 2010). Needless to 
say, such promises were not extended to the impoverished mountaineers who 
comprised the vast majority of those forced to migrate. Adding to the irony, a 
Chechen named Arzu Chermoev—who features widely in subsequent fiction-
al retellings—headed the battalion that destroyed fifteen auls under Kunduk-
hov’s command, and which was followed by resettlements (Muzaev 1992,3). 
Notwithstanding the broad acknowledgement of Chechen complicity by 
Chechen historians, Kundukhov is consistently treated as a major orchestrator 
of Chechen’s suffering during the nineteenth century, and as the man 
6 Otdel rukopisnyh fondov Severo-Osetinskogo instituta gumanitarnyh i social’nyh issledo-
vanii im. V.I. Abaeva (Division of the manuscript section of the North Ossetian Institute of 
Humanities and Social Research named after V.I. Abaev) f. 33; op. 1; d. 1; l. 14, 21, 25. Cited in 
Ibragimova 2010: 295.
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primarily responsible for the large-scale deceptions that were perpetrated re-
garding the terms of the proposed migrations. 
These ambivalent memories tied to Kundukhov’s legacy are even more 
forcefully evoked in vernacular literary representations of Kundukhov from 
the Soviet period. Significantly, the two major historical novels of Ingush and 
Chechen literature, Idris Bazorkin’s From the Darkness of Ages (1968) and Aid-
amirov’s aforementioned trilogy (1972–1999) both devote to Kundukhov a de-
gree of space and attention that compares only with the attention lavished on 
another non-Russian tsarist official, Vorontsov’s aide-de-camp the half-Arme-
nian Count Mikhail Tarielovich Loris-Melikov (1826–1888). On both accounts, 
both Kundukhov and Loris-Melikov were instrumental in organizing the de-
portations. Bazorkin and Aidamirov however attribute the real agency behind 
these events to Kundukhov. As they construct an image of Kundukhov as the 
mastermind behind the mountaineers’ tragedy, both novelists emphasize the 
distance between Kundukhov and the mountaineers. Bazorkin’s irony-laden 
scene in which Kundukhov addresses a pair of Ingush mountaineers, Turs and 
Goitemir, who have come to plead for the right to access their land, renders 
this distance through the paradigm of linguistic difference. “I too am a 
mountaineer,” Kundukhov says to a translator, by way of explaining his wealth, 
and of identifying with the impoverished mountaineers, “I am an Ossetian and 
a Muslim” (2001, 36). That this heartfelt speech takes place through the medi-
um of a translator, with the self-proclaimed Muslim speaking Russian which 
the Nakh (the collective term for Chechen and Ingush) can only understand in 
translation, is indicative of Kundukhov’s alienation from his environment.
As soon becomes apparent, Kundukhov’s words have a hidden motive. He is 
trying to persuade his auditors to embark on a hijra to Ottoman lands. He says 
to his captivated listeners: “I am giving up everything to go to Turkey to live 
with my Muslim brothers. A man must think not only of his mortal life, but 
about his eternal life.” Kundukhov then divulges his plans to relinquish his 
wealth in order to migrate to Turkey alongside his fellow mountaineers. Ma-
nipulating the spiritual, ethical, and legal discourse of hijra for the political 
ends of the colonial state, Kundukhov asserts that anyone who refuses to mi-
grate will become “a slave to the tsar” and “will never see paradise,” while those 
who migrate will be blessed with more land than they can harvest. Kundukhov 
succeeds in persuading at least one of his audience. After he finishes his 
speech, Turs exclaims gratefully, “Praise Allah! I’m so glad that I met you, 
Musa… I’ll do everything in my power to help you. Thank you for everything.”
As readers of the novel soon learn, Turs’ gratitude is entirely misplaced. The 
many promises that were made from both the tsarist and the Ottoman side to 
the Muslim mountaineers who migrated to Ottoman lands went unfulfilled. 
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Instead of fertile land, the migrants were forced to survive on land on which 
crops could not be sown. Many died from starvation. It is on this juncture in 
the muhajirs’ traumatic history that Aidamirov focuses in his literary treat-
ment of Kundukhov. Whereas Bazorkin portrays Kundukhov from the view-
point of his mountaineer protagonists, Aidamirov uses internal monologue to 
depict Kundukhov from within. Writing several years after Bazorkin, Aida-
mirov delves yet deeper into Kundukhov’s enigmatic character, and explores 
how his desire for good was mixed with a willingness to sacrifice his fellow 
mountaineers’ best interests for the advancement of his career. 
Although Kundukhov’s father makes no appearance in this or any other 
Chechen literary text, Aidamirov’s chapter on the mastermind behind the 
migration is entitled “Musa Kundukhov, son of Alxas.” In emphasizing his 
parentage, this label thereby stresses his roots among local mountaineers. The 
chapter “Musa Kundukhov, son of Alxas,” consists mostly of a dialogue between 
Kundukhov, a Chechen emigrant named Arzu (Chechen for “eagle”), and his 
Ali. Arzu and Ali were leading a group of Chechens who, having given up on 
obtaining the land that had been promised, were returning to Chechnya. 
Although the Chechens knew that they would be stopped at the border by the 
authorities and forced to turn back, they felt that they had no other option. 
When Kundukhov crossed paths with the Chechen cavalcade headed for the 
Ottoman-Russian border, they were prepared to die if they could not make it 
across.
Although the encounter that subsumes this chapter is narrated primarily 
through the eyes of the Chechen brothers, Aidamirov’s narrative technique 
polyphonically registers multiple points of view. The scene opens with an un-
named Kundukhov, an officer “dressed in Turkish clothing,” whom Ali recog-
nizes immediately as “a Caucasus mountaineer” (551). At this juncture in his 
rise to power, Kundukhov has become more adept at speaking directly to 
Chechens, for he addresses Arzu in broken Chechen, asking to speak with the 
eldest among the group.
Arzu recognizes Kundukhov before Kundukhov recognizes him. Address-
ing him as “Musa, son of Alxas,” Arzu accuses his interlocutor of having a bad 
memory. By this he means to imply that Kundukhov’s culpability has dulled 
his will to remember. As the modern literature of migration repeatedly af-
firms, memory acts as an ethical compass. According to this same literature, 
memory is sustained by an ethical capacity to withstand trauma, and, in the 
case of the Chechens, to survive. The ethics of memory are forcefully conveyed 
in Arzu’s reflection on why the Chechens are perpetually forgotten by their 
persecutors. “Everyone tries not to recognize us these days,” Arzu says, “Indeed, 
the executioner does not need to know whom he is decapitating.” Following 
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this ominous analogy, Arzu concludes with an equally incendiary topic, con-
cerning the arson that Kundukhov perpetrated on fifteen Chechen auls while 
serving as the governor of the Terek district. In response to Arzu’s accusation, 
Kundukhov launches into a defense of the colonializing project. “It was a bad 
idea to rise up against the tsar,” he declares. “Everyone else submitted to their 
fate. Only you [Chechens] wanted that crazy freedom [dikii svobodyi]” (552).
In contradistinction to earlier periods of Islamic history, the concepts of 
freedom and hijra closely converged during the nineteenth and twentieth cen-
turies, amid the struggle against colonial rule and for political autonomy. 
Whereas hijra originally signified a migration performed under duress but vo-
litionally and in expectation of bigger and better things, the tension between 
the coercive aspects of the obligation to migrate and the yearning for freedom 
became evident once the pressure to migrate was imposed by the state rather 
than by ethical commitment or religious belief. Prior to this transformation, 
which can be said to have begun with the Reconquista and the expulsion of 
Muslims from al-Andalus in 1492, hijra was not coercively imposed by the state. 
As a result of the early modern expulsions, the relationship between hijra and 
freedom changed. Yet even amid this transformation, earlier hijra narratives 
appealed to Muslims during the colonial and Soviet periods due to their long-
standing, if malleable, association with freedom. The desacralized understand-
ing of hijra that shaped the experience of modern Muslims is apparent from 
the remark of another of Aidamirov’s muhajirs, “Everywhere people are run-
ning away from poverty and injustice. It doesn’t matter much whether it is the 
Russian tsar or the Turkish sultan [who causes the injustice]. Everywhere our 
brothers are being expelled” (416).
Given the tension between hijra and freedom generated by new forms of 
state coercion in colonial modernity, it is unsurprising that the climactic de-
bate between Kundukhov and the Chechen migrants he encounters on their 
way back to Chechnya pivots on the issue of freedom, including its dangers 
and illusions. As a Chechen author, Aidamirov is keenly aware of the promi-
nent status accorded to the concept of freedom in Chechen culture. This rever-
ence for freedom penetrates so deeply that the majority of greetings in the 
Chechen language are morphologically related in one way or another to mar-
sho, meaning both peace and freedom (Campana 2009, 45).7 Even the word for 
greetings itself, marshalla, bears this morphological inflection (Jaimoukha 
2005, 140). Finally, as the author of the Chechen national anthem which is 
7 While Campana 2009 is right to point to the constructed status of Chechen freedom myths, 
the present example demonstrates that such myths longs predate the post-Soviet conflict and 
are arguably congruous with Chechen modernity itself. 
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included in the novel—a ballad known as “death or freedom” due to its re-
frain—Aidamirov was well positioned to make this the overriding theme of his 
text.
In response to Kundukhov’s critique of the mountaineers who attempted to 
resist the tsar’s military might, Arzu launches into a defense of freedom, a con-
cept for which he is prepared to die. “Do you know what freedom is?” he asks 
Kundukhov, “We do. This is why we die for it. We have no regrets, even though 
[this knowledge] costs us dearly. But when you know what you are dying for, 
then it’s much easier to die” (552). Impressing on Kundukhov the injunction to 
remember that his experience of banishment has imposed on him, Arzu re-
calls a statement Kundukhov made after destroying the Chechen auls. At that 
time, according to Arzu, Kundukhov had promised to never again harm 
another Chechen. Arzu confronts Kundukhov with the Ossetian proverb he 
uttered at the time to a group of Chechens that included himself: “when a tree 
falls, it falls on a neighbor” (535). This means both that the neighbor prevents 
the tree from falling to the ground as well as that the tree inevitably shoulders 
the burden of its neighbor’s pain. Arzu counters Kundukhov’s proverb by ac-
cusing Kundukhov of lying. “In order to remind you of your promise,” Arzu 
says, “last winter two people travelled to Skut-Koh. One of them was me.”
Tellingly, Kundukhov fails to remember the Chechens’ visit, while it is per-
manently etched on Arzu’s consciousness. When Kundukhov confesses, and 
half apologies for, this failure in his memory on account of the many visits he 
has received from unhappy muhajirs, Arzu explains what made his reasons for 
visiting distinct. “We wished to remind you,” he states, “that you were obliged 
to keep your word.” Disturbed by these unclaimed memories, Kundukhov de-
ploys a familiar line of defense: he had no other option and was acting accord-
ing to what he believed were the Chechens’ best interests. He claims that the 
tsar intended to forcibly remove any Chechens who did not migrate to Otto-
man lands in the depths of Russia, far from the Caucasus, and compel them, 
“like sheep, to adopt the [Christian] faith and the [Russian] language” (556). 
Under such circumstances, Kundukhov stresses, the inevitable outcome would 
have been genocide. Given that, as he admits, Muslim mountaineers would 
never agree to the conditions stipulated by the colonial administration, the 
result would have been war and even more violent banishments of the type 
that were later to be perpetrated by Stalin. With Kundukhov, colonial discourse 
merges with an Islamic ethical tradition concerning the obligation to migrate. 
New meanings are generated and new hypocrisies are forged.
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4 Conclusion
Beyond its status as a core teaching and tradition within Islamic law and eth-
ics, hijra is a story, and a method for narrating displacement. The narration of 
migration as hijra generates a language for grasping the trauma of forced dis-
placement at the global as well as individual level. Much can be gained from 
inhabiting cognitively the prisms through which the hijra story has been told, 
from the Maghreb to the Mashreq, from the establishment of the first Islamic 
state in Medina to the period of dynastic expansion under the Umayyads and 
the Abbasids to the radical contraction of Muslim sovereignty in early moder-
nity and its obliteration under Russian, French, Spanish, and British colonial 
rule. 
As can be seen from these brief excavations of hijra’s meanings across time 
and space, the obligation to migrate is as variable as Islam itself. Seen from the 
vantage point of its complex historical trajectory, hijra bridges temporalities, 
geographies, and peoples. Originating in the severance, of kin from kin, hus-
bands from wives, and of Muslims from non-Muslims, hijra is also paradoxi-
cally a unifying concept, a way of living with and through trauma, that gives 
meaning and structure to the experience of exile and displacement, including, 
for Chechens, the ongoing experience of the 1944 deportation (Gould 2012). 
Through the medium of memory, the hijra story is acted out repeatedly, each 
time with a different meaning yet familiar echoes, varying according to the 
literature in question, the people whom this literature concerns, and every 
text’s genre and form. 
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Chapter 10
Experiences of Uyghur Migration to Turkey and the 




At least one million Uyghurs now live outside their homeland Xinjiang, also 
known as the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) and East Turkistan. 
The experience of migration has been a reality for many years for these Dias-
pora Uyghurs. They reside in about 50 different countries around the world, 
but two locales where Uyghurs reside, Turkey and the US, will be the focus of 
this paper. First, I will describe the migrations to Turkey—when, why and how 
they were treated. Then I will focus on the US. Following that, I will describe 
and analyze the differing experiences of the various waves of migrants in light 
of five topics. The first topic is religion, where I will compare the traditional 
dichotomy of migration to a Muslim and/or a non-Muslim state, the Dār al-
Islām and Dār al-Kufr. The second topic will be the issue of law and the imple-
mentation of changing laws during the periods of migration. The third topic is 
society, specifically the integration of migrants into their new home cultures. 
The fourth is residence, which encompasses both legal and illegal means of 
staying or residing in a country and how this impacts the fifth topic, citizen-
ship. At every juncture, the relationship with the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC), looms large, affecting integration, legal status, business and political 
factors that impact the Uyghurs in the Diaspora. In the concluding remarks, I 
will address the issues of identity and the maintenance of Uyghur culture in 
the Diaspora and how this has been affected by the factors above.
As well as published sources, I draw heavily upon my own experiences as a 
Uyghur in the Diaspora and the fieldwork that I pursued between June 2013 
and September 2017. This fieldwork was carried out while working as an aca-
demic in Istanbul, Turkey and later in the United States. I interviewed 200 Di-
aspora Uyghurs who resided in Istanbul, Ankara, and Kayseri in Turkey as well 
as Washington, New York and Boston in the US. Also interviewed were Uyghurs 
currently residing in other countries. Questions asked included those about 
their migration, and specifically how they maintained their Uyghur identity in 
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the Diaspora. They were asked about their use of language, religious practices, 
food, clothing, holiday celebrations, problems they faced and how they and 
their children identified themselves. 
During the fieldwork research in Turkey, I interviewed the well-known Uy-
ghur religious scholars Dr. Atavulla Karakas and Hebibulla Kuseni in Istanbul, 
exploring their view of immigration and how it can be interpreted from an Is-
lamic perspective. Their views regarding Uyghur migration were located in the 
hijra as referring exclusively to flight and refuge or seeking asylum. Hijra has 
more often been used in relation to emigration to join a Muslim community 
elsewhere to ensure the safe practice of the Muslim faith, meaning for religious 
reasons. In the Qurʾan there is no excuse for suffering under persecution when 
there are other places to seek refuge. Uyghurs have long been oppressed cultur-
ally, economically, socially and religiously. Currently they suffer severe restric-
tions on the practice of their religion. Because of this, thousands of Uyghurs 
have been forced to leave their homeland, East Turkistan, to safe places such as 
Turkey and Western countries. According to Islamic teaching, every part of the 
earth is Allah’s land. Now, borders divide nations and block the flow of migra-
tion from one land to another. Yet it does not matter where Uyghurs migrate, as 
much as their ability to maintain their religious life.
2 Geography, History and Culture of the Uyghur
Uyghurs are the indigenous people in Xinjiang. Most of the world’s Uyghurs, 
Turkic-speaking Sunni Muslims who belong to the Ḥanafī school of law, live in 
Xinjiang, the biggest province of China. Although the XUAR is home to 13 
ethnic nationalities, the largest minority is the Uyghurs (about 11 million, based 
on official statistics) who make up 45.9 % of the total population of XUAR and 
about 1% of the total population of China. Some Uyghur scholars, writers and 
activists stressed that the total population of Turkic people in Xinjiang such as 
Uyghur, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz and Uzbek is 25 million, even some of them claim 35 
million. Located in the center of the Eurasian continent, the total land mass of 
Xinjiang is 1,600,000 square km, making up 1/6 of China. Xinjiang shares 
international borders with Russia in the north, Kazakhstan in the north-west, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Afghanistan in the west, and Pakistan and India in 
the south-west (figure 10.1).
Xinjiang is rich in raw materials and natural resources. Oil reserves in 
Xinjiang total 23.4 billion tons, and gas reserves are roughly 13 trillion m3 
(Jinhui et al. 2016), making Xinjiang one of biggest oil and gas producing 
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regions in the world. It is also the gateway to the Silk Route, through which 
China not only exports to Central Asia and the Middle East, but also imports 
oil and gas for its economic development. Right now, China’s major foreign 
policy initiative is the One Belt and One Road Initiative. Xinjiang is right in the 
middle, the hub of that infrastructure development plan. 
The geographic foundations that constitute the divisions according to cul-
ture and ecotype in the north, south and east are the patterns of the dominant 
landforms of mountains and deserts. North Xinjiang includes the arid steppe 
grassland of the Jungarian basin, surrounded by mountains and high pastures. 
East Xinjiang includes the cities of Turfan, and the large oases around it. South 
Xinjiang consists of the oases surrounding the Tarim basin and the Taklamak-
an Desert. Known variously as Kashgaria or Altishehir (six cities), this region 
has a long and complex history of interaction with Iran and the lands to the 
south.
Figure 10.1 The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region
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3 Brief History of Uyghur and Xinjiang (from Ancient Times up to 
Chinese Communist Rule)
An outline of Uyghur history is essential in understanding modern Uyghur 
consciousness and identity. Existing before the eighth century, Chinese 
historians reported them as Hui-he or Hui-hu. At this time, the Uyghur were 
just one of a number of nomadic tribes, who in 740 A.D, confederated with 
other nomads, defeated the Second Turkish Khanate, established a Uyghur 
empire and then dominated the federation. The traditional shamanistic 
Turkic-speaking Uyghur came increasingly under the influence of Persian 
Manichaeanism, Buddhism and eventually Nestorian Christianity. In the year 
840 A.D., the Kyrgyz destroyed Uyghur power in Mongolia and the Uyghurs 
split into two major groups. One moved into the Gansu Corridor region and 
the other took over the oases north and south of the Tianshan Mountains, 
establishing the Idiqut Buddhist Uyghur Kingdom in Turfan and the Karakhanli 
Khanate in Kashgar. These migrant Uyghurs, as well as the indigenous people 
(such as Scythians, Saks, Tokharians, Sogdian, Hun, and Turks who lived in 
Xinjiang since 2000 BC) with whom they assimilated, make up the stock of the 
current Uyghur population.
Most of the Tarim Basin and Jungaria were ruled by Gengiz (Genghis) Khan, 
his son Chaghatay and his descendants from the early thirteenth to the mid-
fourteenth century, when the Mongol rulers separated from the Ulus of Cha-
ghatay. As a result, Xinjiang was ruled by the Turkic-speaking Mongols until 
the seventeenth century, when Qalmaq Mongols grabbed control of the north-
ern part of Jungaria. They helped establish the White Mountain Khoja clan’s 
rule of the Kashgar Kingdom (Brose 2007; Light 2008).
The Manchu Qing emperor Qianlong had success against the Muslims in 
western Xinjiang in 1758 and south of Lake Balkhash in 1795, once and for all 
bringing the entire area within Chinese rule (Hsü 1995). In 1865 a second at-
tempt at establishing an independent Muslim state in southern Xinjiang was 
made by a leader from Kokand. Within five years, Yakub Beg ruled over a large 
area of Xinjiang from his base in Kashgar, uniting Muslims across the entire 
region. After the defeat of Yakub Beg by Zuo Zong-tang in 1878, the region 
passed into the hands of a Han dominated administration. It was at this time 
that the name Xinjiang was given to the region on November 18, 1884. Xinjiang 
means “new borderlands” or “new frontier.” In 1911, the Nationalist Chinese 
overthrew Manchu rule and established a republic.
The Uyghurs staged several uprisings against the nationalist Chinese rule 
during this period. Twice, in 1933 (in Kashgar) and 1944–1949 (in Ghulja), the 
Uyghurs were successful in setting up a short-lived independent Eastern 
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Turkistan Republic. The 1759 Qing occupation, the 1879 Zuo Zong-tang recon-
quest of Xinjiang and those two secular independent East Turkistan Republics 
are symbols for most Uyghurs of the illegitimate outsider domination and a 
legitimation for their cause. The mere mention of the term Sherqi Türkistan 
(Eastern Turkistan), the preferred term of Uyghurs, especially Uyghur nation-
alists and diasporas, is enough to draw accusations of separatism or even ter-
rorism from the Chinese government.
4 Uyghur under Control of the Peoples Republic of China (1949 to 
Present)
Communist China, with the collaboration of the Soviet Union seized Xinjiang 
in 1949, and the second Eastern Turkistan Republic (ETR) collapsed. The 
Uyghurs were (yet again) incorporated into China. In October 1955, Xinjiang 
was officially made the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and the Uyghurs 
were designated as the titular nationality of the region, thus making Xinjiang 
the homeland of the Uyghur. From 1950 to 1958, the government’s mission was 
to create national unity and establish loyalty among all the minority popu-
lations by promoting patriotism and socialist ideology. A tightened control of 
religion, underpinned by the atheistic principles of Marxism/Leninism, sup-
pressed Islam and ethnic consciousness, alternated with periods of more le-
nient policies. The Great Leap Forward (1958–62) and the Cultural Revolution 
(1966–76) were two periods of the greatest intolerance. Many religious holy 
places including mosques were destroyed or changed into warehouses or pig-
sties. Intellectuals or secular nationalists who played a role in the clergy were 
labeled “counter revolutionary.” Many members of the clergy such as sheikhs 
and ishans (religious clerics), or believers suspected of disloyalty, were perse-
cuted, sent to re-education camps, or executed.
The end of the Cultural Revolution ushered an era of reform policies 
characterized by an expansion of the school system, a drop in illiteracy, and an 
official softening towards religion and the use of minority languages in 
education. There were more opportunities for education and a moderate 
return of religious practices. Churches, mosques, and temples began to reopen 
in the years following official reauthorization in December 1978. The decade of 
1980 to 1990 saw a progressive opening of borders that made Uyghur youth 
better able to travel more freely and provided opportunities for spiritual 
exchange and revival. Until the mid-1990s, hundreds of young Uyghurs 
attended religious schools in Pakistan, Egypt, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia, and a 
few of them also headed to Yemen, Qatar, and Malaysia for the same reason. 
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During this period, hundreds of Uyghur immigrated to Central Asia, North 
America, Europe, and especially to Turkey. Domestic (1989 Tiananmen protest) 
and international (collapse of the Soviet Union) events made the Chinese 
government change their policy toward Uyghurs. Policy changes that date 
from 1989/1990 include changes in religious tolerance, which were mirrored in 
a crackdown on religious education. Attitudes towards Uyghurs involved 
reforms or reinterpretations of official policies towards religion, education, 
and cultural expression. The government began to issue licenses for legal 
mosques, reviewed appointments of imams and started an “education in athe-
ism” campaign (Amnesty International 2002). Thus began a Sinicization by 
educating Uyghurs into Chinese culture. Legally, neither the Qurʾan nor reli-
gion could be taught to students younger than eighteen. Chinese schools and 
television reinforced this Sinicization by teaching “patriotism” at the expense 
of other cultural expressions. Restrictions also included banning religious 
practices during Ramadan, increasing control over Islamic clergy, and the de-
tention or arrest of religious leaders who had been labeled “hypocrite,” “unpa-
triotic” or “subversive” (Human Rights Watch 2005). Restrictions included the 
annual pilgrimage to Mecca. “In contemporary Xinjiang, the power of the state 
to regulate religion, including Islam, has brought the forces of law and order 
into direct conflict with Muslims who are trying to live according the tenets of 
their faith” (Fuller and Lipman 2004, 323). Since September 2017, Chinese offi-
cials have confiscated religious items including prayer mats and copies of the 
Qurʾan in Xinjiang. These copies were taken as part of a Xinjiang-wide cam-
paign that bans “illegal” publicity materials, religious activities and religious 
teachings that officials consider to be tools of terrorism (Radio Free Asia 
2017b).
Education is the key to Sinicization. In order to speed up assimilation, in 
1997, the government provided a new model for compulsory Chinese language 
education and the marginalization of the Uyghur language as well as other 
minority languages in Xinjiang. By using the term bilingual education, the gov-
ernment is implementing a monolingual language education system that un-
dermines the linguistic basis of Uyghur culture. Chinese has become the only 
official language and is now the language of instruction in all levels of Uyghur 
schools including kindergarten (Dwyer 2005). The government has exerted 
more and more control over every aspect of life in Xinjiang. Now, Uyghurs have 
become strangers in their own land. (Bovingdon 2010). China bans the Uyghur 
language in schools in Hotan (Radio Free Asia 2017a), as well as other places.
Ethnic tensions have clearly increased in Xinjiang, especially since the 2009 
Urumqi riot and that worries Chinese government officials. As a result of Chi-
nese repressive policies, Xinjiang has become the largest outdoor prison in the 
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world. (Xiang, 2019). In August, 2018, a United Nations panel reported that 
China had turned Xinjiang into “a massive internment camp.” United Nations 
human rights experts have expressed alarm at what they said were many cred-
ible reports that China had detained a million or more ethnic Uyghurs in the 
western region of “Xinjiang” and forced as many as two million to submit to 
re-education and indoctrination. Gay McDougall, a member of the UN Com-
mittee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination has described this as, 
“something resembling a massive internment camp, shrouded in secrecy, a sort 
of no-rights zone,” (Cumming-Bruce, 2018). The government has intensified 
the crackdown on Uyghurs inside Xinjiang with increased pressure on Uyghurs 
outside Xinjiang. For example, the Chinese government has forced thousands 
of Uyghur students abroad to return home since January 2017. Under pressure 
from the Chinese government, the Egyptian government arrested hundreds of 
Uyghur students in July 2017 (Aljazeera News, 2017). Some of them are still in 
jail, some have been released and some repatriated to China. Hundreds of 
Uyghur students fled to Turkey and a few to Europe.
5 The Uyghur Diaspora in Turkey
After the PLA (Peoples Liberation Army) entered Xinjiang in 1949, a number of 
Uyghur leaders managed to escape, finally settling in Turkey. Since then, the 
migration has continued in waves. At first, they fled China to neighboring 
countries, mainly to India (Kashmir), Pakistan and Afghanistan, but also to 
Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. While most of them stayed, in the second stage 
many Uyghur refugees left their host country and re-migrated to a second host 
country, usually for economic reasons but also, as in the case of Turkey, for 
cultural and political reasons. In the third stage, Uyghurs migrated yet again, 
from a second host country to a third host country—Australia, Western Europe 
and North America—primarily for economic, but also for political reasons. 
In this migration process, Turkey became a terminal destination as well as a 
transit or junction to other destinations. Of the one million Uyghurs who make 
up the Uyghur diaspora, the largest concentration outside Xinjiang can be 
found in the “West Turkestan” central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, as well as significant clusters in Pakistan and 
Afghanistan (Chung 2002; Wang 2003). The largest Uyghur population resides 
in Kazakhstan, where 300,000 have lived for several generations (Golovnina 
2009; Leonard 2009). After Central Asia, the next largest diaspora community 
resides in Turkey, where Uyghurs claim ancestral links to the Turks. Because of 
Turkey’s ancestral, historical, linguistic and cultural ties, it has been the most 
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attractive destination for Uyghurs looking to escape the influence of Commu-
nism. As a result, Turkey has been the most influential node in the Uyghur di-
aspora during the twentieth century. This may also explain why Turkey, since 
the 1950s, has provided Uyghur activists a primary haven to help shape an East 
Turkestan independence movement (Shichor 2007). Of the total population of 
Uyghur living in Turkey, estimated to be 35,000–45,000 about 10,000 of them 
are refugees. 
Already in the nineteenth century Turkey served as a model for Turkistan 
nationalism. Although Turkey could not extend its assistance to Xinjiang’s 
Turkic nationalities, they have always regarded Turkey as a model and a source 
of moral support and ideological inspiration. Indeed, following the flight of 
Uyghur refugees from Chinese Communism in March 1952, Turkey, supported 
by the United Nation High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), offered 
sanctuary (in fact, political asylum) to 2,000 Eastern Turkistan refugees who 
had fled Xinjiang to India and Pakistan following the communist occupation. 
In 1953, Turkey accepted an additional 900 Eastern Turkistan refugees from 
Kashmir and Pakistan. This Turkish policy, offering temporary or permanent 
residence, persists to this day. In 1965, Turkey accepted 235 from Yarkand, one 
third of a group of Uyghur refugees who had fled to Afghanistan in 1961. Their 
absorption was made possible by a special resettlement program financed by 
UNHCR, at the request of the Turkish government. Like their predecessors, 
they were given citizenship and provided with housing. Uyghur have continued 
to arrive in Turkey since the late 1960s, mostly on an individual basis. Since the 
1980s Open Door policy, many Uyghurs have left China to study abroad or go 
on pilgrimage (hajj) to Mecca, never to return. In August 1982, Turkey accepted 
another group of several thousand Uyghur refugees who had come from Afgha-
nistan and Pakistan. Many of them had escaped from Xinjiang by crossing the 
border, now more open and less guarded.
Thus, the Turkish experience created two groups of Uyghurs, called “yerlik” 
(local) or “kona” (old) who were descendants of those migrating at earlier 
times, and “yengi kelgenler” (newcomers), those immigrants since 1980. At first 
the cultural differences between these groups were significant. The “yerlik” 
were more Turkicized, more religious and looked down upon the newcomers 
because of their ignorance of religion. The newcomers, those who arrived 
since 1980, have more relational ties with the Uyghurs of Xinjiang. Most new-
comers saw their new life in Turkey as a temporary solution to the political and 
economic turmoil transpiring in their “homeland.” They felt they would be 
able to return and reclaim their “homeland” once the Chinese communists left 
Xinjiang or the regime changed.
182 Beydulla
Isa Yusup Alptekin and Mehmet Emint Bugra, who, after spending a few 
years in Kashmir following their flight from Xinjiang, had finally settled in Is-
tanbul, led the Uyghur community in Turkey. After Bugra’s death in 1965, 
Alptekin remained the uncrowned leader of Eastern Turkistan until his death 
in 1995, aged 94. Their activities had always been aimed at two interconnected 
targets and at two different audiences simultaneously. Alptekin was particu-
larly active in raising awareness for the Uyghur causes and paid visits to many 
organizations such as the Muslim World League and the Arab League as well as 
attending the Bandung Conference in 1955, the Afro-Asian Conference in 1965 
and the World Congress of Islam in 1964 (Landau 1995, 118, 150; Shichor 2003, 
290). The Uyghur diaspora community in Turkey has also worked closely with 
the Turkish government, and in return, Turkey remains highly critical of Bei-
jing’s Xinjiang policy and is sympathetic toward the plight of the Uyghurs. In 
the 1980s and since, especially since 2009, there has been a new wave of 
migration that crossed the international borders in order to visit relatives, 
engage in trade, to study and for many, to flee from Chinese persecution. 
Initially, most Uyghur migrants who had arrived tended to settle together, 
creating special quarters such as Zeytinburnu, Sefakoy, Aksaray, Kaya Sehir, 
and Selim Pasa in Istanbul or Yasevi in Kayseri. There, residential concentrations 
can also provide networking opportunities for new immigrants. Those with 
professional skills have many opportunities in Turkish society, but Uyghurs 
who do not have qualifications are often trapped in specific labour markets. 
Occupation plays an important role in shaping identity and giving a sense of 
difference. One’s identity may limit or increase not only one’s employment 
opportunities but also one’s social integration.
The interaction between the various communities of Uyghurs has helped 
shape the current concept of a common Uyghur identity. A sense of a unique 
community has begun to dissolve as the younger generations have become 
Turkicized and lost their Uyghur cultural and linguistic identity. They have 
tended to leave their traditional communities seeking accommodation, educa-
tion and employment. For similar economic and professional reasons, since 
the 1960s, many of Turkey’s Uyghurs began immigrating to third countries, 
such as Canada, Holland, and Scandinavia, but primarily to Germany. Para-
doxically, it has been more difficult for them to assimilate and easier to main-
tain their identity in these countries compared to Turkey. Germany has become 
the central outpost and the most important base for promoting the cause of 
East Turkistan independence and Uyghur nationalism. Some of the factors are 
related to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The independence of the 
Central Asian countries, with whom Uyghurs share a common religion, cul-
ture, language and history, created hopes among Uyghurs and contributed to 
 183Uyghur Migration to Turkey and the Usa
their seeking of a greater autonomy or even independence from the PRC. Chi-
na, since the 1990s, has pressured the Turkish government to restrict Uyghur 
national activism as it has become more sensitive to separatist activity within 
its borders. This, combined with growing economic relations between the two 
countries, has dampened Turkey’s enthusiasm in hosting the Uyghur commu-
nity (Shichor 2007). Pro-Uyghur, pro-independence and anti-Chinese govern-
ment mobilization in Turkey has attracted the attention of Chinese authorities, 
and this attention has in turn affected and shaped this mobilization. 
 Since 2009, especially after 2017, China intensified persecution of Uyghurs 
leading to human rights abuses in Xinjiang. Shortly after the mass arrest of 
Uyghur students in Egypt and hundreds of arrests and imprisonment in Tur-
key, Uyghur groups felt the need to move westward again, this time to Europe 
and eventually the United States. All these developments, along with changes 
in communications, contributed to a renewed phase of Uyghur diaspora 
activism. Diaspora members can now share information about news and 
events and coordinate more easily (Brinkerhoff 2006, 31–32, Bernal 2006, 163). 
According to Bernal, the internet is a transnational space where diaspora 
members “produce and debate narratives of history, culture, democracy and 
identity” (Bernal 2006, 161). Thus, the internet has had the capacity to trans-
form the diaspora.
6 Uyghur Diaspora in the United States
During the 1990s, many Uyghurs migrated to the United States. Some of them 
came as students, visiting fellows/researchers and recently came as tourists 
and later sought asylum. Many of them came as political refugees, fearing pro-
longed and ruthless Chinese suppression. The Uyghurs from Turkey and the 
Central Asian region also fled to safer countries like the United States. Many 
Uyghurs in the US have ensconced themselves in middle class America and 
are one of the most educated immigrant groups in the US. Those with limited 
linguistic and professional skills usually work in lower-class, low-wage jobs in 
restaurants, grocery stores, delivery services, drive taxis or work for Uber. The 
majority of Uyghur immigrants are first generation foreign-born and came as 
young singles. Currently, they number around 5,000 to 6,000 and growing. 
They are mostly concentrated in metropolitan areas such as Washington D.C., 
New York, Boston, Los Angeles and San Francisco. First-generation Uyghur 
Americans prefer to live in a Uyghur neighborhood because of language dif-
ficulties. For many unskilled Uyghur immigrant workers, staying in the same 
neighborhood with fellow Uyghurs can provide important advantages for 
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better survival in the “strange land.” Relatives or friends who already live in 
the area may provide them with places to stay and work, thus speeding up the 
process of acculturation.
The Uyghur immigrants in the US have remained attached to their culture, 
which finds expression in the traditional festivals, ceremonies and socio-cul-
tural activities. They remember the two East Turkistan Republic foundation 
days, several incidents such as the 1990 Barin incidents, the 1997 Ghulja dem-
onstration and the 2009 Urumqi riot (Millward 2009). These are seen as pro-
tests to the Chinese government, where Uyghurs were cruelly suppressed, 
hundreds were killed, thousands injured and scores of people were disappeared 
after each event. They also celebrate New Year and religious holidays like 
Ramadan and Qurban Eid and organize a couple of protests in front of the 
Chinese embassy in Washington each year. They engage in traditional Uyghur 
dance theatre, drama, stage shows, and organize picnics and prayers. These 
activities are organized by the Uyghur American Association and the Uyghur 
Human Rights Project in Washington DC., who work along with the World 
Uyghur Congress.
7 Issues and Factors of Religion, Law, Society, Residence and 
Citizenship
7.1 Turkey
As has been mentioned above, Turkey hosts Uyghur separatist activists and 
human rights organizations. Since the mid-1990s, Beijing has been applying 
pressure on Ankara to curb Uyghur separatist activism in Turkey. Beijing has 
used its relations with the Kurds, who claim Turkish territory, to twist Ankara’s 
arm (Kuang Shengyan 1995). Beijing has used an analogy between Uyghurs and 
Kurds, saying that if Ankara continues to support Uyghurs, Beijing will support 
Kurds. When President Jiang Zemin visited Turkey in April 2000, he indicated 
that both countries were faced with the task of protecting national unity and 
territorial integrity and both opposed all kinds of international terrorism, 
national separatism and religious extremism (Si, 2000). 
These days, Turkey hosts thousands of Uyghur refugees and immigrants, but 
their situations are precarious. Aside from those who are citizens, many do not 
have legal or social protection and live on the charity of Turkish people (zakat). 
In pursuit of work and residence permits, they have to deal with various au-
thorities. Many live in constant insecurity, stress and fear, and are forced to 
remain in such a state of limbo for years. Ethnic tensions have clearly increased 
in Xinjiang and this worries Chinese government officials. The Uyghurs (40%), 
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Kazakhs, Kyrgyz and other Turkic groups (15%), who currently make up 55% of 
the population in Xinjiang, are closer culturally and linguistically to Turkish 
people than they are to the Han Chinese. Beijing has planned to combine its 
intensified crackdown of Uyghurs inside Xinjiang with increased pressure on 
them outside Xinjiang, through the Turkish government.
In an interview, one of my informants touched on many of these factors at 
the nexus of law, society, residence and citizenship. He said: 
The Chinese government and investors have an interest in Turkey and 
they have been providing technology and expertise for the development 
of Turkey and they are promising more. One of my friends, who works for 
a Turkish company as a translator, told me that $40–50 billion deals 
(joint funds) have already been made or are being discussed. When the 
Turkish foreign minister visited Beijing this summer he promised to 
restrict all pro-Uyghur activity in Turkey. At the same time, a number of 
Uyghur religious leaders, activists and public figures such as Adukadir 
Yapchan, Canadian citizen Ibrahim Haji, and about a thousand Uyghur 
refugees were arrested and they are in jail now. I do strongly believe that 
Turkey is under pressure from the Chinese government. As Turkey 
receives more economic and technologic assistance from China, there 
will be more pressure on Uyghurs in Turkey. These is no such thing as a 
free lunch... I was kicked out in my last year of medical school in Xinjiang, 
because of my peaceful pro-Uyghur activity. Later, I was able to manage 
to flee from further Chinese persecution in 2000 and I came to Turkey. I 
found a safe haven here in Turkey. I went to medical school in Turkey and 
I earned my degree. Then I worked for a government family care center 
for the last 10 years. I also married and am raising two children in Turkey. 
But now I am nervous and do not feel safe anymore here in Turkey. 
Especially, I don’t see a bright future for my children. So first I planned to 
immigrate to the US or Canada, but based on my knowledge, the US and 
Canada do not accept my medical degree and experiences. It means an 
extremely difficult time for me to find a job there. Later, I learned that it 
will be easy for me to adjust and settle in Europe, especially Germany 
because I can certify my degree and experiences easily and in a short 
time. After all, my family and I decided to immigrate to Germany and we 
have already started the paper work.” (Personal communication, Septem-
ber 4, 2017).1 
1 This informant became a Turkish citizen in 2009, his two children were born as Turkish 
citizens and his wife is an ethnic Uyghur with Chinese citizenship. She applied for Turkish 
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On September 25, 2017, Abdulkadir Tumturuk (Deputy Director of the Uyghur 
association in Kayseri, Turkey) expressed in social media (WhatsApp) that 125 
Uyghurs had been released from jail and the Uyghur scholar and activist Ab-
duwali Ayup (exiled in Turkey for the last two years) expressed in a Facebook 
post that “370 Uyghur are jailed in Turkey, because of terror suspect.” Unoffi-
cially, yet quite obviously, China’s strategy in Turkey is aimed at gaining politi-
cal influence, security guarantees, economic presence and natural resources 
as China has wanted to become one of the main economic powers in Turkey. 
China’s strategy and foreign policy in Turkey is firstly determined by its need to 
consolidate control of “Xinjiang” and restrain the Uyghur independence move-
ment in Turkey. Next in importance is China’s trade and economic investments 
in Turkey, especially its “One Belt, One Road” initiatives. These are not just in-
creasing its influence; they are making Turkey far more reticent to speak out 
about Beijing’s abuses and oppression in Xinjiang. (Gunes, 2019). China’s geo-
economic strategy has resulted in political influence in Turkey that profoundly 
affects its Uyghur population.
7.2 The United States
Religion is the main difference between Turkey and the US for Uyghur immi-
grants. Turkey is a predominantly Muslim country, and the US, a secular coun-
try (but mostly Christian). This obviously colors much of the reception by the 
local population. Many Uyghurs find themselves socially and legally marginal-
ized by United States’ restrictive asylum policies. They cannot lead an indepen-
dent life or plan a future and they are severely restricted in their settlement, 
movement, employment and educational opportunities. In pursuit of work 
and residence permits, they have to deal with various public authorities. Thus, 
many live in constant insecurity, stress and fear, and are forced to remain so for 
years, with the threat of expulsion hanging over their heads. In such a situa-
tion, it is nearly impossible to establish a home in United states and develop a 
sense of national belonging.
In a study of attitudes towards immigrants in America, Canada and Europe 
over the past two decades, Hainmueller and Hopkins looked at two approach-
es, one of political economy and the other of a socio-psychological orienta-
tion. Political economy approaches are characterized as follows: “Frequently 
starting from formal models of immigration’s economic impacts, this theo-
retical approach explains immigration attitudes with reference to native-born 
citizenship in 2016, but she has not yet received any response. He and his family finally 
immigrated to the UK on March 25, 2019 and are now living in London (Personal communica-
tion, March 27, 2019).
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citizens’ individual self-interest” (Hainmueller et al. 2014, 2). By contrast, 
socio-psychological inquiries frequently look at cultural responses based on 
perceived threats to national identity or prejudices generated by local group 
contact. The research shows that a country’s regime policies have important 
implications for the populations’ intolerance of immigrants. In the US, that 
has translated into legal and cultural concepts of citizenship, and the general 
attitude towards immigrants has also become more negative especially since 
the Trump administration. US President Trump has already cut refugee admis-
sions by more than half, from more than 100,000 down to 50,000. In fact, just 
22,491 refugees were resettled in the US in fiscal year 2018, roughly half the 
45,000 cap. The number of Muslim refugees is down by 90 percent since fiscal 
year 2017. Drastic budget cuts and staff layoffs began in 2018 and are expected 
to continue through 2019. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced in Sep-
tember, 2018 that the US would admit no more than 30,000 refugees in fiscal 
year 2019; he also said the lower refugee ceiling would help improve national 
security (Amos, 2018).
However, others have disagreed. Writer, the US homeland security secretary 
from 2005–2009, proposed that, “Cutting refugee admission hurts Americans 
and this would be a mistake. Cutting refugee admission would not only be a 
moral failure but also damage our national interest abroad and our economy” 
(Chertoff, 2017).
Uyghurs acquiring Turkish or US citizenship cannot be taken as an indication 
of a loosening ties to their homeland, East Turkistan. There are two main 
reasons why Uyghurs distinguish between citizenship and national identity. 
The first is that permanent and inborn identities and belongings are consid-
ered more important than those acquired. A second major reason for the non-
identification with the US nation is the strong belief that “natives” will never 
perceive naturalized Uyghurs as being American and continue to identify 
them as “others,” because of, according to Uyghurs, their different physical ap-
pearance, religion and culture. These two reasons are likely to reinforce one 
another. Several scholars (Barnes 2001, 410; Kumar Behera 1999, 76; Valtonen 
1998) suggest that the experience of social exclusion from the mainstream so-
ciety is likely to cause ethnic revitalization and a withdrawal of social and emo-
tional commitment to the host society. 
Meeting America, as some of my respondents express it, has often been the 
first meeting with a democratic system and with political freedom. Meeting 
America has also meant meeting other Uyghur and the Uyghur movement’s 
organizations and institutions. It has also meant opportunities to meet the 
larger world, intensified interactions, identifications as well as differentiations. 
All of my informants appreciated American society very much for the political 
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freedom that they experienced. They also appreciated the possibilities and 
perquisites that society allows them as citizens. However, in the US, they also 
face racism, otherness and an inferior identity as immigrants. A number of in-
formants encountered overt racism and many believe they have fewer chances 
of finding employment and housing. Some informants stressed that at work 
and when they apply for jobs, they experienced disrespect, humiliations, rejec-
tions and blocked opportunities. A number also complained about the United 
States banking system. They stressed that in the United States there is no gov-
ernmental encouragement for citizens to help immigrants. The US banking 
system is based on personal credit history. If an immigrant does not have a 
good history, he cannot get a loan. It takes a long time to develop a credit 
history and, consequently, this makes the lives of immigrants miserable. As 
well, visual religious differences, such as the Muslim headscarf, can also greatly 
influence employment opportunities for immigrant communities. Since 9/11, 
some Uyghur women have faced discrimination when they apply for jobs. The 
feeling of marginalization is probably strengthened by the fact that many 
refugees used to belong to the better-off and educated sections of their country 
of origin. Some respondents believe that foreigners have to work much harder 
and prove themselves more in order to reach the same level as Americans. 
Feelings of not belonging and being different seem to have increased since 
2001 and especially since the current administration.
Men tend to have more contact with formal religious structures and other 
Muslims both in Turkey and the US than women, especially older women, 
since they attend mosques with greater frequency and work outside the home. 
Islam may well offer both a structure within which they can find meaning and 
purpose in their lives, and certain rights and privileges in private life that they 
do not have in public life. Some young women in Turkey and U.S have chosen 
to adopt the hijab, or more “orthodox” veil, which they would not have worn in 
Xinjiang. This is seen as similarly empowering, in that it allows them to project 
the importance of their identity as Muslims and enables them to honour Is-
lamic morality while moving in non-sex-segregated and non-Muslim spaces.
Differences between the generations are undoubtedly exacerbated in the US 
because the younger generation moves with greater ease in the “foreign” land. 
They are generally more proficient in English than their parents, and they 
sometimes act as translators when their parents have to deal with US institu-
tions. They have gone to school and spent more of their formative years in the 
US than their parents. Some of them have non-Uyghur friends (as their parents 
are less likely to), and they are more familiar with technology.
Even those Uyghurs who are not particularly religious, though, still insist 
on the importance of marrying Muslims. For men, and less so for women, 
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marriages are sometimes arranged with Uyghurs outside of the US and occa-
sionally young Uyghur men marry outside the group. Still, there is considerable 
pressure to marry within the community or, at least, to marry another Muslim. 
The most important consideration, perhaps, is the Uyghur fear of losing their 
identity as Muslims, usually expressed as the fear of raising children who are 
“confused” by conflicting religious messages or fear of their children becoming 
“kāfir” (unbelievers). Many Uyghurs said that they believe they will be judged 
guilty and will be punished on judgment day for their children’s “deviant” be-
havior and “sins.”
8 Searching for Identity among the Uyghur Diaspora in Turkey and 
the United States
Uyghur identity-construction spaces are those in which Uyghurness is formed, 
celebrated, and promoted and in which the values of the community are trans-
mitted to the next generations. Uyghur spaces can be seen in five categories: 
cultural, labour/market, residential, institutional, and organizational/political 
spaces. These spaces are not independent of one another, for they all function 
in an interrelated manner to preserve Uyghur identities and to increase the 
power of the Uyghur community in the sociopolitical space. The diversity of 
Uyghur institutions (especially in Turkey) and locations reflects the diversity of 
the community. Although mosques, for example, are important sites for con-
servative Muslims, strict seculars distance themselves from such institutions 
and form their own organizations. Therefore, religion is not only an important 
boundary between Uyghur immigrants in Turkey and the U.S (and the larger 
American culture as well), but also a significant boundary within the Uyghur 
community 
Many Uyghurs are very critical about the images of Muslims and of Islam 
portrayed in the media in the aftermath of 9/11. As non-Western immigrants, 
they are particularly exposed to discrimination and exclusion in American so-
ciety. Besides these problems, the category of forced migrants and exiles suffer 
the traumatic experience of having no access to the places to which they are 
emotionally and socially related. My informants viewed their Uyghur identity 
as inborn and inescapable. This biological inheritance through blood and 
genes must, however, be accompanied with cultural inheritance.
Immigrants are to a large extent pushed back into their own communities 
and therefore do not always have the same relationship towards the “outside.” 
As the “first generation” they have memories, lived experiences, and connec-
tions with a place to which they can relate when they are excluded from the 
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receiving societies, while the “second generation” do not always have these in 
the same way. We are located not only in ethnic categories but also in other 
intersectional categories such as gender, class, generation, lifestyle, origin, his-
tory, nationality, culture, education, sexuality, politics, etc. Uyghur social insti-
tutions include schools, mosques, associations, Uyghur restaurants (both in 
Turkey and the US), social media such as Facebook, WeChat and WhatsApp. 
They function as identity-construction spaces because they provide sites for 
Uyghur’s distinct experiences and expressions of identity. They help Uyghurs 
find a special place in the larger Turkish or American space. These institutions 
represent the Uyghur to “others” and ensure that their voices are heard. Wor-
ship places, churches, synagogues, and mosques, serve as sacred spaces where 
meanings, ethics, and values of a particular nation or culture are transmitted 
through religious discourse and interaction (Barot 1993). As spaces of gather-
ing, sharing, and interacting, they also function to preserve identities and pro-
duce a community based on religion and nationality (Ernst 1987). Places of 
worship provide boundaries of difference to resist the dominant culture and 
celebrate cultural uniqueness. They are territories where a certain degree of 
autonomy is practiced (Barot 1993).
Due to the importance of cultural practices and memories in conceptions of 
Uyghurness, Uyghurs are afraid that their “natural” identity as Uyghur will fade 
away if they do not do the things that make them Uyghur and do not remem-
ber “where they came from.” Children, and young Uyghurs in particular, are 
considered susceptible to change due to their lack of memories of Uyghur so-
ciety. Their exposure to different values and lifestyles has resulted in the older 
generation not considering them to be “real” Uyghur and they themselves of-
ten struggle to define their identity. In their new environment, they begin a 
process of being forced to revalue and negotiate their sense of themselves, 
their experiences and knowledge, in order to orientate themselves and find 
continuity in their identity.
Claims of roots play an important role among the diaspora, but they are 
weakened by the recognition that roots also have had an influence on their 
identity, culture and attachment to territory. Paradoxically, it was these experi-
ences of change, displacement and uncertainties about identity themselves 
that generated the longing to cling to an anchor of roots in the first place.
For diasporic Uyghurs, their identity is formed in direct contact and con-
trast to non-Uyghurs. Practices and beliefs that used to be simply a part of life 
have become conscious symbols of Uyghurness, even if these have had to be 
moderated and adapted to the new environment. To be a Uyghur means be-
longing to a family that has been broken up and scattered all over the world. It 
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means having been displaced from one place to another, and having memories 
of childhood, landscapes, loss and flight.
9 Conclusion
The aim of this study was to explore the experience of Uyghur immigration to 
Turkey and the U.S, in relation to issues of religion, law, society, residence, and 
citizenship. Their experience in Turkey and the US provides a cogent example 
of the complex and contested geographies of home and identity and the 
multiple experiences of displacement. Uyghurs, as refugees, migrants, residents 
and citizens and in liberal Western democracies, have obtained the possibility 
to enjoy general human rights and citizen rights, although in different degrees 
in different countries. In spite of the diversities and differences that divide the 
Uyghur diasporic community, the Uyghur refugees’ relation to Turkey and the 
US can be analyzed within a context where they all encounter Turkish and US 
multiculturalism—which implies on the one hand democracy and tolerance, 
and on the other hand exclusion, inferiority and otherness. Diaspora Uyghurs, 
especially those living in Turkey (depending on government restrictions), the 
US and Europe, have played a major role by their contribution to the 
development of the Uyghur cause by maintaining language and identity. Many 
significant Uyghur cultural and political activities, which do not take place in 
“Xinjiang,” have found a home in exile.
Global migration is an irreversible historical process and is also a component 
of the contemporary global system. However, it challenges the concept of 
citizenship and belonging and demands for adapting to new global conditions. 
Global migration has become an issue of security and is highly political. The 
politics of Turkey and the US are gradually changing in order to encompass this 
shift. Hall claims that a growing number of people “are beginning to think of 
themselves, of their identities and their relationship to culture and to place, in 
more “open” ways” (Hall 1995, 207). I consider it incorrect to focus solely on 
roots and hybridity, because such concepts do not reflect the way that ordinary 
people and nation states themselves think and speak about identity, culture 
and place. A few decades of globalization have not led to the development of 
cosmopolitan hybrids and a post-national world of limitless mobility, but rath-
er to the reinvention of nationalism, boundaries and distinct identities. Immi-
grants are not viewed or treated as equals by the host society. Hence, there is a 
gap between formal and “substantive” citizenship. The social relations between 
refugees or migrants and the rest of society are determined by the position of 
the immigrant “Other” within the global distribution of power and dominance.
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My research has indicated that ideas about an inborn and unchangeable 
identity connected to a certain territory and culture remain very much alive 
among both Uyghur-Turks and Uyghur-Americans. When Uyghurs use 
language about their roots, they refer to a culture that is in their blood, a 
connection to East Turkistan’s holy soil, and they compare East Turkistan with 
a nurturing mother figure. When I speak of roots, I do not mean to say that 
these are naturally and primordially given. Ideas of roots rest upon inventions 
and imaginations. It is important to realize, however, that they appear to be 
natural and authentic in the minds of people. The first generation of Uyghur 
diaspora in Turkey and the US and adults of a young diaspora community are 
still very affected by the Uyghur movement and politics. They have experiences 
of, as well as existing and intense social and emotional bonds to, their “home-
land” and the Uyghur diaspora community. As the “first generation,” they en-
countered much greater difficulties and obstacles in becoming a part of Turkish 
and US society.
Classifying Uyghurs on the basis of national origin as East Turkistan or 
Uyghur reveals nothing about the actual relationships Uyghurs form on the 
ground, where shared language, culture, and especially religion is key, while 
shared national origin is a reminder of historical opposition and persecution. 
In the multicultural landscape of the US, Islam offers a means through which 
Uyghurs can establish themselves in a larger, community of Muslim Americans. 
It is an identity that seeks to assert its independence from forces abroad, one 
that combines the essential elements of Islam and the values of American con-
stitutional democracy.
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Chapter 11
Arab Immigrants under Hindu Kings in Malabar: Ethical 
Pluralities of “Naturalisation” in Islam
Abdul Jaleel P.K.M.
1 Introduction
The process of “naturalisation” by immigrant Muslims in modern nation states 
has often been examined within the light of Islamic legal parameters drawn by 
Muslim scholars in the heartlands of Islam.1 The plethora of legal opinions that 
support naturalisation of Muslims in non-Muslim polities has deliberately 
been ignored to sustain an anti-immigrant fervor in Europe and to reject Mid-
dle Eastern Muslim refugees. The vilifying medieval religious notions of “Dār 
al-Ḥarb” is used to evoke suspicion of Muslim immigrants particularly regard-
ing loyalties to their homeland or to the host country. Against such generaliz-
ing legal opinions, often aired in anti-immigrant campaigns in Europe, this 
chapter reflects some historical anecdotes of naturalisation by Muslims in far-
flung peripheral lands of non-Muslim political settings and examines varying 
but marginalized aspects of critical legal opinions regarding the naturalisation 
of Muslims.
Recent studies show that a majority of Muslim immigrants are easily adap-
tive to European values (for e.g., Haug, Müssig and Stichs 2010; Inglehar and 
Norris 2009) and the ethical doctrines of Islam endorse the grounded princi-
ples of liberal democracy (March 2007).2 Adducing to such ethical debates, the 
historical anecdotes from amicable livelihoods that Arab immigrants nurtured 
in the peripheries such as the Indian Ocean provide better understanding of 
the process of naturalisation in non-Muslim lands. These historical accounts 
counter the tarnished images of Muslim immigrants, demanding a re-think of 
anti-immigrant politics that shut doors against abject refugees. In fact, the 
1 The concept “heartlands of Islam” is geographically assumed as centred around the two cities 
of the Prophet, Mecca and Medina. However, the concept is loosely used in this chapter to 
indicate the entire Arab world in contrast to non-Arab centres of Islamic inhabitancy in 
distant regions of the Indian Ocean.
2 The inherent deep philosophical rift within the liberal Western democracy since the 
Enlightenment is rearticulated by the current anti-immigrant anti-Muslim debates (O’Brien 
2013). 
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question of living and naturalisation under non-Muslim polities loomed large 
among Muslim trading communities who wanted to sojourn or settle in re-
gions far flung from the heartlands of Islam. Centuries prior to the medieval 
re-conquests of Muslim habitats by Christian regimes and the subsequent 
colonization of Muslim lands by Europeans, these traders had traversed waters 
and lands beyond the heartland Arab Muslim localities and domiciled among 
pagan believers in India, Africa, Southeast Asia and among the Buddhists of 
China. The trading communities, along with their indigenous co-religionists, 
participated in the social, economic and political settings of host societies in 
these regions, naturalizing themselves and adapting their religious ethics to 
the cultural and religious settings of the new localities. Living aloof from the 
varied and dynamic experiences of Muslims in these distant non-Muslim pe-
ripheries, medieval Muslim scholars, mostly in the central lands of Islam, often 
demanded their demarcation into distinct ethical abodes of Dār al-Islām and 
Dār al-Ḥarb.3 This chapter offers historical anecdotes of Muslim communities 
in the Indian Ocean to argue that the legal-ethical demarcations of habitats by 
scholars were mostly de-contextualized general assertions removed from the 
real experiences of naturalisation of Muslims and thus Islam in these lands.
The historical anecdotes of naturalisation of Muslim immigrants are mainly 
taken from the sixteenth century anti-Portuguese battle fought jointly by Mus-
lim immigrants and Hindu cavalry under the Hindu kings in Malabar. As ex-
plained below, these historical accounts of the war in Malabar were narrated in 
the Arabic historical texts by indigenous scholars (and in the fatwa compila-
tions such as al-Fatāwa al-Kubrā), but from the central regions of Islam such as 
Mecca and Cairo. While the contextual accounts in Malabar are detailed as 
questions in the fatwa literature, the consideration of contexts was naïve in the 
answers provided by heartland scholars such as Ibn Ḥajar. However, such fat-
was in no way indicate that the scholars of heartlands were completely igno-
rant of the amicable situations in the periphery. Nor does it deny that such 
demarcating scholarly opinions regarding habitats had existed among scholars 
living in the peripheries. Rather, reflecting upon these historical accounts 
3 However, it would not be true to assign exclusively opinions regarding the classification of 
habitats as distinct abodes to scholars in the heartlands of Islam, as the fatwas from the 
heartlands analyzed in this paper recall the significance of peripheral contexts to be taken 
into account in determining the nature of Muslim social lives among non-believers. Regarding 
scholarly opinions on demarcation of abodes into distinct lands, see Abou El Fadl (1994) and 
Al-Judayʿ (2007). The narrow medieval banal demarcations have later on been expanded into 
making these boundaries blurred and making amicable co-existence possible through novel 
concepts such as Dār al-Daʿwa (Abode of mission) and Dār al-ʿAhd (Abode of accord) (Bilici 
2011). 
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against the fatwas issued from heartlands helps to revisit medieval anti-natu-
ralisation fatwas. 
To understand the process of naturalisation—a feature intrinsic to the con-
cept of citizenship in modern nation states—in comparison to medieval his-
torical anecdotes there are certain analytical limitations. First, the modern 
conceptualization of “nation states” and the rights and duties it provides for 
political subjects through the acquisition of citizenship could not be imagined 
fully in sixteenth century provincial kingdoms. Thus, the concept “naturalisa-
tion” in this paper is loosely defined as a socio-political process of engaging in 
local social and political settings—in the present case the sixteenth century 
Hindu kingdoms of Malabar. Likewise, the value-loaded terms of “centre” and 
“periphery” regarding scholarly figures in the region are intentionally used not 
only to indicate the larger Asian scholarly networks that extended from the 
Levant to Southeast Asia and beyond, but also to signify the largely Muslim-
populated yet mostly neglected regions in the study of Islam (Ahmed 2016).
Second, to argue with these historical anecdotes against textual scholarly 
opinions from distant lands requires decisions about what one has to focus 
upon while studying Islam and Muslims as an historical phenomenon: wheth-
er textual traditions or human practices or the integration of both can be seen 
as discursive traditions (Asad 1984), or as a hermeneutical engagement with 
the Pre-Text, Text and Con-text (Ahmed 2016). The process of naturalisation 
that Malabar Muslims achieved historically, despite divergent rulings from the 
heartlands of Islam, was not entirely devoid of textual scholarly legitimation 
produced locally in the region. Conversely, the socio-historical accounts of 
naturalisation under the Hindu Kings in fifteenth and sixteenth century Mala-
bar were compiled by well-known scholars who also had written jurispruden-
tial texts like Fatḥ al-Muʿīn that often accommodated possibilities of living 
under the non-Muslim rulers. The presence of such indigenous textual rulings 
for naturalisation of Muslims provides ample scope for an alternative under-
standing of the process of naturalisation as hermeneutical engagements with 
the Textual forms or as discursive traditions employed. The scholarly rulings of 
heartlands often contradicted writings from peripheries that sought an easy 
naturalisation with distant non-Muslim contexts. These diverse historical ex-
periences from peripheries signify what Shahab Ahmed argued for shifting the 
locus of attention in Islamic studies from the heartlands of Islam to the Bengal-
Balkan peripheries (Ahmed 2016). 
The first part of the chapter discusses the migratory settlement of Arab trad-
ers and the spread of Islam in Malabar along with wider Arab maritime net-
works in the Indian Ocean that not only enabled the spread of diverse religious 
forms but also made trans-regional scholarly exchanges possible. Two 
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historical texts of Tuḥfat al-Mujāhidīn, written for advocating the holy war of 
Jihad against the Portuguese, and Fatḥ al-Mubīn, that celebrates the joint vic-
tory of Muslims and Zamorin’s Hindu cavalry in conquering the Chaliyam fort 
from the Portuguese, will depict the socio-religious and political aspects of 
Muslim naturalisation in sixteenth century Malabar. The historical images 
from these two texts will enhance our understanding of how the community 
became part and parcel of the indigenous polity under the Hindu King Zamo-
rin and how they developed political integrity despite being not under any for-
mal treaty with Hindu Zamorins. 
In the second part, these amicable historical images will be contrasted with 
the fatwas issued from scholars in the heartlands of Islam in Mecca and Egypt. 
These fatwas, written far away from Malabar, were often cast in terms of con-
ventional legal demarcations of lands into separate abodes to prevent moral 
degradation in non-Muslim social realms. While the historical realities in the 
peripheries speak loudly for exemplary naturalisation of Muslims in non-Mus-
lim cultural settings, the scholarly opinions from heartlands often vitiated 
such historical realities into relegating the land and its non-Muslims into the 
category of Ḥarbīs. 
2 Arab Immigrants under Hindu Kings 
Due to its geographic significance in East-West trade and the natural spices it 
produced, the region of Malabar on the west coast of India (now Kerala) had 
been receiving maritime people of different religions and cultures for centu-
ries (Arasaratnam 2004, 33–39; Gupta 2001; Bouchon 1987, Abu Lughod 1989). 
The earliest treatise of Qiṣṣat Shakrawat Fermāḍ that tells the story of the com-
ing of Islam to Malabar names a delegation under the aegis of Mālik ibn Dīnār, 
who approached the local Hindu king for a place to settle down and estab-
lished a number of mosques in different parts of Malabar (Qiṣṣa, n.d., 10). De-
spite being the delegates of the converted king who demised while returning 
from Mecca, this missionary did not seek any political share in the territories 
of the old king. Instead, settling in the territories of local Hindu kings, the mis-
sionary became part and parcel of the local social setting by becoming involved 
in social, political and commercial activities. The missionary appointed mem-
bers of the Muslim community as Shabandars or port leaders in various re-
gions of Malabar (ibid., 10–13) and enriched seaborne trade profits by acting as 
agents for Arab-speaking maritime traders. Since the community accepted the 
prevailing political orders of Zamorins, Muslims such as the Kunjali Marakkars 
were bestowed with high positions including “admiral of the navy” (Nambiar 
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1863). Thus, through whole-hearted participation in the economic and social 
activities, they became naturalized into their host Malabari society. Develop-
ing certain geographies as centres of Muslim habitation through the establish-
ment of mosques was another significant step to develop an indigenous 
community in the region. With the support and involvement of local Hindu 
rulers, the missionary built eleven mosques across the coast of Malabar (Qiṣṣa, 
n.d., 9–13). Thus, from the early centuries of Islam, a distinct Muslim commu-
nity was developed within Malabar. At the same time, they emerged as strong 
defenders of the existing political system of the Hindu kings. 
As will be seen in the texts below written in Malabar, the Hindu rulers 
treated their Muslim subjects with dignity and ensured a social environment 
that enabled them to perform their religious duties. Muslims adopted their 
Hindu rulers as legitimate holders of law. The scholars in Malabar gave legi-
timacy to the qāḍīs appointed by non-Muslim political authorities. This might 
be explained in terms of “ḍarūra” or political and economic necessity where 
Muslims and their Hindu political rulers cooperated with reciprocity for mu-
tual benefit. The legal recognition rendered by the indigenous scholars in Mal-
abar provides an interesting outlook in understanding the process of 
naturalisation of Muslims in non-Muslim lands. However, this does not mean 
that communal harmony permanently prevailed in Malabar following the 
Arab settlement; nor did it negate the political and economic relations of Mal-
abari Muslims with other Muslim rulers in the far-flung areas. For example, the 
Rasulid court ledgers in 1290 show that the khaṭībs (those responsible for deliv-
ering sermons and leading prayers, i.e. imams) in the nine mosques of Malabar 
received stipends from the Rasulid rulers in Yemen (Lambourn 2008; Prange 
2008, 208–213). The Rasulid ledgers also contain a letter sent by Muslims in 
Calicut to the then Rasulid Sultan al-Ashraf II in 1393 requesting his permis-
sion to recite his name in the Friday khuṭba of Calicut (al-Khazrajī 1911, 244–7; 
Prange 2008, 213–5).
These attempts to seek affiliation in khuṭbas with the Rasuild Sultans of 
Aden, though seemingly political, were more framed for the commercial bene-
fits of traders in Aden and Calicut than forging political affiliations with dis-
tant lands (Prange 2008, 215; Lambourn 2008, 82). This observation can be 
substantiated with the request of Zamorin himself through his emissary sent 
to Timurid, prior to ʿAbd al-Razzāq’s visit to Calicut in 1442, to recite Timurid 
Sultan’s name in khuṭbas in his region (Thackston 1989, 304). Prange explains 
that this might also have been initiated by some unofficial influential mer-
chants in Calicut, for trade benefits from the Timurids. These merchants also 
proposed to the Sultan that Zamorin would convert if they sent a suitable am-
bassador, a futile task carried out by ʿAbd al-Razzāq (Prange 2008, 215–7). 
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Generally, however, the Muslim inhabitancy in the region was cordial since the 
community pursued amicable naturalisation with the local Hindu society and 
other inhabitants in the cosmopolitan city of Calicut, along with other com-
munities such as Buddhist Chinese, Jews and Christians.
Malabar was a peaceful multi-cultural cosmopolitan society before the ad-
vent of the Portuguese, who introduced a Mediterranean style of trade along 
with war (Chaudhuri 1985, 64; Ho 2004, 215; Gupta 2001, 423). As Geniza re-
cords indicate, out of sixteen ship owners in Malabar, seven belonged to Mus-
lims, three to Jews and four to Indians (Goitein 2008, 142–8). Such a harmonious 
state of affairs in Malabar is well depicted by the Moroccan traveller Ibn Baṭūṭa 
in the early half of the fourteenth century, when Calicut was maintaining its 
maritime zenith in the Indian Ocean. Despite Ibn Baṭūṭa’s analysis of religious 
scholarly engagements of Muslims in the regions, his description of the social 
and commercial state of affairs provides light into the nature of peaceful Mus-
lim settlement in Malabar. For example in Mangalore, where Muslims num-
bered about four thousand, he narrates that inter-communal issues were 
mediated by the Hindu ruler Ramdev (Ibn Baṭūṭa 1905, 137). He was also keen 
to note the warm reception Muslims and other maritime players received in 
the region. When he reached Calicut, Ibn Baṭūṭa noted that Qulaj, the deputy 
of the King, welcomed him and that he enjoyed hosting the Hindu ruler for 
around three months until his departure for China (ibid., 139–41). In the north-
ern town of Eli (Ezhimala), a masjid (mosque) was revered by both Muslims 
and non-Muslims, with votive offerings made by all sea voyagers. The income 
for this Masjid was spent as stipends for students who studied in the mosque 
and as food for visitors and poor Muslims (ibid.). The next town of Dharama-
dam, ruled by the Hindu ruler Kolathiri Raja, had a mosque where notables of 
Muslims and non-Muslims sat together under its revered tree, expecting its 
leaf written with the name of God and the Prophet Muhammad. While half of 
the leaf was for Muslims, the other half was kept in the treasury of the local 
Hindu ruler for healing purposes (Ibn Baṭūṭa 1905, 138). These narratives by the 
Moroccan traveller indicate the warmth of inter-communal relations and indi-
genization that Muslims adopted under non-Muslim rulers of the Malabar 
coast.
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3 Tuḥfat al-Mujāhidīn and Fatḥ al-Mubīn: Two Texts Celebrating 
Naturalisation 
Tuḥfat al-Mujāhidīn, the well-known sixteenth century history text written by 
Shaykh Zayn al-Dīn al-Makhdūm al-Maʿbarī, depicts vivid aspects of naturali-
sation that Malabari Muslims achieved under the non-Muslim Zamorins. 
Tuḥfa clearly mentions the Muslim community in Malabar as subjects of non-
Muslim rulers and their ruler Zamorin as the one who loves Muslims (Nainar 
2005, 15; al-Maʿbarī, n.d., 9). The text, written as an inspiration to wage religious 
Jihad against the Portuguese, describes the strange customs of Hindu non-be-
lievers in an entire chapter (Nainar 2005, 36–46; al-Maʿbarī, n.d., 26–34; al-
Maʿbarī 1931, 18–22). The broader ethnographic and historical picture of Hindu 
society and customs in Tuhfa paints a civic, multicultural and peaceful urban 
society under attack by the Portuguese (Ho 2004, 222–3). Tuḥfa also wonder-
fully exclaims the fair treatment of Muslims by the Hindu Zamorin stressing 
that the remunerations for the Muslim religious judges and prayer leaders 
were borne by the Hindu king. He made arrangements for implementing their 
own Muslim religious laws. Those neglecting the Friday prayer were punished 
or made to pay a fine (Nainar 2005, 45–6).
Al-Makhdūm al-Ṣaghīr, who also wrote many jurisprudential works such as 
the famous Fatḥ al-Muʿīn and other scholarly works in Sufism and Arabic lan-
guage, was keen to note in Tuḥfa that the legitimate rulers of Malabari Muslims 
were Hindus who enjoyed their judicial and political authority. “Muslims 
throughout Malabar have no leader possessed of power to rule over them. But 
their rulers are Hindus, who exercise judicial authority and organize their af-
fairs by enforcing payment of debt or fine if anyone is subjected to such a pay-
ment” (Nainar 2005, 45). The jurisdictional executions made by non-Muslim 
rulers were also legitimized by Muslim scholars and their community. Tuḥfa 
makes it clear that the death penalty of a Muslim offender was to be carried 
out by the Hindu ruler, while others were handed over to Muslims for their 
ritual punishments. Tuḥfa also illuminates other inter-communal relations 
and social etiquette. For example, the people of other communities would not 
enter a Muslim house without seeking permission, even if they search for a 
wanted criminal; and those who converted to Islam were treated with equal 
respect, even if they were from the lower castes (ibid., 46). 
There were also socio-economic and political reasons behind the earnest 
naturalisation showed by Muslims under the Zamorins of Calicut. As Tuhfa 
observes, it was thanks to Muslims that the construction and development of 
the country largely took place. The text explicates this reciprocal amicable so-
cio-political and economic scenario: while the Arab traders brought prosperity 
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to the region, the Hindu rulers, in turn, facilitated and protected Arabs’ com-
mercial and religious activities (ibid., 45–6). This mutual reciprocity that Arabs 
and Hindu rulers developed in Malabar was not perceived by scholars like al-
Makdūm al-Ṣaghīr as a part of the jurisdictional necessity of “ḍarūra.” Rather, 
Tuḥfa introduces the entire region as an abode of Islam despite being under a 
Hindu ruler. The dynamic approach of regional scholars in Medieval Malabar, 
who recognized the real living conditions in the region, is helpful in under-
standing the naturalisation of Muslims in modern nation states also, where 
they have become increasingly exposed to non-Muslim contexts. 
Like Ṭuḥfat al-Mujāhidīn, the amicable living conditions of Muslims under 
the Hindu rulers were celebrated in another historical poem, Fatḥ al-Mubīn, 
composed by a contemporary scholar from Calicut, Qāḍī Muḥammad al-
Kalikūtī (d. 1616). Qāḍī Muḥammad’s poetic and other scholarly works dis-
course a number of disciplines such as Sufism, Shāfiʿī jurisprudence and Arabic 
grammar. Thus, he also can be reckoned among one of the renowned scholars 
of the time who lent a dynamic approach to the process of naturalisation in 
Malabar. The Arabic poem Fatḥ al-Mubīn that generously celebrates the friend-
ly co-existence of different communities under the Zamorins was written pri-
marily to advise the Muslim rulers in other regions of the world not to succumb 
to the Portuguese invasion. The poem tells the stunning story of conquering 
the Chaliyam fort in Malabar from the Portuguese in a year-long battle in 1571, 
fought by the joint army of Muslims and the Nayar cavalry of Zamorin. Qāḍī 
Muḥammad wanted to convey the joyful news of victory to remind the Muslim 
rulers like ʿAlī ʿĀdil Shah of Bijapur (who retreated and made treaties with the 
Portuguese) that a non-Muslim ruler (Zamorin) had conquered the Chaliyam 
fort for the cause of Islam. He spent all his wealth for this cause, while Muslim 
rulers in distant lands were indulging in luxurious life, forgetting all their re-
sponsibilities (al-Kalikūtī, n.d., 2).
The poem is entitled “The Opulent Victory for Zamorin, the one who loves 
Muslims” (ibid., 1). The character of the king as a sympathiser with Muslims is 
repeated at the beginning of the poem that goes on to describe the king’s ad-
miration for Muslim subjects and fair arbitrations in Malabar. Like Tuḥfa, the 
poem Fatḥ al-Mubīn also calls Muslims in Malabar as the subjects of Zamorin 
wherever they are (ibid., 3). Boasting that the Muslim port leader or Shahban-
dar is honoured with the prestigious chance of standing at the right side of the 
king in the royal festival of Mamankam, the poem exclaims that Muslims were 
politically naturalized and totally reliable subjects of Zamorin. Fatḥ’s descrip-
tion regarding the king’s choice of Muslims as his naval chiefs reiterates the 
level of naturalisation Muslims made in the region. Calling the community of 
Muslims as Zamorin’s beloved subjects, the text appealed to the community to 
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pray for the betterment of all the king’s matters. His staunch support for a non-
Muslim king is that Zamorin did fight for the sake of Muslims while other Mus-
lim rulers gave in to political treaties with the Portuguese (ibid., 4–5).
The poem moves on with the narrative of the Portuguese incursion into 
Malabar, their attempt to build a fort at Cochin and the atrocities they inflicted 
upon local inhabitants, especially on Muslims. When the Portuguese attack 
became unbearable, Zamorin with inspiration from his Muslim subjects 
sought assistance from Sultans in the far-flung regions of Sumatra, Bijapur and 
Hyderabad. Receiving no positive reply, Zamorin was compelled to cordon off 
the Chaliyam fort. The local Muslim community joined the movement under 
their local leaders, such as Sīdī Aḥmad al-Kumāmī, ʾUmar al-ʿAntābī, ʿAbd 
al-ʿAzīz al-Makhdūm al-Maʿbarī, Sufi Shaykh ʿAbd al-Wafā Shams al-Dīn 
Muḥam mad (d. 980 A.H.), and the naval admiral Kunhāli Markkār. Among the 
flamboyant narratives of the war zone are cordial inter-communal relations 
bounding two distinct local communities, as both observed separate ritual 
prayers for the victory in war at their respective religious centres. Muslims 
made votive offering to the mosques of Mecca and Medina, invoked chants 
from the Qurʾan and supplicated Shaykhs. Hindus brought their astrologists 
and prayed to their idols for victory. The dignity Zamorin bestowed upon Mus-
lims is obvious, as the poem quotes him comparing the loss of one Muslim in 
battle to the loss of ten non-Muslims (al-Kālikūtī 1996, 68). Likewise, when the 
joint army completely vanquished the fort, Zamorin allocated a part of the 
booty to repair the mosque demolished by the Portuguese army (ibid., 69).
Why are such aspects of Muslim naturalisation under the Hindu ruler being 
celebrated in a poem addressed to Muslim rulers in faraway regions? Utilizing 
the vivid pictures of honourable treatment of Muslims by the Hindu king in 
Malabar, the poem seeks to remind the Muslim rulers of their political duties 
which they default due to selfish living habits. It also shows that a local Muslim 
community would be ready to accept a non-Muslim ruler if he renders justice 
and respect to the community and helps them to fulfil their religious obliga-
tions. It proclaims that a just non-Muslim ruler committed to the cause of his 
subjects is better than an unjust Muslim ruler and that the non-Muslim Zamo-
rin had spent his treasury for the sake of a harmonious society (al-Kālikūtī 
1996, 74–5). 
The above two texts that provide vivid pictures of amicable naturalisation 
enjoyed by Muslims under the non-Muslim lands were written by two indige-
nous scholarly figures; Shaykh Zayn al-Dīn al-Makhdūm al-Ṣaghīr of Ponnāni 
and Qāḍī Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz (d. 1616) of Calicut. Despite the rich 
historical countenance these texts provided, the religious and ethical values 
mainly regarding the social and political localization that the Malabari Muslim 
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community maintained under non-Muslim rulers cannot be ignored, because 
the authors of both texts were renowned jurists and erudite scholarly figures in 
a number of religious sciences. The author of Tuḥfa is a famous scholar re-
nowned for his magnum opus, the Shāfiʾī jurisprudential work, Fatḥ al-Muʿīn, 
which has been taught and accepted widely across the Indian Ocean. The sec-
ond author was a legal jurist based in Calicut who adorned the post of qāḍī 
under the Zamorin. He wrote not only the famous Sufi text of Muhyiddīn Māla 
but also fiqhī texts like Maqāṣid al-Nikāḥ. Despite their expertise in various Is-
lamic disciplines, they did not record any dissenting note on the political and 
social naturalisation of Muslims in Malabar. These scholars vindicated the un-
conditional support to non-Muslim Zamorin and declared the naturalisation 
under him as a necessity for the Muslim community’s survival. Rather than 
bringing the conventional legal classification of abodes of Islam and war and 
related polemics, they assumed Malabar as a peaceful place for Islam and Mus-
lims. They recognized the serious political and economic precariousness of the 
community in the region, while scholars in the heartlands invoked the general 
polemics of abodes without delving into the contextual practical necessities.
4 Countering Fatwas
Against the viewpoint of indigenous scholars of Malabar favouring naturalisa-
tion under the Zamorin non-Muslim rulers, scholars such as Ibn Ḥajar al-
Haytamī of Mecca cast contrasting scholarly fatwas from the heartlands of 
Islam. From the scholarly centres of Mecca and Cairo to the peripheries of the 
Indian Ocean, Muslim scholars reified a rampant religious network of scholar-
ship. They connected the regions of the Indian Ocean to the heartlands of Is-
lam, where scholars, students, shaykhs and disciples travelled, visited and 
exchanged ideas and goods.4 These maritime networks enabled students and 
scholars in the distant peripheries such as Malabar to connect with scholarly 
stalwarts based in the heartlands of Islam. Such trans-regional connections of 
Malabari students with erudite scholars in Mecca and Cairo are praised in lo-
cal historical and biographical texts such as the brief biography of al-Makhdūm 
4 For a seminal study of the Indian Ocean scholarly networks see Azra (1999). The application 
of Braudelian perspective in the study of the Indian Ocean brought a chunk of literature from 
Chaudhuri (1985), McPherson (1993), Pearson (2003) and a number of studies based on dia-
sporic communities such as the Hadramis. See Freitag and Clarence-Smith (1999), Freitag 
(2003), Boxberger (2002), Bang (2003) and Ho (2006).
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al-Kabīr (d. 1522) in Maslak al-Atqiyāʾ (al-Maʿbarī, n.d., 2–3).5 Maslak mentions 
Yemeni, Egyptian and Meccan scholars among the teachers of al-Kabīr. Besides 
Fakhr al-Dīn bin Ramaḍān al-Shāliyāthī of Malabar, Makhdūm al-Kabīr stud-
ied with Yemenis such as Shaykh Aḥmad Shihāb al-Dīn ʿUthmān bin Ab al-Ḥill 
al-Yamanī in Ḥadīth and Fiqh, with Egyptians such as ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-
Adamī al-Miṣrī, Shams al-Dīn al-Jawjarī (d. 1484), Shaykh Zakariyya al-Anṣārī 
(d.1520/926), the author of Fatḥ al-Bārī, and with Shaykh Kamāl al-Dīn Mu-
hammad bin Abu Sharīf (d. 1500/905) (ibid.).
Since these maritime connections with the distant peripheries were 
flourishing, issues of the peripheries such as Malabar must have been known 
to scholars in the central lands. However, these scholarly networks often failed 
in assessing the real contextual situations in the peripheries, mainly due to the 
geographical remoteness and communication difficulties. Thus, fatwas issued 
by scholars in the central Arab knowledge centres were articulated in strict le-
gal terms, without delving deeper into the real social and political contexts 
existing in far-flung non-Muslim settlements. For example, on the issue of nat-
uralisation, while indigenous scholars encouraged a gradual and complete 
naturalisation process in Malabar, the edicts from the centres were mostly con-
cerned about the socio-political degradation caused by settlement in non-
Muslim polities. The indigenous scholars imagined an Islam suitable to the 
local ecological and social contexts, while scholars of the centres dealt with 
the monolithic, universal and distinctive Islam that they were acquainted with 
in the Arabic heartlands. 
The text we take, as a case for analysis is a collection of scholarly opinions of 
fatwas by Ibn Ḥajar al-Haytamī of Mecca (d.1566), entitled as al-Fatāwa al-
Fiqhiyya al-Kubrā. Born in Cairo, Ibn Ḥajar moved to Mecca after his gradua-
tion from al-Azhar to develop the city, under his tutelage, as a renowned 
knowledge centre of the sixteenth century, recognizing the social and political 
significance it assumed with the Ottoman ascension (Kooria 2016). The text, 
compiled by his disciple ʿAbd al-Ra⁠ʾūf al-Wāʿiẓ al-Zamzamī (d.1568) contains a 
number of questions raised by various contemporaries with answers provided 
by Ibn Ḥajar. Malabar is mentioned in about twenty cases where its ecology, 
trees, language, inter-communal issues, insects, war booties shared with non-
Muslims, trade activities and gender issues are discussed in detail. 
Among many questions raised to Ibn Ḥajar in al-Fatāwa al-Fiqhiyya al-Kubrā, 
a number of issues are related to migratory settlement and naturalisation 
5 The trans-regional connections of al-Makhdūm al-Ṣaghīr, the author of Tuḥfa, are detailed in 
the brief introduction provided in Maslak and can be inferred from his frequent mentioning 
of the phrase “Our Shaykh Ibn Ḥajar” in Fatḥ al-Muʿīn (al-Shafiʿī 2006).
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under non-Muslims in Malabar. For example, under the general questions 
about booty from battles where it is assumed that war booties would not be 
distributed according to the recommendations of Shariʿah, a sub-question was 
raised specifically about the non-Muslim rulers of Malabar who helped Mus-
lims implement their religious duties, acknowledging that the development of 
that country was generated by the maritime trade activities of Muslims. It was 
argued that although there was no written or oral treaty between Muslims and 
their non-Muslim rulers, the Muslims lived as their subjects; they resided in 
their territories and built cordial relations with other communities. After this 
explanation, the final question was whether these friendly non-Muslims are 
ḥarbīs who ought to be fought or not? The answer given by Ibn Ḥajar was: “the 
above mentioned non-Muslims are ḥarbis. However, transactions with interest 
or duping them in weight or size is not permitted” (al-Haytamī n.d. vol. 4, 245).
The answer regarding friendly non-Muslims of Malabar as ḥarbis might be 
suitable to the conventional legal criteria as the region kept non-Islamic laws 
and remains without written or verbal contracts with non-Muslim communi-
ties (Mawsūʿa 1990, 201–219). However, the term “ḥarbi” was in contradiction to 
the indigenous scholars of Malabar who wrote of the Malabari kings and non-
Muslim communities as friendly rulers and fellow co-citizens. They introduced 
themselves explicitly as the naturalized subjects of Hindu Zamorin. The an-
swer given from the centre was a more generalized demarcation of ḥarbi and 
dhimmī. It did not consider the possibilities of mutual faith and the informal 
accord that Muslim trading communities and indigenous Muslims in Malabar 
invested in the non-Muslim political system. The real socio-political dignity 
that Muslims enjoyed in Malabar and the forms of naturalisation about which 
the indigenous scholars depicted in their aforementioned historical works, 
such as Tuḥfa and Fatḥ al-Mubīn, also have to be taken into account while cat-
egorizing the Muslim settlements into distinct abodes. 
However, it is noteworthy that the scholars in Malabar did not always cate-
gorize non-Portuguese as friendly non-ḥarbis. Many questions raised in al-
Fatāwa al-Kubrā by Malabar scholars introduced non-Muslim Malabaris as 
ḥarbis.6 Likewise, the scholars of the centre were not always blindly refusing 
the possibility that Malabari non-Muslims could be included as non-ḥarbis. 
For example, a question in al-Ajwiba al-ʿAjība, asked by Shaykh Zayn al-Dīn al-
Makdhūm in Malabar, introduced the non-Muslim Malabari debtor as ḥarbi, 
while the replying scholar, Ibn Ḥajar of Mecca, included the chance of the 
debtor being a dhimmī also. The question was: 
6 For example, see the question raised from Malabar: is it allowed to join one of the battle sides 
if a battle is going on between two groups of ḥarbis (al-Haytamī n.d. vol. 2: 25).
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One of the ḥarbis is owed an amount to a Muslim and the custom among 
non-Muslims of Malabar is that they inherit property through matrilineal 
side, from aunts to children of sisters. Is it allowed for this Muslim to in-
cur the debt from such inheritors and to procure it by force or not? If it is 
allowable, is the creditor eligible to demand an oath if they would deny 
leaving any inheritance by the demised debtor? The answer provided by 
our Shaykh ibn Ḥajar is: if they are ḥarbis the creditors can own whatever 
they conquer. Also, their repayment of debt and other transactions are 
legal. If they are dhimmīs it is not allowed to take more than what they 
owe to the Muslim. (al-Ṣaghīr n.d., 1–60) 
The answer by Ibn Ḥajar does not consider an option other than the usual 
ḥarbi and dhimmī. In another answer, Ibn Ḥajar recommends not to flee Mala-
bar to protect a new convert Muslim from his non-Muslim master. He suggests 
that if Muslims fail to protect their fellow believer or if sheltering the new con-
vert would imply that Muslims should leave their homes, they should not give 
him shelter (al-Haytamī, n.d. vol. 4, 249).
The previous question in al-Fatāwa al-Kubrā on booties in Malabar provides 
the possibility to consider non-Muslim rulers of Malabar beyond the conven-
tional binary of ḥarbi or dhimmī. In that question, the fatwa seeker introduced 
the Zamorin kings as assisting rulers and their non-Muslim subjects as friendly 
co-subjects who help Malabari Muslims even in their religious activities, de-
spite the absence of formal treaties between them. The question also reiterates 
that the Malabari Muslims consider themselves as subjects of this friendly 
ruler Zamorin—a stand that was demonstrated by most local scholars such as 
al-Makhdum al-Ṣaghīr in his Tuḥfa and Qāḍī Muḥammad al-Kālikūtī in his 
Fatḥ al-Mubīn (Nainar 2005, 15; al-Maʿbarī, n.d. 9; al-Kālikūtī, n.d., 3). In Fatḥ 
al-Mubīn, it was explained that the meeting led by Muslim scholars such as 
ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz al-Makhdūm al-Maʿbarī, Sufi Shaykh ʿAbd al-Wafā Shams al-Dīn 
Muḥammad (d. 980 A.H.), the Muslim merchants and leaders such as Sīdī 
Aḥmad al-Kumāmī and ʿUmar al-ʿAntābī and the naval admiral Kunhāli 
Markkār had lent support to Zamorin in his military attempt to conquer the 
Chaliyam fort from the Portuguese (al-Kālikūtī, n.d., 28–29).
The Malabari scholars, in the early question, did provide the option of hav-
ing treaties with non-Muslim rulers—a condition considered in another po-
litical category of Dār al-ʿAhd (the abode of accord). When a formal treaty is 
ratified, the abode of war moves to the abode of treaty (Verskin 2013, 12). Since 
there was no treaty with Malabar’s non-Muslim rulers, the land of Malabar 
cannot be included in the abode of accord as the above fatwa in al-Fatāwā al-
Kubrā suggests. However, the early jurists like al-Māwardī (d. 1050) attempted 
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to mitigate the contrast between abode of Islam and abode of war by opining 
that the difference is not based upon one ruled by Muslim or non-Muslim. For 
him, like many of the later scholars such as Ibn Ḥajar al-Haytamī himself, the 
land ruled by non-Muslims also come under the category of abode of Islam 
provided that Muslims are permitted to publicly practice their religious rituals 
(Abou El Fadl 1994, 150). Ibn Ḥajar, the author of al-Fatāwā, like his predeces-
sor Shafiʿī scholars, considered staying in Dār al-Kufr as recommended as long 
as his stay would help the religion (Sharawanī and al-ʿAbbadī, n.d., 9, 268–9). 
Such a fluid category of abode of Islam, like the later category of abode of 
missionary (Dār al-Daʿwa), was also legally possible in the non-Muslim region 
of Malabar. But these categories were absent from the fatwa asked by the indig-
enous scholars and answered by heartland experts. Why did the indigenous 
scholars of Malabar omit such viable options, even after they acknowledged 
the ruler as very friendly and helpful by implementing Islamic religious laws? 
Did it indicate that they were yet to accept full naturalisation under the Hindu 
Zamorin? Or was it because such fluid categories were not broad enough to be 
applied in distant lands? A profound answer to such questions seems difficult 
here. However, since fatwas usually address particular issues raised by the fat-
wa seeker, the fatwa answers cannot be generalized to other contexts. Despite 
these scholarly polemical debates regarding the abode of land, it is clear that 
the Muslims of Malabar historically continued making amicable settlements 
as subjects of non-Muslim Zamorins.
Reading the historical accounts and fatwas together explains that although 
there had been scholarly polemics about the character of naturalisation of 
Muslims under the Hindu Zamorin, the indigenous Muslims were ready to be-
come part of the non-Muslim Malabari settings, even fighting for its political 
stability. While the questions asked by scholars from Malabar often recognized 
the political and social significance of a friendly non-Muslim ruler, the scholars 
from the centre insisted they were ḥarbīs, disregarding the amicable socio-po-
litical conditions that existed in Malabar. Although indigenous scholars from 
Malabar had used the “ḥarbi” category to indicate particular anti-community 
figures in other questions, they had assumed a pragmatic political position 
of complete naturalisation under Zamorin. The indigenous scholars such as 
Shaykh al-Makhdūm al-Ṣaghīr provided legitimacy even for the religious judges 
appointed by the Hindu king, Zamorin. Al-Ṣaghīr writes that “if a Sultan, even 
if he is a non-Muslim, appoints an ineligible judge it would be legal” (al-Ṣaghīr 
2000, 215). The clause “even if the Sultan is non-Muslim” was unprecedented 
in the earlier parent texts such as Tuḥfat al-Minhāj of Ibn Ḥajar al-Ḥaytamī, of-
fering a political legitimacy to a non-Muslim ruler’s appointments in religious 
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matters of Islam. By endowing religious legitimacy for appointments of qāḍīs 
made by a non-Muslim ruler, the scholars like Zayn al-Dīn accepted the non-
Muslim political system for his fellow Muslims in Malabar. Such particular is-
sues discussed in Fatḥ al-Muʿīn regarding the non-Muslim contexts made the 
text more acceptable in the peripheries of the Indian Ocean (Kooria 2016).
5 Conclusion
Abou El Fadl (1994) has outlined how the scholarly positions in determining 
territories as distinct abodes of Islam and non-Islam have changed over 
centuries according to historical junctures that the Muslim community faced. 
It was in the wake of the Mongol invasion of Baghdad that the Shāfiʿis reached 
a position that Muslim territories remain as an abode of Islam even after it was 
conquered by non-Muslims (ibid., 183–5). The above historical pictures that 
shed light on the economic, political and social conditions in the peripheries 
such as Malabar, where non-Muslim settings were amicably absorbed by 
Muslims, must also be examined along with the legal texts while we analyse 
the issues of migration and naturalisation of Muslims.
The analysis of the legal and historical texts produced in the peripheries like 
Malabar shows that Muslims in the region unequivocally wanted to become a 
part of the indigenous local settings under the Hindu Zamorins. While indige-
nous Malabari scholars gave due attention to the actual socio-political circum-
stances, the scholarly discussions in the heartlands mostly overlooked such 
contexts, sliding into the binary categories of peace and war. The Malabari 
scholars, through their historical texts, conveyed that the Muslim community 
in Malabar not only had considered themselves as subjects of the Hindu king 
and enjoyed dignified political positions under the Zamorins but they had also 
fought Holy Jihad under the Hindu king against the Portuguese invaders. The 
entire leadership of the Muslim community, from affluent merchants to schol-
ars and Sayyids, had lined up in the forefront of the Chaliyam battle, when 
both Muslims and Zamorins’ Nayar army joined together to conquer the Chal-
iyam fort. Such a particular political and social setting fetched unprecedented 
legal challenges that induced indigenous scholars to think distinctively to en-
able their religious lives under Hindus, rather than invoking the traditional 
categories of abodes. That is why Malabaris asked the scholars in the heart-
lands whether these friendly rulers were ḥarbīs as they did not made any 
 formal accord with Zamorins. The scholars in Malabar transcended such 
demar cations into making Islam suitable to the particular context that they 
happened to live. Therefore, unlike the early jurisprudential texts, we see that 
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Fath al-Muʿīn written by a Malabari scholar legitimized the religious judges ap-
pointed by non-Muslim rulers. The particular contexts and questions he ad-
dressed in this jurisprudential text were an attempt to reconceptualise Islamic 
lives according to the distinctive social political and ecological situations of 
non-Muslim settings.
Therefore, the above historical accounts of ardent socio-political and econo-
mic participation played by Arab traders and their Malabari co-religionists un-
der the Hindu Zamorins in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries not only 
vitiates the pure legal ethical demarcation of habitats into distinct abodes but 
also urges for a process of naturalisation by reformulating Islamic life-worlds 
appropriately to the local socio-political and cultural settings. The Muslim im-
migrants and indigenous scholars in the peripheries like Malabar recon-
ceptualised Islamic life worlds into conducive inter-subjective realms that 
enabled their earnest political, economic and social participation in non-Mus-
lim habitats. The legitimacy that the local scholars gave to the political ap-
pointments made by the Hindu kings in the region was one significant step of 
the community being indigenized. Such a naturalisation of Muslims and Islam 
through these immigrants granted the religion the potential to grow with vivid 
and diverse forms.
With the increasing number of refugees and other Asian communities in 
western countries, the question regarding the process of naturalisation by 
Muslim immigrants in secular nation states looms large. Sadly, in order to re-
tain an anti-immigrant tendency, the legal scholarly articulations emerged in 
the heartlands that have lesser historical experience of non-Muslim settings 
often dominate the debates. The historical accounts such as the one brought 
above from the peripheries like Malabar often skip the conventional scholarly 
attention with their focus on Arab Islam. Shahab Ahmed signifies peripheral 
societies of his Bengal to Balkan complex as “in a post-formative stage of being 
Muslim,” where Muslims are able to strike out for new constructions, trajecto-
ries and expressions of what it means to be Muslim (Ahmed 2016, 81). Although 
the pre-modern historical challenges and the consequent scholarly responses 
analyzed above would not be able to adequately resolve the tensions in the 
naturalisation process of current modern secular nations, the dynamic images 
from the periphery give supple threads to approach the process of naturalisa-
tion quite distinctively from the Euro-centric anti-immigrant viewpoints. 
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al-Kālikūtī, Qāḍī Muḥammad ibn Qāḍī ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz. n.d. Qaṣīda Fatḥ al-Mubīn li al-
Sāmirī al-ladhī Yuḥibbu al-Muslimīn. Manuscript no. 85. Chaliyam: al-Maktaba 
al-Azha riyya.
al-Khazrajī, Shaykh ʿAlī ibn al-Ḥasan. 1911. Al-ʿUqūd al-Luʾluʾiyya fi Tārīkh al-Dawla al-
Rasūliyya. Edited by Shaykh Muḥammad Basyūnī ʿAsal. Egypt: Maṭbaʿat al-Hilāl.
Kooria, Mahmood. 2016. “Cosmopolis of Law: Islamic legal ideas and texts across the 
Indian Ocean and eastern Mediterranean worlds.” PhD diss., Leiden University.
Lambourn, E. 2008. “India from Aden”: Khutba and Muslim urban networks in late 
thirteenth-century India.” In Secondary Cities and Urban Networking in the Indian 
Ocean Realm c. 1400–1800, edited by K.R. Lanham Hall, 55–98. MD: Lexington.
al-Maʿbarī, ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz ibn Zayn ibn ʿAlī ibn Zayn al-Dīn Aḥmad. n.d. Maslak al-Atqiyāʾ 
wa Manhaj al-Aṣfiyāʾ fī Sharḥ Hidāyat al-Adhkiyāʾ ʾla Ṭarīq al-ʾAwliyāʾ. Calicut: 
Tirurangadi Books.
al-Maʿbarī, Shaykh Zayn al-Dīn ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz ibn Zayn al-Dīn ibn ʿAlī. n.d. Tuḥfat 
al-Mujāhidīn fī Baʿḍ Akhbār al-Burtughāliyyīn. Manuscript not numbered. Chaliyam: 
al-Maktaba al-Azhariyya. 
al-Maʿbarī, Shaykh Zayn al-Din ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz ibn Zayn al-Dīn ibn ʿAlī. 1931. Tuḥfat 
al-Mujāhidīn fī Baʿḍ Akhbār al-Burtughāliyyīn. Edited by Shams Allāh al-Qādirī. 
Hyderabad: Maṭbaʿt al-Tārīkh.
March, Andrew F. 2007. “Islamic foundations for a social contract in non-Muslim lib-
eral democracies.” American Political Science Review 101(2): 235–52.
McPherson, K. 1993. The Indian Ocean: A History of People and Sea. Delhi: Oxford 
University Press. 
Nainar, S. Muhammad Husayn. 2005. Shaykh Zainuddin Makhdum’s Tuḥfatul Mujāḥidīn: 
A Historical Epic of the Sixteenth Century. Translated from Arabic with Annotation 
by S. Muhammad Husayn Nainar. Calicut: Other Books.
Nambiar, O.K. 1863. The Kunjalis: Admirals of Calicut. Calcutta: Asia Publishing House. 
214 Jaleel P.k.m.
O’Brien, Peter. 2013. “Clashes within western civilization: debating citizenship for 
European Muslims.” Migration Studies 1(2): 131–55.
Pearson, M.N. 2003. The Indian Ocean. London: Routledge. 
Prange, Sebastian Raphael. 2008. “The social and economic organization of Muslim 
trading communities on the Malabar Coast, twelfth to sixteenth centuries.” PhD 
diss., University of London, SOAS.
Qiṣṣat Shakrwatī Farmāḍ. Manuscript, n.d. Nellikuth: Muḥammad ʿAlī Musli yār’s per-
sonal library. 
al-Ṣaghīr, Shaykh Aḥmad Zayn al-Dīn al-Makhdūm al-Malibārī. n.d. Al-Ajwiba al-ʿAjība 
ʿalā al-ʾAsʾila al-Gharība. no place: Kunhi Muhammad al-Kodanchery and V.K. 
Mūsān Kutty Musliyār.
al-Ṣaghīr, Shaykh Aḥmad Zayn al-Dīn. 2000. Fatḥ al-Muʿīn bi Sharḥ Qurrat al-ʿAyn, 
Tirūrangādi: Tirurangadi Book Stall.
al-Shāfiʿī, Aḥmad Shaykh Zayn al-Dīn ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz al-Maʿbarī al-Malibārī al-
Funnānī. 2006. Fatḥ al-Muʿīn bi Sharḥ Qurrat al-ʿAyn bi Muhimmāt al-Dīn. Calicut: 
Tirūrangādi Book Stall.
al-Sharawāni, ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd and al-ʿIbādī, Aḥmad ibn Qāsim. n.d. Ḥawāshī Tuḥfat al-
Minhāj bi Sharḥ al-Minhāj Ta⁠ʾlīf al-Imām Shihāb al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn Ḥajar al-Haytamī. 
Egypt: al-Maktaba al-Tujāriyya al-Kubrā.
Thackston, W.M. 1989. “Kamaluddin Abdul-Razzaq Samarqandi: Mission to Calicut 
and Vijayanagar.” In A Century of Princes: Sources of Timurid History and Art, edited 
by W.M. Thackston, 299–321. Cambridge: Agha Khan Program for Islamic 
Archi tecture.
Verskin, Alan. 2013. Oppressed in the Land: Fatwās on the Muslims Living under Non-
Muslim Rule from the Middle Ages to the Present. Princeton: Markus Wiener 
Publishers. 
Wazārat al-Awqāf wa al-Shuʾūn al-Islāmiyya. 1990. Al-Mawsūʿa al-Fiqhiyya. Vol. 20: 
201–219. Kuwait: Wazārat al-Awqāf wa al- Shuʾūn al-Islāmiyya. 
 215Index Index
Index
_full_alt_author_running_head (neem stramien B2 voor dit chapter en nul 0 in hierna): 0
_full_alt_articletitle_running_head (oude _articletitle_deel, vul hierna in): Index
_full_article_language: en
1951 Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees (Refugee Convention) 18
1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees 18
ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Adamī al-Miṣrī 206
ʿAbd al-Razzāq 200
ʿAbd al-Ra⁠ʾūf al-Wāʿiẓ al-Zamzamī 206
ʿAbd al-Wafā Shams al-Dīn 
Muḥammad 204, 208
ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz al-Makhdūm al-Maʿbarī 204, 
208
ʿĀbidín, Muḥammad Amīn Ibn 42
Abkhazia 159
abode of inequity 15
abode of Islam (see also dār al-Islām) 15, 
21–22, 156, 163, 203, 205, 209–210
abode of unbelievers (see also dār  
al-kufr) 15








advent of Portuguese 201, 203–204
Afghanistan 2–3, 18–19, 48, 175, 180–181
agency 8, 31–32, 34, 60, 68, 70, 73, 76, 79, 
81–84, 88, 96, 148, 167
ahl al-kitāb (People of the Book) 138









Alexandre, Emperor of Russia 164
Algeria 112, 144–145




amān (pledge of security or safe 
conduct) 19









Arabic literature of hijra 162
Arabic poem 203
Arab immigrants 11, 122, 196–197, 199, 201, 
203, 205, 207, 209, 211
Arab maritime networks 198
Arab Revolt 22
Arab traders 198, 202, 211
Arab world 37, 51, 112, 121, 123, 137, 145, 196
al-ʿArifī, Muḥammad 70
Asad, Talal 28–29, 38, 47
al-ʿĀṣ ibn al-Rabīʿ 20
Al-ʿĀshir 74
al-Ashraf II, Rasulid Sultan 200
al-Assad, President of Syria 48
asylum 2, 6–8, 19, 25, 35, 49, 51, 60, 123–124, 
175, 181, 183, 186, 213












Barzegar 7, 28, 30, 32, 34, 36, 38, 40, 42, 44, 
46, 127
Battle of Badr 14
© Ray Jureidini and Said F. Hassan, 2020 | doi:10.1163/9789004417342_013






bidūn (those without nationalities) 144
Bijapur 203–204












Canada 2, 88, 182, 185–186
Casanova, José 117
Caucasus 10, 143, 154–165, 167–171, 173
Çelik, Faruk 49
Central Asia 139, 143, 176, 179–180
central lands of Islam 197
Chad 18
Chaghatay 177
Chaliyam 199, 203–204, 208, 210






















contracts in Islamic law 99
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, 










Damascus 50, 56–59, 62, 74, 76, 159
dār al-daʿwa (abode of mission) 197, 209
dār al-fisq (abode of inequity) 15
dār al-ḥarb (abode of war) 1, 11, 21, 160, 
196–197
dār al-Islām (abode of Islam) 1, 11, 15, 21–24, 
138, 157, 161, 174, 197
dār al-kufr (abode of unbelief) 15, 21, 157, 
174, 209
dār al-ʿadl (abode of justice) 15














discourse on human rights 16
discourse on migration 16
discursive tradition 28–29, 38, 47, 53
displacement 18–19





Eastern Turkistan Republic (ETR) 178
East Turkistan see also Xinjiang, 174–175, 
178, 181–182, 184, 187, 192, 215
East-West trade 199
Egypt 8, 24, 67, 69, 71, 73–79, 81, 83, 85, 87, 





Erdoğan, Recep Tayyip, President of Turkey  
30, 48
ethical doctrines of Islam 196
ethic of conviction 9, 112–114, 125







Europe 2–5, 23, 28, 33, 53, 60, 86, 110, 116, 118, 








exploitation 6, 18, 69, 77, 81, 84–86, 88, 92, 
95–96, 104–105, 124





Fakhr al-Dīn bin Ramaḍān al-Shāliyāthī 206
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Qāḍī Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz 204
Muhammad, Prophet of Islam 3, 10, 14–15, 
20, 31, 48, 51–53, 58, 61, 63, 71, 136, 155, 158, 
164, 196, 201
Muhyiddīn Māla 205
mujāwir (servant of sanctuary) 20
multiculturalism 11, 55, 114, 120, 126–127, 191
Mūsā (Moses) 35




Muslim communities in the Indian 
Ocean 197
Muslim humanitarian sector 29, 33, 36, 38, 
41, 44
Muslim immigrants 122, 196–197, 211
Muslim localities 197
Muslim mountaineers 160, 163, 167, 170
Muslim peripheries 197
Muslim scholars 1, 4, 11, 68, 162, 196–197, 
202, 205, 208
Muslims in Calicut 200
Muslim World League 23, 182
musta⁠ʾman (person enjoying a protected 
status) 19




muʾākha (brotherhood) 15–16, 19, 23–25
Nahda Party 37
An-Naʿim, Abdullahi Ahmed 110, 128
Nakh 167
nationalism 7, 23–24, 62, 138, 181–182, 191
Nationalist Chinese 177
national separatism 184
nation-state 1, 4, 11, 22, 47–49, 51, 53–59, 
62–63, 68, 95, 115, 138, 142–143, 191, 196, 198, 
203, 211
naturalisation 1, 4, 9–11, 124, 136–138, 
140–151, 196–207, 209–211
naturalisation as a selective instrument 149
naturalisation through marriage 147
Nayar Cavalry of Zamorin 203





New York 10, 174, 183
NGO 33
Nicholas, Emperor of Russia 164
Niger 143
non-Muslim communities 35, 207




non-Muslim rulers 198, 201–205, 207–211
non-Muslim subjects 208
non-Muslim Zamorin 204–205
non-secular humanism 29–30, 33, 35, 41–42





Oman 2, 138, 145–146, 148
 221Index




orphans 31, 71–72, 78–79, 101
Oruc, Huseyin 32
Ottoman empire 164
Ottoman lands see also Ottoman empire, 
159, 162–163, 165–167, 170
The Overseas Development Institute 34
Pabst, Adriana 118
Pakistan 3, 18, 143, 145, 149, 175, 178, 180–181
Palestinian refugee crisis 19









People’s Republic of China (PRC). see China
peripheries 55, 196–199, 205–206, 210–211, 
220
Piché 115
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